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A B S T R A C T
In our society, nowadays pervaded by ICT, security services as authentication
and non-repudiation play a very important role. In some critical systems and
applications, in fact, it is mandatory that only authorized users are allowed to
have services and functionalities at their disposal, especially in working envi-
ronments where operators are in charge of analyzing sensitive data. Moreover,
it is also essential that once users or entities make use of critical services, taking
decisions for which they are directly responsible and which may have serious
implications on company’s assets or even citizen’s safety, cannot subsequently
deny their involvement. Nevertheless, in order to avoid possible intrusions, it
is fundamental that these two services are provided continuously, that is for
the whole session duration. In addition, they have to preserve usability and to
avoid disturbing the user activity, otherwise they may result ineffective or even
counter-productive.
This Thesis aims to provide a solution to the problem of continuous authen-
tication and describes the architecture design, protocol definition, prototyping
and implementation of a multi-biometric system meant for this purpose. A risk
assessment supports its design process from a security point of view, while an
extensive and sound testing campaign, conducted with the involvement of real
users, validates it from the usability perspective.
This work also coins the term continuous non-repudiation, and proposes three
alternative approaches for the seamless provision of this service. All of them
share a common multi-biometric identity verification core, while they differ
in terms of the way they technically address non-repudiation, as well as in
the architectures and protocols. In particular, each solution introduces an im-
provement constituted by digital signature, biometric signature, and blockchain
technology respectively. The latter, called Block-CNR, has been designed and
implemented after having evaluated the usefulness of distributed ledgers for
our purposes and takes into account also risks and common issues of adopting
this technology.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N , B A S I C S A N D S TAT E O F T H E A RT

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 motivation
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) pervades modern society
to the extent that we massively rely on it from private life to business. Today,
users and operators can share confidential data, perform financial transactions,
or remotely execute critical operations in real-time.
However, the need for security has gone hand in hand with the technological
progress, and our reliance on ICT strictly depends on it.
In many critical systems and applications, it is fundamental that only au-
thorized users are allowed to interact with a machine. In some working envi-
ronments, in fact, users are in charge of analyzing potentially sensitive data,
taking decisions they are directly responsible for, and which may have serious
implications on company’s assets or even on citizen’s safety. Their workstations
should be properly protected in order to prevent undesired consequences.
Authentication, which is intended to provide assurance in the identity claimed by
an entity, is the security service designed for this purpose. Traditional authenti-
cation approaches are knowledge-based and take advantage of passwords or
PINs; alternative solutions have been proposed, either possession-based (e.g.,
security token), or making use of biometric traits.
In all cases, when the identity verification is performed as a single occurrence
during the login phase, and no identity checks are performed during sessions,
unauthorized people may take physical control of the device. For instance, in
an office environment if a worker leaves the computer unattended without
logging out e.g., for a short break or to reach the printer, insiders may intervene
accessing, modifying or deleting sensitive information, or even introducing
vulnerabilities.
In order to address this issue, it is desirable to have user identity continuously
verified, for the whole duration of a session. However, repeatedly asking for
passwords and secrets over time, requires user active participation: it would
disturb operations and reduce system’s usability. It is well-known, in fact, that
usability and security are often seen as competing goals. Improving usability is
sometimes considered as improving vulnerabilities, to the extent that it has also
been perceived as helping the attacker.
Solutions based on biometric authentication have been proposed in the liter-
ature, and some have the potential to continuously verify the identity of the
user. Thanks to this approach, known as biometric continuous authentication, user
3
4identity verification is no longer a single occurrence, but a continuous process.
Furthermore, it is commonly agreed that the use of multiple biometric traits,
properly combined, can improve the performance of the identity verification
process. In addition, appropriate sensors, together with specific design choices,
permit to acquire biometric traits transparently, i.e., without the active involve-
ment of the user.
However, there is a real lack of studies with emphasis and focus on end-users.
In fact, the evaluation of a proposed system or framework is often conducted
as a simulation, rarely with human involvement, and almost never through a
proper usability assessment. Nevertheless, in our opinion, when introducing
a new approach, it is fundamental to address not only technical issues, but to
consider also the effects of this innovation on humans, on their thoughts, and
perceptions.
Therefore, a proper usability testing campaign may combine measurements on
effectiveness and efficiency of the system with an analysis of user satisfaction,
e.g., through interviews or questionnaires.
Authentication is not the only security service which plays a very important
role in critical ICT services. The ability to demonstrate that users or entities
requested specific functionalities, or performed certain actions, among other
abilities, is also very useful. In fact, when a dispute arises or an error occurs,
people may attempt to deny their involvement, and to repudiate their behavior.
For instance, customers may disclaim a withdrawal from their account, or a
payment with their own credit card, when they actually did it.
In addition to users denying their usage of a service, there have been cases of
malicious operators or disreputable service providers. These two are both cases
of repudiation, which can be defined as the denial of having participated in –
all or part of – an action, by one of the entities involved.
Non-repudiation, consequently, is the ability to protect against such denial.
A non-repudiation mechanism has to provide evidences in order to clarify
responsibilities, and to guarantee the establishment of the facts, if necessary,
even in front of a court of law. Therefore, a non-repudiation service can be
useful both as a mean to obtain accountability, and as a deterrent for deliberate
misbehaviors. In the two situations previously reported, a non-repudiation
mechanism would prevent that the fraudulent customer succeeds in denying a
transaction, or would help an innocent client to protect his investments.
In the literature, the problem of repudiation has been mainly tackled in the
electronic transactions context. A transaction is a one-shot information exchange,
which can be defined as transferring of a message from A to B. Transactions’
security is useful in digital contract signing, e-commerce, or electronic voting,
in which communicating parties may try to cheat each other. The issue of
transactions’ non-repudiation is usually addressed exploiting digital signatures.
In order to perform a digital signature, users need to keep secret of their private
5key. It can be stored in a computer, or more frequently in a smart card or USB
device, and protected by a secret (password, or PIN). Items and secrets must not
be stolen, lost or forgotten. But what happens if the information that needs to
be signed, is not a single transaction, but a continuous information flow? For
instance, the access to the private area on a web service for online banking, or
VoIP calls in case of verbal contracts signing, and so on, are different scenarios
which may benefit from non-repudiation. Asking for the password or secret for
each single transaction would drastically reduce the usability of the service, and
may end up frustrating the user. Conversely, requesting the secret only at the
first login does not guarantee authenticity of the user for the whole session. For
applications in which the communication is confidential, or involves information
regarding assets which need to be protected with high assurance, authentication
has to be repeated frequently. Otherwise, insiders may be able to interfere, taking
advantage of the parties, or causing errors and consequent disputes hard to be
solved.
In those cases, new solutions are necessary in order to provide a non-repudiation
service for the entire duration of the session. Therefore, there is a need for a
continuous non-repudiation service. Many research questions arise here. Can
continuous authentication mechanisms be complemented with non-repudiation?
Does biometric authentication provide sufficient and undeniable evidence of
user’s participation in an action? And then, thanks to the recent technological
advancements, – e.g., the introduction of distributed ledgers – , is it possible to
reinforce the traditional non-repudiation solutions?
1.2 contribution and thesis organization
Part I In the first part of the Thesis, we introduce basic concepts regarding
dependability and security, as well as fundamentals of authentication,
and non-repudiation. Then, targeting a continuous authentication system
that is both usable and incurs in little system overhead, we address the
discipline of biometrics, and review the state of the art, comparing the
most relevant multi-biometric solutions from academia and in commerce.
Part II In the second part, we perform a risk assessment of an interesting state-
of-the-art approach. The assessment is part of a design and requirements
definition process, and is performed in order to guide the development
of our own authentication and non-repudiation solutions. We propose a
multi-biometric continuous authentication mechanism, which integrates
face, fingerprint and keystroke recognitions, and removes the necessity of
conscious human-computer interactions. Data is transparently acquired
by the workstation and transmitted to an authentication server, which
performs the identity verification. In case of successful verification, the
authentication server permits the establishment of a user session. Then it
6calculates and updates a trust level that decreases as time passes; the ses-
sion expires when such level becomes lower than a predefined threshold.
We evaluate the system through a usability testing campaign, involving a
population of 60 users selected amongst academia. We devise experiments
where participants are asked to perform different office processing tasks.
We collect users’ feedbacks regarding system usability and their satisfac-
tion.
During the tests, we also measured the acceptance and rejection rates of the
face, fingerprint and keystroke subsystems, and of the integrated system,
to evaluate the effectiveness of the authentication solution. Furthermore,
we considered system efficiency measuring the time interval during which
a legitimate user remains authenticated, and the window of time needed
by the system to reject an impostor.
Finally, the trade-off between usability and security is quantified. Results
show that even taking into account usability as a primary goal, security of
users’ workstations is increased. We publish a repository of the log files
recorded by the system, which, as far as we know, is the first public dataset
on logs of a continuous authentication service available to researchers.
The supplementary data consists also in detailed questionnaire results
regarding user satisfaction.
Part III In the last part of the Thesis, we address the problem of continuous non-
repudiation through multi-biometric continuous verification of identities.
The idea is to introduce, in the architecture of our continuous authen-
tication solutions, the modifications needed to provide also continuous
non-repudiation.
We propose three alternative solutions: the first two are respectively called
DS-CNR (Digital Signature based Continuous Non-Repudiation), and BS-CNR
(Biometric Signature based Continuous Non-Repudiation). They mainly dif-
fer in the generation and handling of the cryptographic keys and in the
underlying architecture. We assume that the communications between
the entities are encrypted, and the involved third parties are trustable.
Under the stated assumptions, both solutions offer a non-repudiation
service for a continuous information flow scenario between a client and
a remote internet service, protecting both parties for the whole duration
of the session. We also discuss the technological readiness of biometrics
to offer non-repudiability. We show that algorithms that possess high
verification accuracy already exist in the literature. In our opinion, if those
algorithms are properly integrated in a multi-biometric system, and possi-
bly coupled with other security mechanism, biometrics is ready to offer
non-repudiation.
Finally, after the birth of blockchain, which has recently spread to the
extent that resembles a real fever, we investigate if it can provide advan-
7tages in offering a non-repudiation service (e.g., reducing the number of
third parties to trust), and we show which of its multiple configurations
would better fit. For this purpose, we propose a methodology for the
requirements-driven selection and configuration of blockchains. We also
perform a risk assessment in order to be aware of its threats and to identify
existing countermeasures.
After these steps, we introduce the third version of the continuous non-
repudiation protocol, named Block-CNR (Blockchain based Continuous Non-
Repudiation), which benefits from the properties provided by the dis-
tributed ledger technology, as immutability, transparency and intrinsic
non-repudiability. We also show, with an implementation, that creating a
blockchain, and configuring it for the storage of non-repudiation evidences,
is actually feasible.

2
D E P E N D A B L E A N D S E C U R E S Y S T E M S
This Chapter describes the context in which the work concerning this Thesis
has been developed. Section 2.1 explains what a dependable and secure system
is; Sections 2.2, and 2.3 respectively provide the basic terminology and con-
cepts regarding threats and means to attain dependability and security. Finally,
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively introduce authentication and non-repudiation,
two security services particularly relevant for this Thesis, and the traditional
approaches to provide them.
2.1 dependability, security and their attributes
According to the taxonomy of [1], a system is an entity that interacts with other
entities, i.e., other systems, including hardware, software, humans, and the
physical world. The service delivered by a system is its behavior as it is perceived
by its user(s); a user is another system that receives service from the provider.
A system may sequentially or simultaneously be a provider and a user with
respect to another system, i.e., deliver service to and receive service from that
other system.
2.1.1 Basic Definitions and Attributes
The original definition of dependability [1] is:
Definition 1. The ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted.
This definition stresses the need for justification of trust. An alternate defini-
tion proposed in [1], that provides the criterion for deciding if the service is
dependable, is the the following.
Definition 2. Dependability of a system is the ability to avoid service failures that are
more frequent and more severe than is acceptable.
As reported in [1], other different definitions of dependability exist in the
standards. The the ISO definition [2], clearly centred upon availability, is:
Definition 3. The collective term used to describe the availability performance and its in-
fluencing factors: reliability performance, maintainability performance and maintenance
support performance.
Instead, the IEC defines deependability as [3]:
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Definition 4. The extent to which the system can be relied upon to perform exclusively
and correctly the system task(s) under defined operational and environmental conditions
over a defined period of time, or at a given instant of time.
As developed over the past decades, dependability is an integrating concept that
encompasses the following attributes:
• Availability: readiness for correct service;
• Reliability: continuity of correct service;
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the envi-
ronment;
• Integrity: absence of improper system alterations;
• Maintainability: ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
When addressing security, an additional attribute which has great prominence
is:
• Confidentiality: the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information.
Security has not been characterized as a single attribute of dependability. In fact,
it is a composite of the attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability,
requiring the concurrent existence of availability for authorized actions only,
confidentiality, and integrity with improper meaning unauthorized [1]. Figure 1
summarizes the relationship between dependability and security in terms of
their principal attributes. This is in agreement with the usual definitions of
security [4, 5], that propose it as a composite notion, namely:
Definition 5. The combination of confidentiality, the prevention of the unauthorized
disclosure of information, integrity, the prevention of the unauthorized amendment or
deletion of information, and availability, the prevention of the unauthorized withholding
of information.
The unified definition for security in [1] is:
Definition 6. The absence of unauthorized access to, or handling of, system state.
The attributes of dependability and security that have been defined in this Section
may be of varying importance depending on the application intended for the
given computing system: availability, integrity, and maintainability are generally
required, although to a varying degree depending on the application, whereas
reliability, safety, and confidentiality may or may not be required according
to the application. The extent to which a system possesses the attributes of
dependability and security should be considered in a relative, probabilistic,
sense, and not in an absolute, deterministic sense: due to the unavoidable
presence or occurrence of faults, systems are never totally available, reliable,
safe, or secure [1].
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Figure 1: Dependability and security attributes and their relationship. [1]
Secondary Attributes
Besides the attributes defined and discussed above in this Section, other, sec-
ondary, attributes can be defined, which refine or specialize the primary at-
tributes. The notion of secondary attributes is especially relevant for security,
and is based on distinguishing among various types of information. Examples
of such secondary attributes, which are particularly relevant for the purpose of
this Thesis, are [1]
• Accountability: availability and integrity of the identity of the person who
performed an operation;
• Authenticity: integrity of a message content and origin, and possibly of
some other information, such as the time of emission;
• Non-repudiability: availability and integrity of the identity of the sender of a
message (non-repudiation of the origin), or of the receiver (non-repudiation
of reception1).
2.2 threats to dependability and security : faults , errors , fail-
ures
Correct service is delivered when the service implements the system function.
On the contrary, a failure, is an event that occurs when the delivered service
deviates from correct service, as shown in Figure 2. A service fails either because
it does not comply with the functional specification, or because this specification
did not adequately describe the system function.
A service failure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service, i.e.,
to a state that does not implement the system function. The period of delivery
of incorrect service is a service outage. The transition from incorrect service to
correct service is a service restoration. The deviation from correct service may
assume different forms that are called service failure modes and are ranked
according to failure severities [1].
1 sometimes referred as non-repudiation of destination
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Figure 2: Error Propagation scheme.
Since a service is a sequence of the system’s external states, a service failure
means that at least one (or more) external state of the system deviates from
the correct service state. The deviation is called an error. The adjudged or
hypothesized cause of an error is called a fault. Faults can be internal or external
of a system. The prior presence of a vulnerability, i.e., an internal fault that
enables an external fault to harm the system, is necessary for an external fault
to cause an error and possibly subsequent failure(s). In most cases, a fault first
causes an error in the service state of a component that is a part of the internal
state of the system and the external state is not immediately affected.
For this reason, the definition of an error is the part of the total state of the
system that may lead to its subsequent service failure. It is important to note
that many errors do not reach the system’s external state and cause a failure. A
fault is active when it causes an error, otherwise it is dormant.
When the functional specification of a system includes a set of several func-
tions, the failure of one or more of the services implementing the functions may
leave the system in a degraded mode that still offers a subset of needed services
to the user. The specification may identify several such modes, e.g., slow service,
limited service, emergency service, etc. A such system is said having suffered a
partial failure of its functionality or performance.
2.2.1 Faults and Errors Classification
All faults that may affect a system during its life are classified according to eight
basic viewpoints, leading to the elementary fault classes, as shown in Figure 3. If
all combinations of the eight elementary fault classes were possible, there would
be 256 different combined fault classes. However, not all criteria are applicable
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Figure 3: The main fault classes. [1]
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Figure 4: The AVI model. Image reworked from [103]
to all fault classes; for example, natural faults cannot be classified by objective,
intent, and capability. Possible combined fault classes are shown to belong to
three major partially overlapping groupings:
• development faults that include all fault classes occurring during develop-
ment;
• physical faults that include all fault classes that affect hardware;
• interaction faults that include all external faults.
Knowledge of all possible fault classes allows the user to decide which classes
should be included in a dependability and security specification.
2.2.2 Security Terminology and the Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Intrusions (AVI)
Model
As discussed so far, the potential causes of unexpected behaviors that may make
a system undependable are: faults, errors and failures. In particular, considering
security, it is possible to devise a specialization of the fault-error-failure chain, the
so-called Attack-Vulnerability-Intrusion (AVI) fault model, shown in Figure 4. In
this Section, we describe the AVI model and introduce some terminology that
will be useful throughout the Thesis. Some concepts will be further addressed
in specific Chapters.
Such model considers vulnerabilities as internal and dormant faults, introduced
either at design stage or during system operation. According to [7], a vulnerabil-
ity is a flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and
management that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy.
Attacks are malicious faults, typically external and generated with the aim of
exploiting one or more vulnerabilities of the system. In [7], an attack is defined
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Figure 5: The CIA triad: dependability attributes involving security. [7]
as an assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat; that is, an
intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or
technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system.
A successful attack provokes an intrusion, which generally is characterized
by an erroneous state of the system (e.g., the attacker obtains an unjustified
permission to access some system configuration file). Without countermeasures in
place, capable of coping with the intrusion, a failure in the system is likely to
occur.
The dependability attributes involving security – often referred as CIA triad,
as shown in Figure 5– can be threaten by different kinds of attack, attributable
to the following four main categories [7, 8]:
• disclosure: unauthorized access to information (e.g., exposure, interception,
inference, intrusion);
• deception: acceptance of false data (e.g., masquerade, falsification, repudia-
tion);
• disruption: interruption or prevention of correct operation (e.g., incapacita-
tion, corruption, obstruction);
• usurpation: unauthorized control of some part of a system (e.g., misappro-
priation, misuse).
However, it is necessary to specify that some attacks can have consequences
belonging to multiple categories contemporaneously.
Sometimes, the consequences we just mentioned could be not the result of a
deliberate attempt from an attacker, but come from environmental characteristics.
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Under different circumstances, the threat comes from the legitimate user: this
takes the name of insider threat [104, 105].
After this brief overview on the threats to dependability and security, it is
useful to discuss some countermeasures which can reduce the vulnerability
in a system. In the following, we refer to both general strategies and specific
mechanisms particularly relevant for the Thesis.
2.3 the means to attain dependability and security
Over the course of the past decades, many means have been developed to
attain the various attributes of dependability and security. Those means can be
grouped into four major categories:
• Fault prevention means to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults.
• Fault tolerance means to avoid service failures in the presence of faults.
• Fault removal means to reduce the number and severity of faults.
• Fault forecasting means to estimate the present number, the future incidence,
and the likely consequences of faults.
Fault prevention and fault tolerance aim to provide the ability to deliver a
service that can be trusted, while fault removal and fault forecasting aim to reach
confidence in that ability by justifying that the functional and the dependability
and security specifications are adequate and that the system is likely to meet
them.
Security Policies
A security policy can be considered a mean to obtain dependability and security.
According to [7], it is a set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a
system or organization provides security services to protect sensitive and critical
system resources. In [1] a security policy is a set of security-motivated constraints,
that organizations or systems (e.g., computer systems) have to adhere to.
The enforcement of such rules, practices and constraints may be via technical,
management, and/or operational controls, and the policy may lay down how
these controls are to be enforced. In practice, there may be a hierarchy of security
policies, related to a hierarchy of systems, for example. If presence of different
security issues, there may be separate but related policies, e.g., a policy regarding
the controlled public disclosure of company information, one on physical and
networked access to the company’s computers. Some computer security policies
include constraints on how information may flow within a system as well as
constraints on system states.
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Dependability and security classes are generally defined via the analysis of
failure frequencies and severities, and of outage durations, for the attributes that
are of concern for a given application. This analysis may be conducted directly
or indirectly via risk assessment (this concept, particularly relevant for the Thesis,
will be further addressed in Section 5.1).
The variations in the emphasis placed on the different attributes directly
influence the balance of the techniques (fault prevention, tolerance, removal, and
forecasting) to be employed in order to make the resulting system dependable
and secure. This problem is all the more difficult as some of the attributes are
conflicting (e.g., availability and safety, security and usability), necessitating that
trade-offs be made.
Security Services and Mechanisms
In [7], a security mechanism is described as a mechanism that is designed to detect,
prevent, or recover from an attack. Thus it can be seen as a mean specifically
directed to external faults.
A security service, instead, enhances the security of the data processing systems
and the information transfers of an organization. The services are intended to
counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more security mechanisms
to provide the service.
According to the standards ITU-T, Rec. X.800 [106] and IETF RFC 2828 [107],
the data security is pursued by assuring, among others, the following services:
authentication, and non-repudiation.
2.4 authentication
2.4.1 Definitions and Approaches
Authentication can be defined as the process that provides assurance in the
claimed identity of an entity [38]. Authenticating a user or an application thus
means verifying their authenticity property. This is possible thanks to a piece of
information typically called authentication factor [39]. In literature, many types
of authentication factors have been proposed, and they are usually divided in
the following three categories:
• Knowledge factors: something the user knows (e.g., passwords, PINs).
• Possession factors: something the user has (e.g., passports, private keys,
security tokens).
• Inherence factors: something the user is or does (e.g., physiological or
behavioral biometrics).
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This process is composed of two consecutive steps: registration (or enrollment)
and verification. Registration consists in storing an authentication factor associ-
ated with the user identity, and which will be verified in the subsequent step
(on verification).
Traditionally, most of the access controls in ICT – as login operations for ac-
cessing Internet services or local devices – are performed through a knowledge
factor. This is probably because of simplicity, as it can be easily implemented
through software, without the need for specific hardware or sensors. In those
cases, however, the chosen password impacts on the dependability of the authen-
tication; for some scenarios, a normal password that the user is able to remember,
can be enough. In fact, many users choose memorable words or alphanumeric
identifiers, e.g., proper names or birth dates of their relatives, of celebrities, or
nouns that can be found on a dictionary. However, those choices are probably
the worst from a security point of view: guessing the noun, or trying with a
brute force strategy (as in the dictionary attack) may lay the foundations for a
successful spoofing. Moreover, many users choose the same password for ac-
cessing several different services, and, consequently, a successful attack could
mean several intrusions. In order to solve this problem, a long and complex
password may be sufficient; however, it becomes hard to remember and the user
is often forced to write or copy it somewhere (typically, on a post-it attached
on the screen). In this situation, it is necessary to protect the location where
the credentials are stored, which means simply displace the problem elsewhere.
Another limitation of knowledge factors appears when the secret is intercepted
or deduced: the system cannot verify if the user is actually the legitimate one or
not, and repudiating actions performed by and intruder becomes very difficult.
The so-called object-based authentication constitutes a viable alternative and
exploits the possession of physical objects from the user. It is mainly adopted
in governmental or financial applications, which for instance make use of
badges, tokens, credit cards, licence, passports, and so on. The main issue of
this approach is represented by the possibility that those objects can be lost or,
even worse, stolen, thus preventing the system from granting authenticity and
non-repudiation properties.
Combining multiple traditional authentication factors, gives rise to the so-
called strong authentication, which is quite common, e.g., for cash withdrawals at
the automated teller machine (ATM): only customers in possession of the card
and having knowledge of the corresponding PIN are able of performing the
financial transactions.
The third family of factors that can be used for authentication are biometric
data, typically diffused in application domains as forensic science, medical,
or criminal investigation. In the last decade, biometric sensors have also been
integrated in common notebooks and smart phones, and consequently the
number of application scenarios is growing. The main advantages of biometric
traits in comparison with other authentication factors are the following: they are
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hard to be copied or shared, cannot be lost or forgotten and normally they need
the user to be physically present at the moment when, and in the place where,
the authentication is being performed.
Authentication Protocols: Static, Robust and Continuous
Together with the type of authentication factor used, taxonomy of authentication
includes static, robust, and continuous authentication, depending on the sustaining
protocol [40]. An authentication protocol is [39]: a defined sequence of messages
between an entity and a verifier that enables the verifier to corroborate the
entity’s identity.
Authentication is said to be static when a specific factor (as a password) is not
modified from one login session to another, and consequently can be used more
than once; this protects the system from attacks in which the intruder does not
know, or does not possess the information needed to complete the verification
process. Traditional mechanisms based on passwords, exploits protocols of this
family, which security directly depends on how hard is to guess the password
or how effectively it is protected.
An additional category consists in the so-called robust authentication proto-
cols, based on dynamic factors, which vary from one session to another, and,
therefore, are valid just once. A classical example is a dynamic key as OTP
(One-Time Password), which prevents an attacker from accessing the system,
even obtaining the credentials: they will not be usable anymore after the first
login has been performed. Users cannot memorize and reuse OTPs – they are
typically generated by specific devices, as tokens, or trusted mobile applications;
consequently, robust authentication protocols are mainly object-based. However,
once the user is authenticated, either statically or dynamically, he/she obtains
full access to the system for the whole duration of a session, which terminates
only with an explicit logout or after an idle activity period. A problem that can
arise, and that continuous authentication intends to address, is thus the situation
in which a user leaves the device unattended, even for a short break, without
logging out: an intruder may intervene and take over confidential resources,
undermining the system, its integrity and availability. In some cases, the user
identity has to be verified so frequently as the access to confidential resources is
granted [41], [19].
In a continuous authentication protocol, the system constantly and repeatedly
requests the authentication factor(s) necessary to confirm the identity of the
entity which is being authenticated.
Authentication factors, which for their own nature are most suitable for
continuous authentication are biometric traits, because by mean of specific
sensors, they can be acquired in an implicit way. For example, let us consider
a system which every thirty seconds asks the user to enter a password or a
code written on an badge: this procedure hinders the user from carrying out
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the activities and forces him/her to actively and repeatedly participate in the
authentication procedure.
2.5 non-repudiation
In this Section, we present some basic concepts dealing with non-repudiation,
its goal and the traditional mechanism used to provide it.
Together with authentication, also the ability to demonstrate that users or
entities requested specific services, or performed certain actions, is useful. In
fact, when a dispute arises or an error occurs people may attempt to deny
their involvement and to repudiate their behavior. For instance, customers may
disclaim a withdrawal from their account, or a payment with their own credit
card that they actually did. According to The New York Times, 0.05 percent of
MasterCard transactions worldwide are subjects of disputes, which probably
means around 15 million questionable charges per year [51]. In addition to users
denying their usage of a service, there have been cases of malicious operators
or disreputable service providers. One example is a fraudulent or inaccurate
web service for stock trading: a broker is instructed by a customer to buy or sell
stocks, or to follow a particular investment strategy, but retards the process in
order to help other investors have their trades executed quickly [52], causing a
consistent loss of money for the client. Then, the trader denies the involvement.
2.5.1 Definitions and Typical Approach
The two above are both examples of repudiation, which can be defined as the
denial of having participated in all or part of an action by one of the entities
involved [53]. Consequently, non-repudiation is the ability to protect against such
denial. A non-repudiation mechanism has to provide evidences in order to
clarify responsibilities and guarantee the establishment of the facts even in front
of a court of law. Therefore, a non-repudiation service can be useful both as a
mean to obtain accountability as well as a deterrent for deliberate misbehaviours.
In the two situations reported above, a such mechanism would prevent that
the fraudulent customer succeeds in denying a transaction, or would help an
innocent client to protect his investments.
Non-repudiation provides the capability to determine whether a given indi-
vidual or entity took a particular action [54]. Referring to secondary attributes
of dependability and security, it can be seen as the ability to provide non-
repudiability property as defined in [1] and already introduced in Section 2.1.1.
This property has been presented in the context of message exchange, but it
– and consequently non-repudiation services– can be useful also in different
contexts. Typically, non-repudiation protects individuals against:
i) authors, repudiating having authored particular documents;
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Figure 6: Traditional non-repudiation approaches for the transaction scenario. Image
adapted from ([56]).
ii) messages senders, denying having transmitted messages;
iii) messages receivers, denying messages reception;
iv) signatories, repudiating their signature on documents.
Thus, non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information origi-
nated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g.,
send an email, sign a contract, approve a procurement request), or received
specific information [54].
The goal of the non-repudiation service is to generate, collect, maintain, make
available and validate evidence concerning a claimed event or action in order to
resolve disputes about the occurrence or no occurrence of the event or action.
Such evidence is an essential object, and may be produced either directly by an
end entity, or involving a Trusted Third Party (TTP) [56]. In order to obtain non-
repudiation services, organizations employ various techniques or mechanisms;
the most common is digital signature [57].
Regarding transactions, assuming that an entity A wishes to send a message
M to entity B, typical disputes that may arise are 6:
- Repudiation of Origin. B claims that it received M from A, while A denies
sending it;
- Repudiation of Delivery. A claims that it has sent M to B, while B denies
having received it.
Then, we also mention two additional disputes that may exist in case a delivery
authority is involved: Repudiation of Submission and Repudiation of Transmis-
sion [56]. According to the existing ISO/IEC standard, two different mechanisms
for non-repudiation are distinguished [56]. A NRO (Non-Repudiation of Origin)
token is used to provide protection against A’s false denial of having originated
the message. It is generated by A (or by the TTP), sent by A to B, and stored
by B after verification of its validity. An NRD (Non-Repudiation of Delivery)
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token, instead, is used to provide protection against the B’s false denial of hav-
ing received and recognized the content of the message. It is generated by B
(or by the TTP), sent to A, and stored by A after verification of its validity. If
TTP is involved (optional), it must keep all NRO tokens generated and record
whether or not each NRO token is used to generate a NRD token. For electronic
transactions, the evidences (non-repudiation tokens) are created using digital
signatures. A knows its own public key certificate and the associated private
key, B knows its own public key certificate and associated private key, and the
corresponding public key certificates are available to all the entities concerned
[56].
3
I N T R O D U C T I O N T O B I O M E T R I C S
This Chapter provides basic concepts about biometrics, starting from its def-
inition, in Section 3.1. Then, Section 3.2 briefly introduces the most common
physical and behavioural biometric modalities and their attributes. To conclude
the Chapter, Section 3.3 presents biometric systems: how they are employed
for user authentication, the accuracy and error metrics, as well as the typical
sources of error that have to be faced.
3.1 origins and definition
The term biometrics derives from the ancient Greek words (métron), and (bíos),
and literally means measure of life. Although this discipline became known
in the 19th century for its usage in the judicial and forensic fields [10, 12, 16],
today it is widely used for people recognition in a relatively large number of
applications, also because dedicated sensors have been recently integrated into
many commercial devices as notebooks and smartphones.
Biometrics is defined by the ISO1 as: "automatic recognition of individuals
based on their biological and behavioral charachteristics" [17].
3.2 biometric traits and their attributes
In this Section, we first present attributes of biometric traits and systems. Then,
there is a brief description of some the traits which are currently the most used
for recognition of individuals. A detailed analysis of all the possible biometric
modalities is out of the scope of this Thesis: the interested reader is referred to
[11].
It is impossible to determine whether exists and which is the very best
biometric trait for the aim of recognition. However, the following is a list of
requirements that each trait should possess and which may help a designer of a
recognition system in choosing the most appropriate traits for its purpose [10].
• Universality: ideally, everyone should have the trait;
• Distinctiveness or Uniqueness: the trait is sufficiently different from one
person to another;
1 International Organization for Standardization
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• Permanence: the trait is sufficiently invariant, with respect to the matching
criterion, over a period of time, otherwise becomes unusable for recognition
algorithms;
• Collectability or Measurability: the trait can be acquired and measured
quantitatively, without the need of sophisticated sensors;
There are also requirements and issues, often depending on the traits em-
ployed, that practical biometric recognition systems should address, including
[10]:
• Performance: which refers to the recognition accuracy, and occasionally also
to speed, and the resources required to achieve the desired recognition
accuracy;
• Acceptability: indicates the extent to which people are willing to accept to
be subject to recognition of a specific biometric trait, or to use it in their
lives;
• Circumvention: which refers to the easiness in fooling the system by fraudu-
lent methods like physical biometric traits reconstruction - e.g. fake fingers
- or by imitation of user behaviour.
The list of biometric traits usable for recognition is very long; some of them
have been studied since the nineteenth century, others in the last thirty years,
and others have arisen more recently. In the following, we present a selection of
some of the most relevant traits, exposing their main characteristics, highlighting
their main strengths and weaknesses [10, 12, 13, 15].
Face is a biometric characteristic that we all use in our everyday life for people
identification and is probably the most used in biometric recognition systems.
The trait is characterized by a set of macro elements (as mouth, nose, eyes, lips,
etc.), information regarding their dimensions, and relations between them. Face
recognition is a non-intrusive method, which can be static, e.g., using videos or
pictures, or dynamic, by means of a real-time scanning.
Fingerprint has been employed in recognition since the past century thanks
to this trait’s high accuracy. A fingerprint, as for the palm print, is a set of
ridges and valleys present in the surface of the fingers, whose information is
determined during the first seven months of fetal development. In addition,
fingerprints of identical twins are different as well as the prints on each finger
of the same person.
A modern fingerprint recognition system, if based on a relatively economical
sensor, is capable of recognizing accurately few hundred users. In order to
identify people on a larger scale (as millions of users), a smart strategy employs
more than a single fingerprint for each individual.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) An eye with the iris highlighted. [42] (b) Picture of a retina. [43]
Keystroke, sometimes also known as keystroke dynamics, has been shown to
be a behavioral biometric trait employable for user recogntion in the last decades
(e.g., by [44] in 1990). In fact, the rhythm with which a user presses and releases
the keys, even if it has not a high uniqueness, permits to create a template for user
identity verification. This trait can be monitored in a non-intrusive way, while
the person is using the keyboard, and it favours the continuous verification.
However, keystroke recognition systems are not considered the most accurate.
Voice is a biometric trait which combines physiological and behavioral traits
and is based on the shape and size of the appendages (e.g., vocal tracts, mouth,
nasal cavities, and lips) that are used in the synthesis of the sound. These
physiological characteristics of human speech are invariant for an individual,
but the behavioral part of the speech of a person changes over time due to age,
medical conditions (such as a common cold), emotional state, etc. There are
voice/speech recognition systems capable of recognizing the words, and others
whose goal is the speaker identification.
Iris is the 11mm annular coloured region of the eye, bounded by the pupil
and the sclera (the white part of the eye). The visual texture of the iris is formed
during fetal development and stabilizes during the first two years of life. The
complex iris texture carries very distinctive information useful for personal
recognition. Each iris is distinctive and, like fingerprints, even the irises of
identical twins are different.
Retina is a vasculature with a very rich structure, possesses a high distinc-
tiveness and is hard to change or be replicated. Experiments showed that also
identical twins present different vascular patterns.
Measurements regarding the human hand geometry, which normally are em-
ployed for recognition, are: shape, size of palm, lengths and widths of the fingers.
Although those measurements do not significantly vary from an individual to
another, commercial hand geometry-based verification systems have been in-
stalled in hundreds of locations around the world. As for the other traits, it
has its own advantages and weaknesses. It is a simple technique, not intrusive,
easy and cheap to use. In addition, its accuracy in verification is not influenced
by environmental factors, as the weather, or factors like dryness of the skin.
Nevertheless, one of the main drawbacks of this modality is that it is hard to be
embedded in other devices, because of the physical size.
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: (a) Analysis of hand geometry. [45] (b) Palmprint. [46]
Palmprint of the human hands, similar to fingerprint, contains pattern of
ridges and valleys, some of which are determined during the first weeks of
pregnancy, and others appear at the birth. Some of the characteristics are genetic,
some are not, and are different even between identical twins. The palmprint
area is larger than the area of a finger, therefore, this means that palmprints
have even higher distinctiveness than fingerprints. However, on the other side,
palmprint scanners need to capture a larger area, so they are not easy do be
embedded and usually more expensive than other sensors.
DeoxyriboNucleic Acid (DNA) is well known for being used in the context of
forensic applications for person recognition. It can be considered one of the
most accurate traits, taking into account that the probability of two individuals
having the same DNA sequence is lower than 1 on 100 millions (except for the
fact that identical twins have identical DNA patterns). However, it is not often
used in applications different from forensics, considering that:
• it is relatively easy to obtain the DNA of a subject without his/her permis-
sion, and this can facilitate the masquerading.
• it is difficult to imagine an application in the field of real-time and auto-
matic verification of individuals, because it usually needs quite complex
chemical methods, as well as advanced tools and knowledge in order to
be analyzed and compared;
• for ethical and privacy reasons, because it can bring information as suscep-
tibilities of a person to certain diseases, and it could be somehow abused
or result in discrimination.
Vital Parameters have been studied in literature as biometric traits which can
be applied for human recognition. An example is monitoring heart rate from
the ECG. Recognizing and classifying the heartbeat are extremely useful for
medical purposes, but can be a viable solution also for recognition, because the
geometric and physiological differences of human heart of different subjects
also impact, with a certain uniqueness, the heart signals.
Gait is a quite complex behavioural trait and consists in the way an individual
walks, runs, goes up and down the stairs, or moves in descent. Gait acquisition
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Figure 9: (a) Gait analysis. [47] (b) Skeleton for movement template generation. [48]
is usually done with the video-sequence footage of a walking person or with
accelerometers placed on the body to register the activity of the subject. Gener-
alizing, gait analysis can be considered one of recognition methods of human
activities belonging to the so-called activity-related biometrics, which is based on
complex body movements as moving, picking up an object, which are performed
by everybody with their own style and personal behavior. It is possible to track,
with the help of specific sensors, trajectories of body movements (e.g., head and
hands), and generate a template of a subject performing a specific action, (as
shown in Figure 9 (b)), for the purpose of authentication.
The handwritten signature is a well known, and highly adopted, behavioural
trait which consists in the way a person signs his or her name. The weaknesses
of this trait are multiple: it requires a contact and a conscious effort by the user,
it changes over a period of time and is influenced by physical and emotional
conditions of the individual. In addition, signatures of some people vary sub-
stantially. Further, professional forgers may be able to reproduce signatures
that fool the system. However, it has been accepted in government, legal, and
commercial transactions as a method suitable for verification.
The way a user interacts with the touchscreen of a smartphone can be consid-
ered a behavioral biometric modality. In fact, acquiring the basic movements –
such as scrolling in different directions – has shown useful for the system to
recognize the users. The accuracy of recognition does not seem very high to let
this trait employable for authentication; however, it could be integrated with
other characteristics in a multi-biometric system.
3.3 biometric systems
A biometric system is nothing more than a pattern recognition system that com-
pares the biometric trait of a user with a previously acquired and stored version
of the same trait.
The first step consists in a registration, also known as enrollment, of the user;
he/she presents a biometric trait to the sensor capable of extracting the main
features and storing their digital representation in a database. The scanning of
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Figure 10: A typical biometric verification process.
raw data with sensors may be repeated until the quality of information is not ad-
equate. Subsequent steps can be slightly different depending on the application
context: they may belong to the verification or identification processes.
The verification process, shown in Figure 10, is often adopted for the user
authentication scenario and consists in a one-to-one matching.
• First, the individual who desires being authenticated, claims the identity
(e.g., by mean of a user name or another identifier);
• a sensor acquires in real-time the raw biometric data of the user;
• the system, during a pre-processing step, extracts the main features from
the trait;
• then, it matches the acquired sample with the corresponding template,
extracted from a database;
• matching determines a score, based on which the system assesses the user
authenticity and decides whether to accept or reject it.
Typically, verification is used by positive recognition systems that aim to prevent
multiple users to access them with a unique identity, and, consequently, its ideal
application is access control and intrusion prevention.
Identification, usually, is adopted by negative recognition systems, with the aim
of preventing a unique user to have multiple identities. It consists in a one-to-
many matching: the system possesses a biometric information and, looking for a
corresponding template in the database, wishes to establish the identity of the
owner of that trait. Consequently, unlike verification, identification is a process
that may even fail, and it actually happens if the user to be identified has not
been previously enrolled. This procedure is similar to the way the human brain
performs identification when, for instance, we meet a person: it matches the
information obtained by the eyes with the image already present in our memory.
Occasionally, identification is adopted also for positive recognition, for instance
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when the user is not required to claim his/her identity; however, this could be
very expensive from a computational point of view, especially in databases of
large size.
3.3.1 Accuracy and Errors
Biometric traits are quite complex, and often their digital representation can
vary considerably. Therefore, it is not reasonable to require an exact matching
between two samples. For example, two acquisitions of face images belonging
to the same person are never completely identical. For this reason, matching
algorithms, which are integrated in biometric systems, generate a matching
score, typically between 0 and 1, which quantifies the similarity between the
trait received as an input and the sample stored in the database. A score is close
to 1 when the similarity to the template is higher; the algorithm uses a threshold,
based on which the system can either decide if the representation belongs to the
authentic user or not. But this inference is error-prone. If a received biometric
trait is erroneously considered as legitimate, we have a false accept, meaning that
an impostor is accepted as genuine user. Conversely, if the matching of two
samples of biometric traits actually belonging to the genuine user produces a
score lower than the threshold, the user is not authenticated, and a false reject
happens.
Consequently, the error can belong to the aforementioned two categories, and
the corresponding error metrics are [6, 10]:
• False Acceptance Rate (FAR): the proportion of verification attempts with
wrongful claims of identity that are incorrectly confirmed;
• False Rejection Rate (FRR): the proportion of verification attempts with
truthful claims of identity that are incorrectly denied.
Often, they are also referred as False Matching Rate (FMR), and False Non
Matching Rate (FNMR) respectively. The matching scores, s, obtained by a
genuine user who tries many times to authenticate, have a probability density
function (pdf), as shown in Figure 11; analogously, we show the distribution of
the scores, indicated as Imposter profile, obtained by non-legitimate individual
claiming to be the actual user.
As it can be seen in the Figure 11, the two error rates vary based on the
threshold t, as in a trade-off between security and usability. Indeed, by increasing
the threshold, the number of false accepts decreases, and this is reflected in
an enhancement of security level for the system protected by such a security
mechanism. However, the adverse effect would be a worsening in usability.
Conversely, by decreasing the threshold we typically obtain a more usable
system, but at the expense of security.
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Figure 11: Ad-hoc example of error rates in a biometric system; FAR and FRR, and their
relation with the threshold. Image adapted from [7].
The adequate accuracy and the choice to be taken, normally depend on the
application scenario and on the requirements.
It has to be noticed, however, that the score distribution of Figure 11, is just an
example built with the purpose of explaining error rates, while a more realistic
score distribution can be see in Figure 12 [152].
Together with errors related to the matching process, a biometric system can
be subject to the following [14]:
• Failure to Capture (FTC): indicates an unsuccessful tentative of acquiring a
biometric trait. It typically happens when a sensor is not able to detect a
signal of sufficient quality associated with a biometric characteristic.
• Failure to Enroll (FTE): indicates an unsuccessful tentative of registering
a user. It may happen when, during the enrollment a system rejects a
template because of low quality.
The enrollment is thus very important: requiring that a database contains only
high quality templates, increases the matching accuracy and, consequently,
reduces both FAR and FRR. Failure and error rates in biometric systems are
therefore dependent upon one another: each of these metrics constitutes an
important specification for the accuracy of a biometric system.
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Figure 12: Realistic example of error rates in a biometric system [152].
3.3.2 Sources of Errors
Biometric signals of an individual and their representations may vary con-
siderably based on multiple factors, including: the acquisition method, the
surrounding environment, the human-machine (sensor) interactions, as well as
physiological phenomena or medical conditions. The most common reasons are
the following [10]: the presentation of the trait is inconsistent, is not-replicable,
or there is an imperfect acquisition of the signal.
Inconsistent presentation. The signal captured by a sensor depends either on the
biometric trait itself, or on the way the trait is presented. Consecutive acquisitions
are never completely identical. Indeed, it may happen that a biometric signal is
acquired as a non-deterministic composition of physical biometric traits of the
user behaviour, and of the interaction between the human and the acquisition
interface. As an example, let us consider the fingerprints: we should notice
that the finger is not a hard object and possesses a three-dimensional shape,
but its surface is typically projected on a two-dimensional surface, that is, the
surface of the sensor. This process of projection is never controlled precisely. For
this reason, different acquisitions of the same fingerprint are always slightly
different.
Regarding the face images, instead, is possible that the variation consists in a
different pose of the user in front of the camera, as well as the facial expression,
as in the example of Figure 132.
Non-replicable presentation. Measurements of biometric traits may be prone to
laceration and consumption, malfunction, or physical development. For example,
2 where the subject is the author of this Thesis.
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Figure 13: Example of inconsistent presentation: changing the pose w.r.t the camera or
the facial expressions. Non-replicable presentation: caused by wearing or not
wearing accessories as glasses.
Figure 14: Non-replicable presentation: temporary changes in fingerprint caused by
laceration and consumption in the ridges. [14]
as shown in Figure 14, the structure of the ridges constituting fingerprints may
vary because of accidents or manual labour, sometimes permanently.
Face recognition may suffer from many factors, including: beard growth or
cutting, accidents (as nasal septum fractures), wearing accessories (e.g., glasses,
hats, jewelry), make-up, haircuts. All these reasons may make the presentation
non-reproducible.
Imperfect acquisition of the signal. Conditions regarding signals, in practice, are
rarely perfect and cause additional variations in the acquisition of a biometric
trait. Typically, this problem is due to noise, and noisy data can give rise to errors
in the matching process (false accept or false reject). As an example, face images
are affected by differences in the lighting, which cause significant variations
in the face appearance. In particular, back-light significantly complicates face
recognition.
Figure 15: Imperfect acquisition of face images, caused by a strong back-light. In the
first face on the right, it can be noticed how a strong frontal light - the light
emitted by a screen- partially solves the problem.
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Figure 16: Imperfect acquisition of fingerprints: the figures show low quality cresta,
probably because of skin dryness ([14]).
Regarding fingerprints, sometimes the noise is due to accumulation of dirt
on a fingerprint sensor, which provokes an incomplete contact of the crests
and a consequent low quality acquisition. A similar situation can be influenced
by a skin dryness or injuries, old age, or genetic factors which cause a crests
consumption, as well as sweat, or humidity in the air.
Because of the several aforementioned causes of variations in the biometric
signal, determining if two representations belong to a unique individual, requires
complex pattern recognition mechanisms. In addition, it is expected that signal
variations constitute actual input which, if not properly handled, may raise
errors in the biometric system (e.g., false accept and false reject). Errors not
properly corrected, may lead the system to a failure.
Together with sources of errors, there are also other limitations for biometric
systems, directly related to the attributes of the traits – presented in Section 3.2 –
as low distinctiveness, and non-universality.
3.3.3 Non-zero Effort Attacks
Another way to classify sources of errors and attacks is between zero effort,
and non-zero effort. For the errors discussed so far, the cause is ascribable to
an unintentional event, or to environmental condition. However, we have to
acknowledge that in biometric recognition systems there may be also issues
related to the latter category, where the attacker is a person who actively mas-
querades as someone else by falsifying the biometric of the claimed identity, e.g.,
using artificial materials [153]. Among these attacks, spoofing is one of the most
known and relevant: it has been shown in literature that it can be performed
using commonly available materials and furthermore, it does not require specific
knowledge of the internal functionality of the system. For instance, a person can
fool a fingerprint system by using artificial or gummyfingers of another person
in order to gain unauthorized access [154].
Non-zero effort attacks and related countermeasures will be further addressed
in the context of Section 5.1.
Many of these errors, issues and attacks are difficult to overcome, especially by
unimodal biometric systems, which are based on a single trait. However, some
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Figure 17: A non-zero effort attack may be performed e.g., with a gummy finger (b),
obtained with a specific mold (a) and produced from a residual fingerprint
([154]).
of the limitations can be reduced thanks to the usage of multiple biometric
characteristics properly combined in a single system.
4
C O N T I N U O U S A U T H E N T I C AT I O N
This Chapter focuses on continuous authentication. Section 4.1.1 introduces
multi-biometric systems, and the reasons why they are considered a viable
solution to provide the desired security service. Section 4.1.2, presents a litera-
ture review and comparison of the most interesting continuous authentication
solutions, with a detailed description of CASHMA [19] in 4.1.2. The review
of the state of the art is enriched with an overview and a gap analysis about
commercial solutions for continuous authentication.
4.1 multi-biometric continuous authentication systems
We now introduce multi-biometric systems especially focusing on the character-
istics that make them applicable and effective for the continuous authentication
scenarios.
4.1.1 Multi-Biometric Systems
A biometric system can be defined as multimodal if it uses more than a single
biometric trait -either physical or behavioral- in order to perform enrollment,
verification or identification. For example an authentication system may request
the user to present fingerprints of multiple fingers, or to provide both the face
image and the iris scan.
It has been shown in the literature (e.g., [58]) that this kind of systems possess
various advantages:
• higher accuracy in the recognition;
• more reliability, thanks to redundancy provided by the multiple traits;
• they permit to overcome limitations of unimodal systems (e.g., non-
universality: with multi-modality, the population covered is relatively
wide);
• they are robust against spoofing attacks given that it becomes harder for an
attacker to provide simultaneously multiple traits, so that they can actually
resemble the traits of the legitimate user (especially if the combination of
biometric traits is randomly assigned).
In terms of security, the improvement of employing multimodality, instead
of unimodal biometric authentication, is evident. However, if the system has
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not been properly designed, other aspects as computational cost, time needed
to complete the verification process, or the resources usage, may significantly
increase.
Integrations Schemes and Fusion levels
According to the application context and to the requirements, it is fundamental
to choose the traits, sensors and algorithms in order to make them perfectly
integrated. This integration can happen according to different schemes [10, 59]:
• Multiple sensors: using more sensors to acquire the same type of biomet-
ric trait; this introduces redundancy and consequently increases system
reliability and fault tolerance. The system can still provide an accurate
decision about biometric recognition even if one of the sensors is not able
to complete the verification.
• Multiple traits: employing multiple sensors to acquire different types of
biometric traits; this not only introduces redundancy, but also permits to
tackle the potentially low universality of some traits.
• Multiple acquisitions: the sensor acquires exactly the same trait for multiple
times (or, it acquires multiple samples of the same trait, as fingerprints of
different fingers). This can increase the accuracy in the recognition without
having a significant impact on computational costs;
• Multiple algorithms: to process the same trait through different formats,
features vectors, or matching strategies.
Once decided how each unimodal subsystem has to operate, they have to be
integrated to create a unique multimodal system. Biometric recognition systems
are composed of different modules, so the integration process becomes a fusion
of the outputs of those modules. The fusion can happen at various levels:
1. Sensor: raw data acquired by different sensors can be processed and inte-
grated in order to generate new data from which subsequently extract the
main features.
2. Feature: features sets generated from different traits can be fused to create
a new set of features representing the same individual. For example,
characteristics regarding hand geometry can be added to coefficients
extracted from face image in order to obtain a new set of higher dimension.
3. Score: matching scores obtained from single modules can be fused to
generate a final score. For instance, scores obtained through fingerprint
recognition and face image can be combined (e.g., by a simple sum) to
obtain a new score which supports the final decision.
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4. Ranking: this fusion is especially useful for biometric systems working
in identification mode. Each classifier associates a matching order to the
identities stored in the database (higher positions correspond to higher
matching scores). The fusion of rankings creates a new matching order to
be used for the final decision.
5. Decision: when the matching process terminates, each unimodal subsystem
generates a label corresponding to the decision (e.g., accepted or rejected
if the biometric system operates in verification mode, or the identity of an
individual in case of identification mode). The final decision is derived in
many ways, for example by majority voting.
4.1.2 The State of the Art
Several studies describe frameworks, systems and novel characteristics for bio-
metric authentication of humans. The following literature review includes the
most relevant and recent papers available so far on this topic and is espe-
cially concentrated on approaches based on continuous authentication which
conducted usability tests involving real users.
Academic Literature Review
We describe our findings with the support of Table 1.
The surveyed works are ordered by the year of publication starting from the
most recent. Then, the table reports on various aspects:
• Multi-bio: the solution integrates multiple traits, thus is multi-biometric;
• Cont. Authe.: the authentication is continuous (instead of static or robust);
• Usability Testing: the usability of the solution has been measured;
• Security & Perf. Evaluation: the solution has been tested from a security and
performance point of view;
• Tests with user base: the assessment involved real users and is not performed
only through simulations.
• Trust score: the solution is based on a trust level or similarity score;
• Use case: explains if the solution has been designed for a specific system
(and which is it), or for a specific use case.
Sitova et al. [60] introduced a set of behavioral biometric features for con-
tinuous authentication of smartphone users: hand movement, orientation, and
grasp (HMOG). They evaluated them from three perspectives: continuous au-
thentication, biometric key generation performance, and energy consumption.
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Table 1: Comparison of related works on multi-biometric continuous authentication
Year Multi- Cont. Usability Security & Tests with Trust Use case &
bio. Auth. Testing Perf. Eval. user base score Target system
[60] 2016 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[19] 2015 3 3 3 3 Internet Services
[61] 2015 3 3 3 Mobile
[62] 2015 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[63] 2014 3 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[64] 2014 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[65] 2014 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[66] 2014 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[67] 2014 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[68] 2013 3 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[50] 2013 3 3 3 Mobile
[69] 2013 3 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[70] 2013 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[71] 2013 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[72] 2013 3 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[73] 2012 3 3 3 Mobile
[74] 2011 3 3 3 3 Mobile
[75] 2011 3 3 3 MANET
[76] 2010 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[77] 2010 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[78] 2010 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[30] 2009 3 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[59] 2008 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[31] 2007 3 3 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
[79] 2006 3 3 3 Distributed platf.
[80] 2003 3 3 3 Desktop/Generic
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The evaluation was performed on multi-session data collected from 100 subjects
under two motion conditions (i.e., sitting and walking). The results show that
HMOG is well suited for continuous authentication of smartphone users.
In [19], a sequential multi-modal biometric authentication system is composed
of an authentication service, web services and clients. Clients are users’ devices
(e.g., laptop and desktop PCs, smartphones, tablets) that acquire the biometric
data, and transmit those data to an authentication server for a single-sign on
procedure. This solution inspired the work of this Thesis and will be described
in more detail in a dedicated Section 4.1.2.
Saevanee et al. [61] propose a novel text-based multimodal biometric approach
built on linguistic analysis, keystroke dynamics and behavioral profiling. They
present a framework that is able to provide robust, continuous and transparent
authentication. Due to the lack of public datasets, the effectiveness of the pro-
posed framework for providing security and user convenience was evaluated
via a simulation approach (using the MATLAB environment). The simulation
process involved implementing a virtual user. The result showed that it is able
to provide a 91% reduction in the number of intrusive authentication requests
required for high security applications.
Crouse at al [62] present a work on a face-based continuous authentication
system that operates in an unobtrusive manner. The authors propose a method-
ology for fusing mobile device (unconstrained) face capture with gyroscope,
accelerometer, and magnetometer data to correct camera orientation and, by
extension, the orientation of the face image. Experiments demonstrate (i) im-
provement on face recognition accuracy from face orientation correction, and (ii)
efficacy of the prototype continuous authentication system.
De Marsico et al. [63] propose a biometric application based on a multimodal
recognition of face and iris, which is designed to be embedded in mobile devices.
The system is inspiring for our purpose even if specific for a different target
system. A framework complementing face recognition and clothing colors for
continuous authentication is proposed in [77] et al. Similarly, the work by Tsai
et al. [64] builds a passive continuous authentication system based on both
hard and soft biometric features (e.g., clothes color). These approaches could
be integrated to other multi-biometric continuous authentication solutions to
further improving the detection capability; however, at present stage a proper
usability study is missing and the improvements in security, especially tolerance
to counterfeit, are not detailed.
Bailey et al. [65] present a behavioral biometric system that fuses user data
from keyboard, mouse, and Graphical User Interface (GUI) interactions. As
a multimodal system, authentication decision is based on a broader view of
the user’s computer activity while requiring less user interaction to train the
system than previous work. The system performs authentication every two
minutes. Testing over 31 users shows that fusion techniques significantly improve
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behavioral biometric authentication accuracy over single modalities on their
own.
Roth et al. [66] propose a novel biometric modality named Typing Behavior
(TB) for continuous user authentication. Given a webcam pointing toward a
keyboard, they develop real-time computer vision algorithms to automatically
extract hand movement patterns from the video stream. Unlike the typical
continuous biometrics, such as keystroke dynamics (KD), TB provides a reliable
authentication with a short delay, while avoiding explicit key-logging. They
collected in a database videos of 63 unique subjects, with type static text and free
text for multiple sessions. The experimental results show a superior performance
of TB when compared with KD.
Prakash et al. [67] introduce a new continuous user authentication scheme,
which is designed to authenticate the user irrespective of their posture in front
of the system. The system continuously monitors the user by using soft bio-
metrics (color of user’s clothing and facial skin) along with hard biometrics. It
automatically registers soft biometric traits every time the user logs in and fuses
soft biometric matching with the conventional face biometric authentication.
In their paper, Draffin et al. [68] propose a novel passive authentication method
for mobile devices users. The authors show that every user possesses unique
physical and behavioral characteristics reflected by how rapidly they type with
the device soft keyboard, and influenced by a variety of soft-keyboard specific
micro-behavior features. Using this data, plus a variety of statistical tools, they
generate a certainty score of whether the user’s phone is in a stranger’s hands.
Without any contextual information, they can passively identify that a mobile
device is being used by a non-authorized user.
In their work, Frank et al. [50] investigate whether touchscreen gestures are
a viable biometric trait for continuous authentication of smartphone users. Ex-
periments to assess security and performance involving users are presented.
Based on the results, the authors identify this method as suitable for multi-
modal biometric authentication system. However, the solution is specific for
smartphones, and the authors acknowledge that it cannot securely serve as an
exclusive authentication mechanism of a device.
Zhu et al. [69] investigate the usage of passive sensory data collected from
accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers to ensure the security of ap-
plications and data on mobile devices. They build the gesture model of how a
user uses the device and propose a framework which calculates the sureness
that the mobile device is being used by its owner. Based on the sureness score,
mobile devices can dynamically request the user to provide active authentication,
or disable certain features of the mobile devices to protect user’s privacy and
information security.
Crawford et al. [70] address mobile device authentication as provided by a
password or sketch. They propose an extensible Transparent Authentication
Framework that integrates multiple behavioral biometrics with conventional au-
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thentication to implement a continuous authentication mechanism. The security
and usability evaluation of the proposed framework showed that a legitimate
device owner can perform tasks while being asked to authenticate explicitly 67%
less often than without a transparent authentication method. Furthermore, the
evaluation showed that attackers are soon denied access to on-device tasks as
their behavioral biometrics is collected.
Both the works by Mondal et al. [71] and by Deutschmann et al. [72] are based
on a trust model and influenced by Bours et al. [22]. Authors of [71] propose
to perform continuous authentication using Mouse Dynamics as the behavioral
biometric modality. They used a publicly available mouse dynamics with data
of 49 users and evaluated the system performance with 6 machine learning
algorithms. Their continuous authentication scheme is based on a trust model
which uses both global thresholds and person specific thresholds. Deutschmann
et al. [72] investigate the possibility of authenticating users continuously on
desktop computers. They tested a continuous behaviometric authentication system
on 99 users over 10 weeks, focusing on keystroke dynamics, mouse movements,
application usage, and the system footprint. They continuously monitored users’
activity during an entire working session. Such a continuous-authentication
system uses the set of behavioral traits to calculate a similarity ratio (score)
between the user’s current and expected behavior.
Meng at al. [73] propose a novel user authentication scheme based on touch
dynamics that uses a set of behavioral features related to touch dynamics for
accurate user authentication. They select 21 features, collect and analyze touch
gesture data of 20 Android phone users, comparing several known machine
learning classifiers.
Shi et al. [74] describe SenGuard, a user identification framework that enables
continuous and implicit user identification service for smartphone. It leverages
availability of multiple sensors on smartphones and passively uses sensor inputs
as sources for user authentication. SenGuard invokes active user authentication
when there is mounting evidence that the phone user has changed. A prototype
of SenGuard was created using voice, location, multitouch, and locomotion. Pre-
liminary empirical studies with a set of users indicate that those four modalities
are suited as data sources for implicit mobile user identification.
In their paper, Bu et al. [75] focus on user-to-device authentication in high
security Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs). The paper studies distributed com-
bined authentication and intrusion detection with data fusion in such MANETs.
Multimodal biometrics is deployed to work with intrusion detection systems
(IDSs). The system decides whether user authentication (or IDS input) is re-
quired and which biosensors (or IDSs) should be chosen, depending on the
security posture.
Xu et al. [76] propose a feature level fusion method called matrix-based complex
PCA (MCPCA), for bimodal biometrics that uses a complex matrix to denote
two biometric traits from one subject. The method respectively takes the two
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images from two biometric traits of a subject as the real part and imaginary
part of a complex matrix. In order to obtain features with a small number of
data items, they have devised a two-step feature extraction scheme and shown
through experiments that it can achieve higher classification accuracy than other
techniques, as 2DPCA and PCA. The authors used different existing unimodal
databases (of ear, palm print and face images) to simulate bimodal databases
and create virtual subjects for the experiments.
Kumar et al. [78] present a new approach for adaptive combination of multiple
biometrics, employed to determine the optimal fusion strategy and the corre-
sponding fusion parameters. The score-level fusion rules are adapted to ensure
the desired system performance. The experimental results presented in the paper
illustrate that the proposed score-level approach can achieve significantly better
and stable performance over the decision-level approach. Their experiments
leverage on publicly available biometric databases, which were combined one
another to obtain multimodality.
Kwang et al. [30] performed a usability study for a bi-modality continuous
biometrics authentication system that combines fingerprint and facial biometrics
to authenticate users. The system suffers from a computational overhead of up
to 42% to the computer system.
The goal of the paper by Azzini et al. [59] is to investigate if a multimodal
biometric system can be used as input of a fuzzy controller for preventing user
substitution. The chosen modalities are face and fingerprint. The fuzzy controller
requests the fingerprint data only if the face recognition matching produces a
trust level that is below a threshold. Experiments have not been performed with
specific biometric systems, but simulated in different conditions. In our opinion,
the explicit request for fingerprint does not seem to be a proper transparent
acquisition of biometric traits, which we think is a fundamental requirement to
meet usability in continuous authentication.
Sim et al. [31] present a multimodal biometric verification system that contin-
uously verifies the presence of a logged-in user based on face and fingerprint
modalities. The imposter attacks were detected within 3 s, but at the cost of an
overhead of 25% of time completion for CPU-intensive tasks.
Toledano et al. [79] promote user-centered design and usability and security
evaluation of biometric technologies, including fingerprint, voice and signature
verification. However, the biometric modalities are studied in isolation, so they
are not combined for a single authentication decision and there is no tailoring
to a specific algorithm or context.
Altinok et al. [80] proposed a multi-modal biometric continuous authentication
system that integrates information temporally, as well as between modalities.
Simulations show that temporal integration improves authentication accuracy.
Therefore, the literature review highlights that, whereas all studies focus
on security or performance evaluation, there is a real lack of usability testing
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in the field of continuous authentication. Furthermore, if we do not consider
works specifically tailored for mobile devices, the list becomes even shorter.
Our goal is to present the first -at least to our knowledge- multi-biometric
continuous authentication system designed, implemented and evaluated from a
user-centered perspective.
Commercial Continuous Authentication Solutions
This Section integrates the analysis of the state of the art conducted so far with
a list of the main continuous authentication solutions currently available in
commerce. The description is entirely based on public information accessible on
companies’ websites, and the mechanisms have not been tested.
ThisData [109] provides a real-time API called Verify which can be used to
identify a user based on a behavioral profile, refined during the usage of the
client application. In order to build up a behavioral profile, this solution uses
risk attributes as: unknown devices, high risk IP addresses, suspicious login
locations, Tor usage, white-list and blacklist countries, velocity checking, and
geo-location anomalies. If the risk for a user is moderate, the administrator
might ask to re-confirm their identity through a Two Factor Authentication code.
If the risk is extremely high, it is possible to log them out.
NoPassword [110] offers behavioral and continuous authentication especially
targeted to enterprise workforce; after successful authentication, if user suspi-
cious or unusual behavior is detected, NoPassword can limit the user access to
non-sensitive applications or ask the user to perform additional biometric au-
thentication. The layers composing the mechanism are: online activities, screen
touch pattern, smartphone handling, typing pattern, and mouse movement
pattern.
BioCatch [111] proposes continuous authentication of online users selecting
and verifying 20 unique features from a set of 2000 behavioral patterns. The
behavioral profile is based on: (i) cognitive factors such as eye-hand coordination,
applicative behavior patterns, usage preferences, device interaction patterns and
responses to Invisible Challenges1; (ii) physiological factors such as left/right
handedness, press-size, hand tremors, arm size and muscle usage, and (iii)
contextual factors such as transaction, navigation, device and network patterns.
BehavioSec [112] analyzes the activity between login and logout, considering
behavioral traits as keystroke dynamics, touchpad or mouse movements, and
comparing them with the previous interaction belonging to the same user. It
creates a ticket for the session and a score, which is provided to a risk engine,
so that is possible to automatically intensifying security, where needed. The
algorithm is updated with the behaviors and skills of the users, so if they change
or improve, the same happens with the security layer.
1 subtle tests that users subconsciously respond to
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Table 2: Comparison of commercial continuous authentication solutions
Solution
Physiological Behavioral traits Characteristics Issues
traits and context info and use case (gap analysis)
ThisData
n.a.
IP address, login location, API Not biometric
[109] Tor, known devices (Ruby, PHP, .NET) solution
NoPassword unimodal Touchscreen, keystroke, mouse mov. smartphone, browser Phys. biometrics
[110] (unspecified) apps usage, online activity desktop only at first auth.
BioCatch arm navigation pref., pressure Online Doubts regarding
[111] dimension preferred hand users recognition accuracy
BehavioSec
n.a.
Keystroke, mouse mov., touchpad SDK for Only behavioral
[112] accelerometer, pressure,... web and mobile biometrics
Plurilock
n.a.
Keystroke, Desktop, Only behavioral
[113] mouse movement laptop biometrics
Kryptowire
n.a.
Touchscreen, mobile Only behavioral biom.,
[114] pressure, movement devices limited use case
SensifyID
n.a.
Typing, touchscreen, transactions on Only behavioral biom,
[115] preferred hand, context mobile devices limited use case
Plurilock [113] provides monitoring and continuous authentication tools based
on behavioral biometric traits as keystroke and mouse usage. It is meant for
desktop or laptop users, and is capable of learning the typing style in 30 minutes
of regular keyboard usage.
Kryptowire [114] proposes a continuous authentication technology that identi-
fies users of mobile devices through behavioral patterns. It is based on multiple
on-board sensors of mobile devices including touch, pressure, movement, and
power to recognize users based on the way they interact with the device and
within the context of each mobile app. The proposed in-app instrumentation can
detect imposters attempting to gain unauthorized access to data and services
available on the device.
SensifyID [115] is a solution designed for providing continuous authentication
acquiring information from sensors, and the environment. The main features
are: task-based authentication (users are asked to perform a specific action as
an authenticator to determine whether the user or a bot is trying to use the
device, such as holding the phone and swiping across the screen), and real-time
intelligence (a model is built from behaviors as typing, swiping and tapping,
or the hand preferred for holding the device), proof of presence (e.g., network
intelligence), and contextual information.
The commercial solutions review, summarized with the help of Table 2, high-
lights that almost none of them uses physiological biometrics, and in the only
two cases in which this happens, either the trait is employed only for the first
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authentication, or its accuracy is questionable (e.g., for traits as arm dimension).
In our opinion, instead, a multi-biometric continuous authentication mecha-
nism should benefit from the advantages of physiological biometrics (possibly
in multiple samples) for the whole verification procedure. Moreover, in these
solutions the selected biometric traits make the recognition possible only for a
limited use case as the mobile device users authentication. Finally, it is unknown
whether the approaches in Table 2 have been tested or not with a proper usability
assessment involving real users.
CASHMA Protocol
The continuous authentication protocol proposed in [19] improves security and
usability of user session. The protocol computes adaptive timeouts on the basis
of the trust posed on the user activity and in the quality and kind of biometric
data transparently acquired during their activity. The overall system, shown in
Figure 18, is composed of the CASHMA authentication service, the clients and
the web services, connected through secure communication channels.
Figure 18: Overall view of the CASHMA architecture [19]
The CASHMA authentication service includes:
i) an authentication server, which interacts with the clients,
ii) a set of high-performing computational servers that perform comparisons
of biometric data for verification of the enrolled users,
iii) databases of templates that contain the biometric templates of the enrolled
users (these are required for user authentication/verification).
The web services are the various services that use the CASHMA authentication
service and demand the authentication of enrolled users to the CASHMA au-
thentication server. These services are potentially any kind of Internet service
or application with requirements on user authenticity. Finally, clients are the
users’ devices that acquire the biometric raw data corresponding to the various
biometric traits from the users, and transmit those data to the CASHMA authen-
tication server as part of the authentication procedure towards the target web
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service. The CASHMA authentication server is in charge to transmit a certificate
to the client. The certificate is composed by the following information:
i) Timestamp and sequence number useful to univocally identify each certifi-
cate, and to protect from replay attacks;
ii) ID is the user ID, e.g., a number;
iii) Decision, which represents the outcome of the verification procedure
carried out on the server side;
iv) the expiration time of the session – the absolute instant of time at which
the session should expire– , dynamically assigned by the CASHMA au-
thentication server.
Figure 19: Initial phase of CASHMA protcol [19]
The execution of the protocol is composed of two consecutive phases: the
initial phase (Figure 19), and the maintenance phase.
Initial phase. This phase is structured as follows:
• Step 0 - The user (the client) contacts the web service for a service re-
quest; the web service replies that a valid certificate from the CASHMA
authentication service is required for authentication.
• Step 1 - Using the CASHMA application, the client contacts the CASHMA
authentication server. During the first step, at time t0, the client device
acquires and sends the different biometric traits, specifically selected to
perform a strong authentication procedure. The application explicitly
indicates to the user the biometric traits to be provided and possible
retries.
• Step 2 - The CASHMA authentication server analyzes the biometric data
received and performs an authentication procedure. Two different pos-
sibilities arise here. If the user identity is not verified (the global trust
level is below the trust threshold gmin), new or additional biometric data
are requested (back to step 1) until the minimum trust threshold gmin is
reached. Instead if the user identity is successfully verified, the CASHMA
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authentication server authenticates the user, computes an initial timeout
of length T0 for the user session, set the expiration time at T0 + t0, creates
the CASHMA certificate and sends it to the client.
• Step 3 - The client forwards the CASHMA certificate to the web service
coupling it with its request.
• Step 4 - The web service reads the certificate and authorizes the client to
use the requested service until expiration time.
The maintenance phase is composed of three steps, analogous to Step 1, Step
2 and Step 3, repeated iteratively [19].
Finally, we report the following set of security solutions in place for CASHMA
and some assumptions which will be important for the following of the Thesis.
First, all communications between the components of CASHMA architecture are
made through encrypted communication channels, using Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL). With SSL, the channel is protected against replay attacks using the MAC
(Message Authentication Code) computed from the MAC secret, the sequence
number, the message length, the message contents, and two fixed character
strings [85]. Further, biometric data is transmitted in raw format from client
to the CASHMA authentication service, and this has been a design decision
applied to reduce the dimension, intrusiveness and complexity of the application
installed on the client device [19]. However, biometric data in not stored on the
client side: the templates are stored on the CASHMA authentication service
side.
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D E S I G N A N D E VA L U AT I O N O F A C O N T I N U O U S
A U T H E N T I C AT I O N M E C H A N I S M
The present chapter describes our approach to continuous authentication. The
solutions proposed here and in the following chapters have some common
features with CASHMA [19]. For this reason, in Section 5.1 we first provide a
risk assessment of [19] that supports decisions related to its modifications. Then,
in Section 5.2, we present the proposed mechanism, its design, prototyping
and implementation. Finally, in Section 5.3, we explain how we assessed and
evaluated our solution, especially focusing on usability, security and their trade-
off.
5.1 risk assessment of cashma continuous authentication pro-
tocol
In this Section we perform a qualitative risk assessment of the CASHMA protocol
[19], already presented in the previous chapter. The assessment is based on the
methodology of NIST SP-800-30 [55], and its purpose is to establish if some of
the steps of the protocol and of the entities involved may be exposed to relevant
security risks. This activity supports decisions related to protocol modifications
and improvements, where needed, and will be an important step for designing
the continuous authentication and non-repudiation solutions presented in this
Thesis.
It has to be noticed, however, that the result of the assessment may always be
considered subjective by the reader, even if it has been conducted in compiance
with a well known methodology and with the help of a standard scoring
framework [84].
5.1.1 Definitions
In order to describe the details of the risk assessment, we first introduce some
useful definitions from NIST SP-800-30 [55].
A threat is any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of
information, and/or Denial of Service (DoS). Threat events are caused by threat
sources, i.e., hostile cyber or physical attacks; human errors of omission or com-
mission; structural failures of organization-controlled resources (e.g., hardware,
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Table 3: Attackers and their characteristics
Hacker (Hk) Insider (Is)
Access External Internal
Resources Moderate Organization
Capabilities High Minimal
software, environmental controls); natural and man-made disasters, accidents,
and failures beyond the control of the organization.
We already introduced in Section 2.2 the term vulnerability. In the specific
context of this assessment, we also report to the NIST definition: a weakness in
the system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that can be
exploited by a threat source.
The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted risk factor based on an analysis of
the probability that a given threat is capable of exploiting a given vulnerability
(or set of vulnerabilities). The likelihood risk factor combines an estimate of
the likelihood that the threat event will be initiated with an estimate of the
likelihood of impact (i.e., the likelihood that the threat event results in adverse
impacts). For adversarial threats, an assessment of likelihood of occurrence is
typically based on adversary:
(i) intent;
(ii) capability;
(iii) targeting.
The level of impact from a threat event is the magnitude of harm that can be
expected to result from the consequences of unauthorized behavior.
Risk is a function of the likelihood of a threat event’s occurrence and potential
adverse impact should the event occur.
5.1.2 The Assessment Methodology
We first determine which types of threat sources have to be considered during
the risk assessment. We consider adversarial threat sources only, as opposed to
non-adversarial like human errors, structural failures or natural disasters. The
characteristics of the identified attackers are summarized in Table 3 and are
adapted from the quantitative security evaluation of [19].
A Hacker (Hk) represents an external individual having high technological
capabilities but moderate resources. An Insider (Is) is an internal attacker, having
minimal capabilities and organization-level resources.
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The threat events that we consider can be divided into two categories [6, 81, 82,
83]:
• Transport level threats: spoofing, forgery, unauthorized access, eavesdrop-
ping, message corruption;
• System level threats: brute force attack, reuse of residuals, insertion of
imposter data, component replacement, database compromise.
In the following, we rate the likelihood of occurrence as a combination of
• the likelihood that a threat is initiated, possibly related to the attack gain,
and
• the likelihood that a threat event, once initiated, will result in adverse
impact.
The likelihood of occurrence determination is based on authors’ experience
and obtained with the help of CVSS framework [84]. The overall likelihood
is expressed in a qualitative scale: Very Low (VL), if the threat event is highly
unlikely to occur and have adverse impact, Low (L) if it is unlikely, Moderate (M)
if it is somewhat likely, High (H) if it is highly likely, and Very High (VH) if it is
almost certain.
As discussed in [55], impacts from threat events are determined considering
• the characteristics of the threat sources that can initiate the events;
• the vulnerabilities/predisposing conditions identified;
• the susceptibility reflecting the safeguards/countermeasures planned or
implemented to impede such events.
The assessment scale is: Very Low (VL), meaning that the adverse effect is
negligible; Low (L), if the impact is expected to be limited; Moderate (M), if the
threat event is expected to have a serious adverse effect; High (H), in case of
severe or catastrophic impact; and Very High (VH), if the threat event is expected
to have multiple severe or catastrophic adverse effect.
As summarized in Table 4, risk is a combination of:
• the likelihood of the events occurring.
• the impact resulting from the events;
So, as an example, based on the methodology in [55], an event which we
assess having Moderate likelihood and a Very High impact will result in a High
risk.
In the following, we call: Hk and Is, the attackers (as in table 3), being a Hacker
or an Insider, respectively; C, the legitimate client; AS, the Authentication Server;
54
Table 4: Level of risk determination. [55]
Likelihood
Level of Impact
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Very High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
High Very Low Low Moderate High Very High
Moderate Very Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Low Very Low Low Low Low Moderate
Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low
and WS, the Web Service. In order to not being too redundant, the assessment
reported here only regards the initial phase of the protocol, but it can be easily
extended to the maintenance phase too, which is analogous.
For each threat event, and for both the attackers, we explain the reasons and our
perceptions guiding the likelihood and impact determination. Then, we propose
countermeasures -where possible-, and repeat the assessment assuming their
inclusion in a new hypothetical version of CASHMA. The process is summarized
with the help of Tables 5- 9.
5.1.3 Transport Level Threats Analysis
Spoofing
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Table 5: Spoofing Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures
New Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk
Spoofing X pretends towards AS to be C (step 1)
Hk H H H 1) Digital signature M H M
S1 Is H H H of the message. M H M
Spoofing
X pretends towards C to be AS (step 1 and 2)
Hk H H H 2) Additional encryption M H M
S2 Is M H M of the message with L H L
Spoofing
X pretends towards C to be WS (step 3)
Hk H M M receiver’s public key. M M M
S3 Is M M M 3) Do not transmit raw biometrics L M L
Spoofing
X pretends towards WS to be c (step 3)
Hk M H M over the wire: encrypt L H L
S4 Is M H M biometric data on client-side L H L
Table 6: Forgery Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures
New Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk
Forgery The attacker fabricates one or more biometrics Hk L H L Do not transmit raw biometrics over the wire L H L
F1 to spoof C’s identity Is M H M encrypt data on client-side L H L
Forgery X fabricates a fake certificate, Hk M H M
Digital signature of the message
L H L
F2 claiming that was received from AS Is L H L L H L
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The spoofing threat (often also referred as masquerade), is a communication
level threat that happens when an entity pretend to be recognized as a dif-
ferent entity, possibly laying the foundation for other threats like forgery or
unauthorized access [81]. For instance, it can be accomplished using stolen user
credentials. Traditional countermeasures are: the usage of strong authentication,
avoiding the storage of secretes (e.g. passwords) in plaintext, avoiding transfer
of credentials in plaintext over the wire, and protecting communication with
SSL [82]. Based on the protocol description and assumptions, CASHMA is inte-
grating most of the countermeasures to this threat. However, we identified four
different points of vulnerability, and the related threats are referred as S1, S2, S3
and S4, shown in Table 5.
The threat Spoofing S1 specifically refers to step 1 of the CASHMA protocol
(see Section 4.1.2): the adversary injects believable biometric raw data into a
message, claiming to be C, and obtains a valid certificate from the AS. Note-
worthy, the attacker needs previous possession of the biometric raw data of the
legitimate user. An Insider may be somehow capable of acquiring the biometrics
needed, helped by the proximity and knowledge of C habits. In order to perform
step 1 of the protocol and act as being C, it should send the data to the AS.
This may be harder for Is because we consider that high skills are needed to
circumvent the SSL protocol. We consider as High the overall likelihood. On
the contrary, if the threat agent is a Hk, it may be hard to obtain access to the
set of biometric raw data remotely. If data are obtained, the Hk may possess
enough capabilities to circumvent the SSL protocol. The overall likelihood is
High also for Hk. If the attacker is able to accomplish the spoofing attack, it
may lay foundations for subsequent threat events: being recognized as C, and
obtained a valid certificate, X may send a valid request to the Web Service. For
this reason, we determine as High the Impact of this threat. As shown in Table
5, the resulting Risk is High for both the attackers.
The threat Spoofing S2 refers both to steps 1 and 2 of the protocol. On step 1,
the attacker spoofs the AS, receives the biometric traits of C, with detrimental
effects on C’s privacy. In addition it can be used in step 1 of a subsequent
iteration of the protocol to act as being C towards AS (Spoofing S1). As a result,
we consider High the Impact of this threat. On step 2, instead, if X can corrupt a
certificate and claim to be the AS, the corruption probably provides a fake and
useless certificate to C. We consider Moderate the likelihood of spoofing the AS
for the Insider and High the likelihood of occurrence of S2 for the Hacker.
The threat Spoofing S3 applies to step 3 of the protocol. The attacker spoofs
the WS, receiving the request and a valid certificate from C. These data can be
useful in step 1 to spoof C (see Spoofing S1). However, a CASHMA certificate
integrates information like timestamp and user ID that protect from replay
attacks (see also Message corruption M1). For this reason the impact can be
considered Moderate: the gain is not so relevant if the obtained data is not useful
for the attacker.
57
The threat Spoofing S4 applies to step 3 of the protocol. The attacker sends
a request with a valid certificate, obtaining the access to the service provided
by WS. The impact is High, but we consider the successful reuse of a valid
certificate moderately likely, because it is univocally identified by Timestamp
and sequence number.
Possible countermeasures for threats S1-S4 range from sending the message
coupled with its digital signature (measure useful for auditing and as a de-
terrent), adding a further level of encryption using AS’s public key or avoid
passing the raw biometric data over the wire.
Forgery
The forgery happens when an entity fabricates information and claims that such
information was received from another entity or sent to another entity [81]. For
the CASHMA protocol, we discuss two main forgery threats, F1 and F2, shown
in Table 6.
For threat Forgery F1, the attacker fabricates one or more biometric traits in
order to spoof C’s identity. The occurrence likelihood depends on the kind of
biometric traits necessary for the authentication, on their FRR (False Rejection
Rate) and on the FRR of the system. However, as discussed for threat S1, it is
probably not highly likely to forge a set of traits and provide them continuously
for the remote Hk, and moderately likely for the Is. For this reason, even if the
threat has a High impact (especially if the application protected is critical), the
risk can be considered low for Hk. Instead, we consider a Moderate risk for the
Is. An additional countermeasure useful for reducing this risk is to not transmit
raw biometric over the wire. This threat is related to Sensor Spoofing (See Table
10).
The threat Forgery F2 refers to the forgery of a CASHMA certificate. We can
consider Unlikely for the Insider attacker to forge a certificate and Moderate
the likelihood of occurrence if the threat source is Hk. The impact is High. As a
countermeasure, the message containing the certificate sent on step 3 to the WS,
should be digitally signed by the sender.
Unauthorized Access
When an entity accesses data in violation to the security policy in force [81], we
have the so called unauthorized access threat event. We now comment the two
threats U1 and U2, shown in Table 7.
With the threat Unauthorized access U1, we refer to the event of getting
(physically or remotely) possession of C’s device or workstation, but not the
critical functions only provided through continuous authentication. We consider
the likelihood for a remote attacker (Hk) as Moderate, and High for the Is.
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Table 7: Unauthorized Access Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk
Unauthorized The attacker gets possession Hk M L L
Access U1 of C’s device or workstation Is H L L
Unauthorized X gets access to data protected by Hk L H L
Access U2 the continuous authentication Is L H L
However, the resulting impact and risk are Low because, as reported in 4.1.2, no
biometric data is stored on the device.
The threat Unauthorized access U2 refers instead to the access to the critical
functions/services protected with the continuous authentication. Proper config-
uration of security permission is able to mitigate this threat. No modifications
to the protocol are required in this case. We rate the likelihood and the related
risk as Low. No additional countermeasures are proposed for these two threats.
Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping (or Sniffing) is a breach of confidentiality by unauthorized moni-
toring of communications [81]. We detect the threats E1, E2, and E3 for CASHMA,
shown in Table 8. A sniffing happens when an attacker captures packets from
the network and reads the data content in search of sensitive information like
biometric data, secret keys, certificates or any kind of confidential information.
Traditionally, the full encryption of communication, including credentials, pre-
vents sniffed packets from being usable to an attacker. SSL is an example of
encryption solution [82].
The threat Eavesdropping E1 refers to the sniffing of the message on step 1,
containing the biometric raw data of C. Referring to Section 4.1.2, the message
on step 1 is transmitted through an SSL channel, thus it is encrypted with a
session key that only C and AS know. We consider Moderate the likelihood of
occurrence for E1 if the attacker possesses high capabilities, as the Hk, and Low
if it is the Is. The impact is High, because obtaining the biometrics may cause
identity theft. Possible countermeasures are a subset of what is proposed for the
Spoofing threats: adding a further level of encryption using AS’s public key or
avoid passing the raw biometric data over the wire.
The threat Eavesdropping E2 refers to the sniffing of the message on step 2 or
step 3, containing the CAHSMA certificate. Again, we assess the likelihood as
Moderate for Hk and Low for Is. The impact can be considered Moderate, as
discussed for Spoofing S3 threat, being that the CASHMA certificate contains
ID and timestamp that protect from replay attacks.
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Table 8: Eavesdropping Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures
New Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk
Eavesdropping X sniffs the message on step 1 Hk M H M 1) Encrypt the msg with receiver’s public key L H L
E1 with the biometrics of C Is L H L 2)Not send raw traits: encrypt on client L H L
Eavesdropping X sniffs the message on step 2 or Hk M M M
Additional encryption of the message
L M L
E2 step 3, containing the certificate Is L M L with receiver’s public key L M L
Table 9: Message Corruption Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures
New Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk
Msg corruption X copies a message (step 1 to 4) Hk M L L Do not transmit raw biometrics over the wire L L L
M1 and replays it to the receiver Is L L L encrypt biometrics on client side L L L
Msg corruption
X deletes a message (steps 1 to 4)
Hk M L L
n/a
n/a n/a n/a
M2 Is L M L L M L
Msg corruption X inserts a msg into the flow from C to A Hk M L L 1) Encryption with receiver’s public key L M L
M3 or from C to WS (and vice versa) Is L M L 2) Do not transmit raw biometrics L M L
Msg corruption X changes the sequence of Hk M L L
n/a
n/a n/a n/a
M4 messages for AS Is L L L n/a n/a n/a
Msg corruption X alters a msg in plausible way: Hk M M M 1) Digital signature of the msg L M L
M5 C and/or WS do not detect the changes Is L M L 2) Encryption with receiver’s public key L M L
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Message Corruption
The message corruption threats refer to the situation in which the integrity of
transferred data is compromised by unauthorized copying, deletion, insertion,
modification, reordering, replay or delay [81].
For the CASHMA protocol, we detect the set of message corruption threats
shown in Table 9. Referring to Section 4.1.2, the SSL encryption and the MAC
address protect the protocol from this threat.
The threat Message corruption M1 happens when the attacker copies and
replays one of the messages, for instance the message sent on step 1 containing
the biometrics of C. We consider as Low the impact of the simple replaying of a
message (without modification) thanks to the SSL encryption, already present
in CASHMA, as discussed above.
The threat Message corruption M2 applies to the deletion of a message sent
on steps from 1 to 4.
If the message on step 1 with biometric traits is deleted, no verification is done.
However, it does not have any relevant consequence in terms of security.
If the message on step 2 containing the certificate is deleted, the client has to
restart from the first step of the protocol.
If the message sent on step 3 with the certificate is deleted, the client has to send
the same message again or, if the session is expired, restart from step 1.
Finally, if the message "access granted until timeout" (step 4) is deleted, C waits
for the message until the session expiration.
We may consider all these threats together having a Low impact and a resulting
Low risk.
The threat Message corruption M3 refers to the insertion of a message in
between the information flow from sender and receiver (from C to AS, from AS
to C, from C to WS or from WS to C). The impact is Moderate, being that the
insertion of a message can be used for instance to conduct a spoofing threat.
However, in CASHMA, messages from one party cannot be inserted into the
other’s output, since they use independent MAC secrets [86]. Consequently, the
likelihood for this threat is set to Low. The resulting risk is set to Moderate if
the attacker is Hk, and to Low for the Is.
The threat Message corruption M4 represents a resequencing attack conducted
against AS. Again, it is not likely due to the encryption obtained with SSL.
Moreover, the impact is limited. For instance, inverting messages in step 2 and 4
would make C thinking to be able to access the WS, when actually it is not. So it
just results in unsatisfied user due to unavailable or delayed service.
For threat Message corruption M5, we can distinguish four events, one for
each step from 1 to 4.
Step 1 : The attacker corrupts the message with the biometric traits of C, but
cannot act as C. The corruption makes the verification procedure to reject
C, causing a DoS.
61
Step 2 : The attacker corrupts the message containing the certificate, alters the
timestamp, the sequence number, the expiration time, the decision, with
remarkable consequences for the subsequent steps.
Step 3 : The attacker alters a valid certificate, generated for C when it is being
sent to the WS. This impacts the next step.
Step 4 : if messages are corrupted by X, the WS denies the access for C or grant
it for a time window shorter than normal, thus provoking a Denial of
Service.
All considered, we rate the impact of this threat as Moderate, and the likelihood
as Moderate for the Hk and Low for the Is. The resulting risk and proposed
countermeasures are shown in Table 9.
5.1.4 System Level Threats Analysis
In this Section we analyze a set of system level threats, shown in Table 10, which
are typical of a biometric system [83].
Brute Force
Brute force attacks in general rely on computational power to crack secrets
secured with hashing and encryption.
The Brute Force B1 threat refers to the submission of a huge set of biometric
traits to the sensors embedded or connected to the client workstation with
the objective of finding a trait (or a set of traits) that let the attacker to be
authenticated. However, the CASHMA protocol, as it is, should maintain Low
the impact of this threat, because the number of retries is limited, as discussed
in 4.1.2. As a result, in our assessment the risk is also Low for both the attackers.
Sensor Spoofing
An attacker provides a set of fake physical or digital biometric traits designed
to circumvent the biometric system. The CASHMA system integrates a multi-
modal biometric system: the user has to provide a set of traits in order to be
authenticated. The multi-modality itself can be considered a first defensive
measure to this threat [83]. The impact of this threat is High. We assess a
Moderate risk for the Is attacker, which may have direct access to the device and
the biometric sensors. An additional countermeasure that can reduce the risk is
the liveness detection to ensure the biometric sample presented to the reader is
from a live person.
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Reuse of Residuals
An attacker gains somehow access to valid biometric data and reuses it. As
discussed in the assumptions, no biometric data is stored on client’s device.
However, it is important to defend from this threat, because the attacker may
obtain data in other ways (i.e. through Eavesdropping). The risk is Moderate
and the Impact is considered High for the Hk attacker. An effective defensive
measure is prohibiting identical samples being used consecutively.
Database Compromise
An attacker obtains access to template repository and is able to read, modify
or substitute templates. We consider Low the likelihood of this threat: we as-
sume that the CASHMA authentication server implements a very efficient and
complete set of access control mechanisms. However, the impact of this threat is
very high for template security and users’ privacy, and, as a consequence, the
risk for Hk is Moderate.
To reduce the risk, it may be necessary to introduce additional defensive mea-
sures. A viable solution may be cancelable biometrics, thanks to which data
are stored after a transformation, and if these data are compromised, a new
transform can be applied, thus replacing the original template [83, 87].
With the integration of this countermeasure, or an alternative template pro-
tection approach [88], we imagine a reduction of the Impact due to database
compromise from Very High to High, which together with a Low likelihood
determines a Low risk.
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Table 10: System Level Threats in CASHMA
Threat Description Attacker
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures
New Risk Assessment
Likelihood Impact Risk Likelihood Impact Risk
Brute X submits many traits Hk L L L
n/a
n/a n/a n/a
Force to find a matching Is M L L n/a n/a n/a
Sensor X uses fake traits to Hk L H L
Liveness detection
L H L
Spoofing circumvent the system Is M H M L H L
Reuse of X gets access to biometrics Hk M H M Forbid consecutive use L H L
residuals and reuses them Is L H L of identical samples L H L
Database X gets access to templates Hk L VH M Cancelable biometrics or L H L
Compromise and can corrupt them Is VL VH L or other template protection VL H L
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The assessment of CASHMA highlighted the threats that, in our opinion,
have to be addressed in order to reduce security risks connected to its usage.
The CASHMA approach can be considered a starting point for the continuous
authentication and non-repudiation solutions presented in this Thesis. Its assess-
ment is part of a design and requirements definition process, and is performed in
order to guide the development of our own authentication and non-repudiation
solutions. In particular, some of the countermeasures highlighted here are in-
cluded in protocols described in Chapters 6 and 7, which are an improvement
of CASHMA targeted to the inclusion of non-repudiation service.
The solution presented in the current Chapter, -from Section 5.2 on-, instead, is
a different approach which still possesses some common features with [19], thus
the assessment is useful for its design process.
5.2 the proposed mechanism
The solution proposed in this Section aims at providing continuous authentica-
tion, especially focusing on maintaining a high usability, and being contempora-
neously general enough to be adapted to different desktop scenarios.
5.2.1 Application Scenario
In fact, the mechanism has been thought for human operators of desktop
workstation but we think that it is applicable to desktop users in general. This
solution has been integrated in the prototype of the the Secure! [156] crisis
management system. In that scenario, operators are in charge of analyzing and
interpreting situations that describe the current status of an emergence. Using
the information available, the operator from his workstation (mainly via text
messages, using a keyboard) is able to command intervention teams on field,
and to dispatch instructions to civilians in the target area.
It is required to protect the workstation from unauthorized people (intruders)
and insiders that may want to acquire privacy-sensitive data, disrupt the crisis
management operations, disseminate false information, or simply commit errors,
which will be ascribed to the operator in charge of the workstation.
In order to protect the workstations, we need to guarantee authenticity of the
commands/functions executed, meaning that commands that are transmitted
and expected from an operator, are actually generated from him or her.
5.2.2 The BCAS System Architecture
The system we designed is called Biometric Continuous Authentication System
(from now BCAS) and it is composed of:
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• A desktop workstation, including sensors for the biometric signals acquisi-
tion.
• An authentication server, responsible for receiving the biometric traits digi-
talized by the workstation;
• A database of templates in which the traits are stored.
The choice of the biometric traits may depend on the scenario and the sensors
available. The solution described here, in our opinion, fits the workstation
scenario, but the BCAS system can easily be adapted to different scenarios and
choices of biometric traits.
Based on the characteristics of a generic workstation, the user interface typically
consists at least of a screen, a keyboard, and a mouse. In our opinion, the
best choice to achieve system acceptability is to avoid the introduction of any
additional device with which the user actively interacts. In this way, there is no
loss of time spent in learning how to use the device and, consequently, no loss
of proficiency and efficiency in the working activity. The system only requires
the usage of a particular kind of mouse that incorporates a fingerprint scanner
where users normally place their thumb [9]. This measure may be unpleasant
but is necessary; otherwise the biometrics acquisition would not be possible in a
transparent way. Then, the other sensors are a keyboard and a camera which
nowadays is very common to be integrated in a laptop or on top of the screen of
a workstation, e.g., for usage in video conferences.
The BCAS is therefore based on three unimodal biometric subsystems, for finger-
print recognition, face recognition, and keystroke recognition. Each subsystem
is composed of hw/sw elements necessary for the acquisition of the trait and
for the verification process, including sensors and recognition algorithms, such
that each one is able to decide independently if the user is genuine or not. The
fusion is performed at decision level.
These three biometric traits have different levels of performance and measur-
ability [10, 18], and we think that they well complement each other. In fact,
high measurability of facial images will help covering temporal gaps that could
exist between two fingerprint acquisitions, when the operator is not using the
mouse. Keystroke supports the other two traits, despite its lower performance
(as described in Section 3.2), and it can be useful especially when fingerprint
acquisitions are missing.
5.2.3 The Protocol
The proposed continuous authentication protocol is shown in the sequence
diagram of Figure 20. It is divided in two phases: the initial phase and the
maintenance phase. Before the initial phase, we assume that the enrollment already
took place as a preliminary step.
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Figure 20: Sequence diagram of the protocol
Initial phase
It is composed of the following steps:
1 The user logs in and each subsystem performs the biometric verification
in a short time interval. At this time instant, indicated with t0, the trust is
set to trust(t0) = 1.
2 Biometric data is acquired by the BCAS workstation and transmitted to
the authentication server.
3 The authentication server matches the user’s templates with the traits
stored in the database and verifies his/her identity.
4 In case of a successful verification, the BCAS application establishes a
session and allows access to restricted functions.
Maintenance phase
The biometric continuous authentication protocol works as follows:
5 The user’s biometric data are periodically acquired by the biometric sub-
systems operating on the workstation and are transmitted to the authenti-
cation server.
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6 The authentication server waits for fresh biometric data, from any of the
three subsystems. When new biometric data is available, it verifies the
identity claimed by the user and, depending on the comparison results of
each subsystem, it computes and updates trust(t).
7 The session expires when trust(ti) becomes lower than trustmin.
8 When the trust level is below the threshold, trust(t) < trustmin, the
session expires and the restricted functions are disabled. The user receives
a notification of this event, and, if necessary, restarts again from the initial
phase.
5.2.4 The Trust Level Computation
We describe the algorithm executed by the authentication server to compute the
trust level. Our system integrates three unimodal biometric subsystems
• S1 for fingerprint recognition,
• S2 for face recognition,
• S3 for keystroke recognition
such that each one is able to decide independently if the user is genuine or
not. The algorithm which computes the trust level is executed periodically
on the authentication server as follows. During the maintenance phase, the
authentication server verifies the user identity thanks to all biometric data
provided in a specific time interval. In our implementation, this interval is
20s, during which multiple attempts of fingerprint, and face acquisition are
sequentially performed, while a keystroke listener runs in parallel for almost
the whole interval. In general, let us consider the time interval [ti−1; ti], where
ti is the current time instant and ti−1 is the time instant in which the previous
iteration of the protocol has been concluded. Regarding the status of the system
at time instant ti, we have three following alternatives: three recognitions, two
recognitions, one or no recognitions.
Three recognitions: for any time interval in which all the three biometric subsys-
tems led to successful verifications, the authentication server sets trust(ti) = 1.
Two recognitions: two-out-of-three biometric subsystems led to successful verifica-
tion. The trust level is updated to a static value, which can be set a priori based
on the estimated accuracy of the subsystems that decided the user legitimacy.
The trust level is computed following Equation 5.1
trust(ti) = m(Sk1) + (r ·m(Sk2)) (5.1)
where:
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Table 11: Trust computation with two out of three successful recognitions
Pair of biometric subsystems trust(ti)
Fingerprint, Face 0.9+ (0.1 · 0.8) = 0.98
Fingerprint, Keystroke 0.9+ (0.1 · 0.7) = 0.97
Face, Keystroke 0.8+ (0.1 · 0.7) = 0.87
• Sk1 and Sk2 are the subsystems which correctly verified the identity of the
user, and Sk2 is the one with the lower performance;
• r is a parameter to weight m(Sk2) in order to have trust(t0) between 0
and 1.
In our implementation, setting r = 0.1, m(Sk1) = 0.9, m(Sk2) = 0.8, m(Sk3) =
0.7, we have the combinations shown in Table 11 .
The selection of these values has been conducted comparing the biometric traits,
analyzing how their performance is evaluated in literature (e.g., in [10, 18]), and
it is related to the number of false accepts produced by each subsystem. We
found that these values can properly represent the accuracy of each subsystem,
but other different values can be easily adopted, if necessary, following a similar
approach.
One or no recognitions: if instead, at most one biometric verification is successful at
time instant ti, trust(ti) decreases nonlinearly through time. Given trust(ti−1),
that is the trust level computed at the previous iteration of the algorithm, we
have that trust(ti) will be smaller than trust(ti−1). Its value is given by 5.2
(from [19])
trust(ti) =
(−arctan((∆ti − s) · k) + pi2 ) · trust(ti−1)
−arctan(−s · k) + pi2
(5.2)
where ∆ti = ti − ti−1 and k are introduced to tune the decreasing function: k
affects the inclination towards the falling inflection point. In regard to [19], in 5.2
we set the value of s, the parameter which allows delaying the decay. Through
an experimental evaluation, we found that 5 is the most appropriate value to
manage the delay in our setup.
The selection of k, in particular, affects the speed of the decrease of the trust
level. We adopt three different values of k according to which and how many
verifications are successful. A fast decrease is set when no verifications are
successful or no biometric data is transmitted. The decrease is said average if
only one verification is successful, for any biometric subsystem. Finally, we have
a slow decrease if face is correctly verified and keystrokes are detected but not
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recognized, either because data is not sufficient to perform keystroke recognition
or because keystroke recognition fails.
The latter is the situation in which:
• the user is actually busy in the usage of the keyboard,
• the user is not able to send any fingerprint data,
• the amount of keys pressed is too low or too sparse to permit keystroke
recognition.
Thus, a small penalization is assigned to the trust in the user, smoothly de-
creasing the trust level. The triples of k values selected for the experiments are
discussed in the following of the Thesis.
Algorithm 1 summarizes in pseudo-code what has been described so far about
the trust level computation.
Algorithm 1 Trust Level Computation
function InitialPhase
if user u is strongly authenticated or accepted by 3 subsystems then
trust(t0) = 1.
else if user u is accepted by 2 subsystems then
trust(t0) = m(Sk1) + (r ·m(Sk2)).
MaintainancePhase(trust(t0))
function MaintainancePhase(trust(ti−1))
Try to collect biometric data and perform verifications
if user u is accepted by 3 subsystems then
trust(ti) = 1.
else if user’s face is recognized and keyboard usage is detected then
trust(ti) =TrustDecaying(trust(ti−1), slow).
else if user u is accepted by 1 subsystem then
trust(ti) =TrustDecaying(trust(ti−1), average).
else if user u is rejected by all subsystems then
trust(ti) =TrustDecaying(trust(ti−1), fast).
if trust(ti) > trustmin then
MaintainancePhase(trust(ti)).
function TrustDecaying(trust(ti−1), k)
return
(−arctan((∆ti − s) · k) + pi2 ) · trust(ti−1)
−arctan(−s · k) + pi2
It is important to say that, in our prototype, the trust computation is only
influenced by the number of successful verifications, and not by unsuccessful
verifications. In fact, as an implementation choice, we do not distinguish between
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Figure 21: The SecuGen OptiMouse Plus
a missing biometric characteristic and a trait verified as not legitimate. This is
to favour usability, considering also the high number of false rejects that may
happen under different operating conditions, for instance, when the fingers
are sweat, or the room is darker than usual. However, an alternative solution
may address this difference: if a subsystem considers the trait belonging to an
impostor, this may cause a faster trust level decreasing w.r.t. a missing acquisition
of the same trait.
5.2.5 The Prototype
Together with the protocol design, we have developed a prototype of the BCAS
system aiming at assessing the applicability of the proposed solution and set it up
since the early stages of development. In this Section we describe the prototype
from different perspectives, including hardware components, biometric sensors,
implementation choices, and the algorithms adopted for biometric recognition
in each of the subsystems.
Hardware Prototype
The hardware is entirely COTS (Commercial of-the Shelf). For fingerprint acqui-
sition, our choice is the SecuGen OptiMouse Plus mouse [9], shown in Figure 21,
which incorporates an optical fingerprint scanner where a user normally places
the thumb. Such fingerprint scanner does not require active participation by the
user and, therefore, it is not necessary to periodically perform biometric-related
tasks that are not part of the normal user activities. Its approximate cost is 150
US Dollars.
For acquisition of the images for face recognition, we use the built-in camera of
a laptop that can continuously capture images. Finally, we collected keyboard
data using the standard PS/2 keyboard integrated in the laptop.
Software Design
In this Section, we describe our software implementation. All software we
developed is implemented in Java. Client-server communication is based on
RESTful web services (REpresentational State Transfer architectural, [23]), and
developed using the Jersey framework [24].
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Figure 22: Class diagram of the most relevant workstation classes
The workstation software, described in Figure 22, is started by a Client object,
which activates the methods of: (i) InvisibleFaceTracker, (ii) KeyListener and
(iii) FingerPrintDetection. Each class contains respectively:
(i) an algorithm that, exploiting the camera, saves an image if (at least one)
face is detected,
(ii) a procedure that, exploiting the SecuGen OptiMouse Plus, cyclically detects
and saves a fingerprint which, when available, is transmitted to Client,
(iii) an algorithm that detects the pressing of the keys. At fixed time intervals,
a text file is saved containing, for each row, the press and release times for
each pressed key. Such file is delivered to the authentication server.
The Client is in charge of invoking the UploadFileService REST client to trans-
mit via HTTP post the saved image, fingerprint and text file to the authentication
server, together with the client ID.
On the authentication server side, the TrustCalcService, shown in Figure 23,
guides the biometric verification, the calculation of the trust level, and the
communication of session expiration to the critical application or system which
has to be protected, and to the client’s workstation. The TrustCalcService class
contains the RESTful web service that receives the transmitted biometric traits
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Figure 23: Class diagram of the most relevant authentication server classes
from the client, and a REST client to communicate the session expiration to the
workstation. Getting the information from the client, the web service decides
which method should be called to start the verification process. Each subsystem
produces a decision about the legitimacy of the user.
At fixed time intervals, the trust level is raised according to Table 11 or, if less
than two traits are correctly verified, selecting the trust decaying function with
the appropriate k value as in equation 5.2.
The objective of this implementation is a proof of concept, while we are aware
that for being commercialized, the implementation should integrate recognition
algorithms with much higher accuracy.
An Off The Shelf solution for fingerprint recognition
The SecuGen’s FDx Software Developer Kit [9] provides low-level APIs for
device initialization, fingerprint capture and matching functions. It provides
support for Java and during the enrollment and the verification stages generates
the templates in one format to be chosen between different alternatives available.
Customized algorithm for face recognition
We have customized the face recognition software available in [20], which is able
to:
(i) analyze the frames captured via a camera,
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(ii) locate a face in the frames,
(iii) verify user’s identity.
When a face is present in front of the camera, the algorithm detects its presence;
in most of the cases, this happens within approximately 40 ms. Otherwise, if
a face is not present, the algorithm takes up to 200 ms to ultimately notify
that no face is present. The implementation available in [20] requested the
installation and configuration of OpenCV [25], an open source library that
includes several hundreds of computer vision algorithms, and of JavaCV, the
related Java interface.
The face recognition is based on the so-called eigenface technique [21].
Our customization of the software was necessary in order to:
(i) structure the implementation available in [20] in two client and a server
sides, where the first is in charge of capturing images and deciding if a
face is present, and the second of performing verification, and
(ii) make the acquisition of the biometric data transparent and automatic,
removing the graphical interface and interactions of the user with the
software.
An enrollment phase is necessary. During this phase, the user ID is associated
to a set of face templates. The verification phase compares the selected face to
the enrolled templates to produce a matching result.
The implementation of keystroke recognition
Keystroke data acquisition relies on the library JNativeHook [26] that provides
keyboard listeners for Java. In particular, this library allows detecting keys press
and release events and captures, in correspondence to those events, the time
instant of the events. JNativeHook also permits to detect the keyboard usage
(and the keys pressed), both if the user is typing in a specific text area or not:
the cursor position is not relevant. This is consistent with our needs as we can
capture keystroke data without being invasive for the activity of the control
room operator.
Relying on such library, we realized the keystroke recognition in the KeyAnalyzer
class, implementing the algorithm described in [22]. Such algorithm continu-
ously collects the keystroke dynamics (the typed key and related pressing and
release time) and applies a penalty/reward function on the dataset to measure
the confidence that the user has not changed in the selected time interval. An
enrollment session is required where the operator types several sentences, to
create a biometric template based on the timing information for each typed key
and key combination [22].
In our implementation of [22], when the keyboard is used with continuity,
i.e., there is evidence that someone is currently typing, we collect keystroke
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Table 12: An example of the first processing operation for keystroke data
current key dwell time flight time next key
16 432 -154 65
65 133 101 76
dynamics for a defined time interval and then we transmit all values to the
authentication server.
The selection of the time interval is critical because if the number of values
collected is too low, verification will most likely fail: a short time interval would
probably result ineffective for keystroke authentication following [22]. Moreover,
a long time interval would imply a long wait before transmitting the values,
thus risking that the session expires meanwhile.
We evaluated that listening for up to 10s of continuous typing was deemed
sufficient to allow successful verification (we also remember that keystroke is
the weakest of our biometric traits, and it is easily prone to false positives).
The KeyListener class executed on workstation side, records data in the
following format:
KeyDown,16,Maiusc,1409386484764
KeyDown,65,A,1409386485042
KeyUp,65,A,1409386485175
KeyUp,16,Maiusc,1409386485196
KeyDown,76,L,1409386485276
KeyUp,76,L,1409386485340 
where every row corresponds to a key pressure or release, and for every key we
have the corresponding hashcode, name, and the timestamp (at microsecond) of
the action.
The first processing operation of this biometric trait, performed by the authen-
tication server and implemented in the KeyAnalyzer class, is a modification in
the formatting of the obtained raw data, as in Table 12, where dwell time (or
duration) indicates the time during which the key remains pressed, whereas
flight time is the interval between a release and the pressure of the next key (this
interval can also be negative, as in the example of Table 12, meaning that the
next key has been pressed before the release of the current key).
Then, we analyze the obtained sequence to compute statistical data (average
and standard deviation) of the detected measures and the number of occurrences
of every single key. Starting from these data, it is possible to create a template,
in case of the enrollment step (and, in order to do so, the keys with a number of
occurrences lower than 50 and with a ratio between standard deviation and aver-
age of duration lower than 0.35 are excluded); otherwise, during the verification
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step, comparing the values with the ones stored as a template, and producing
the distance measures.
Distance measures let us compute the difference from the template, obtained
with the penalty/reward function [22] and, once established the maximum thresh-
old, it is possible to decide about the user identity.
Parameters Configuration
The proposed solution offers a wide set of parameters that can be tuned accord-
ing to system requirements, in order to manage the trade-off between security
and usability. The three subsystems possess their own parameters that can be
managed. For example, if we consider the keystroke subsystem in our prototype,
possible configurations are the penalty/reward function, and the time interval
for the keystroke listening. More in general, an administrator responsible for
the workstation security can act on the parameters that affect the trust level
computation:
• The weight r and the trust in the individual subsystems m(Sk) in equation
5.1.
• The decreasing function parameters k and s, in equation 5.2.
• The time interval between two consecutive verification attempts.
• The minimum threshold trustmin required by the system to maintain the
user authenticated.
In our prototype, all these parameters are easily set via configuration file.
5.2.6 Exemplary Run
For clarity, we show in Figure 24 an exemplary run. As discussed in Section 5.2.3,
the user initially performs a strong authentication, which sets trust(t0) = 1,
indicated by square markers in the figure. The BCAS acquires biometric traits at
time intervals of approximately 20s.
In this run, we have three traits contemporaneously verified during the intervals
ending at seconds 347, 1749, and 2002; this means that the trust level is raised to
1.0 three times.
Instead, when exactly two traits are recognized, the trust(ti) is set to the cor-
responding value of Table 11. In Figure 24, round marker signals that the two
recognized traits are face and fingerprint, and trust(ti) is 0.98; instead, with
a diamond marker we indicate that face and keystroke are recognized, and
trust(ti) is 0.87.
In the run of Figure 24, the situation of having fingerprint and keystroke recog-
nized in the same interval has never arisen, thus trust(ti) has never been set to
0.97.
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Figure 24: Example of continuous verification with the user remaining authenticated
for about 42m until leaving.
When the face trait is recognized and keyboard usage is detected (but it is not
possible to complete keystroke recognition), the trust(ti) starts decaying slowly.
This is indicated in Figure 24 by a triangle.
The decaying becomes a bit faster (average speed, star marker in Figure 24) if
exactly one trait is recognized, and even faster if no traits are recognized (fast
speed, target marker). In the run of Figure 24, we can see that the user remains
authenticated for about 42 minutes, then at second 2441 he stops using both
mouse and keyboard: only the face is recognized and the trust(ti) decreases
with an average speed for four intervals.
Finally, after second 2506, the user leaves the workstation and no data is recog-
nized: as can be seen in Figure 24, the trust quickly decreases to 0.47, below the
trustmin threshold of 0.5 selected for this run.
5.3 experimental evaluation and usability-security assessment
In order to evaluate the proposed mechanism, we assessed its usability and
security trade-offs varying configuration parameters. This allows identifying the
more suitable configuration for different requirements. This section describes
the tests methodology and results, after the introduction of some fundamental
concepts.
5.3.1 Foundations on Usability Analysis
The formal definition of usability by the ISO (International Organization for
Standardization) is the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context
of use [27].
There are important attributes characterizing usability. These are [28, 29]:
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• Effectiveness, which answers the question: "Can users complete tasks with the
system?" In other words, a system is effective if it behaves as expected and
can be used easily. This is usually measured quantitatively with error rate,
which in our context means FAR and FRR.
• Efficiency, which answers the question: "How much effort is required from
the users to do this?" In other words, a system is efficient if users can
accomplish goals quickly, accurately, completely and with limited resources
consumption. It is usually a measure of time.
• Satisfaction, which answers the question: "What do users think about the
easiness of the products’ use?" It refers to the users’ perceptions, feelings,
and opinions about the product, their comfort and feedback about the
system usage. Usually satisfaction is captured through interviews or ques-
tionnaires.
5.3.2 Overview and Goals of the Assessment
The best way to investigate the usability of our system is conducting a study
involving real users, because it provides direct information about how they
perceive the system and interact with it. Following the definition of usability by
the ISO, we want to study our BCAS in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and
satisfaction, taking into account also the trade-off with security. We will compare
our results mainly with [30] and [31], which among the works in literature
are the closest approaches. We will also compare with [10] the acceptability of
biometric traits.
Effectiveness
Can users of our system complete their tasks while the continuous authentication is
running? How often are they disturbed or even rejected as impostors? Are the impostors
rejected if they try to intrude the system?
Effectiveness itself is in a certain way a measure of the trade-off between usability
and security. We want to measure the effectiveness of our solution calculating
the FAR and the FRR for the individual biometric subsystems (fingerprint, face,
and keystroke biometric traits), and for the BCAS. These two metrics, in fact, are
indicators of system effectiveness: lower are the error rates, more effective is the
continuous authentication.
Efficiency and Resources Utilization
How long the legitimate user remains authenticated during a task execution? How
fast an intrusion is detected? Are the system and the user activity slowed down by
continuous authentication?
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In our tests, the efficiency of user-system interaction is represented by the time
that the legitimate user remains authenticated before session termination. Our
goal is to assess the efficiency of the system measuring the time interval between
the initial strong authentication and the unexpected session termination. We call
this measure Authentication Time (AT).
Similarly, we are interested in the Time to Impostor Rejection (TIR), namely the
time necessary for the authentication system to reject an impostor that gains
possession of a workstation left unattended.
We also want to clarify if the overhead introduced by the continuous au-
thentication system slows down the workstation and, therefore, increases the
effort required to the users. For this purpose, we asked participants to complete
four tasks on a workstation provided with our BCAS application running in
background. One of the tasks is performed with a placebo application that
resembles the real one but actually does not perform continuous authentication.
Consequently, it has an insignificant overhead.
We want to measure the Completion Time (CT) for each task, and compare the
CT difference between the same tasks completed with the real and with the
placebo applications. The tasks resemble real-life work using Microsoft Office,
and the participants are requested to reproduce documents using Word, Excel
and PowerPoint. This choice will also permit a comparison with [30]. In addition,
we want to calculate the overhead of the BCAS in terms of percentage of CPU
usage.
Satisfaction
What do users think about working at a workstation with continuous authentication
running in background?
The satisfaction of the participants has been measured with a Likert scaled post
questionnaire [32, 33, 34], designed to gather users opinions and comments
about their acceptance to provide the biometrics, and their interaction with the
BCAS for both the enrollment and the continuous authentication phases.
Trade-off Security/Usability
How do changes in parameters configuration affect security and usability?
Another goal is to perform the specified measurements with different param-
eters configuration, such as varying the trustmin threshold or the triple of k
parameter values, which modifies the speed of the trust decaying function, as
discussed in Section 5.2.3.
We tested two configurations of k, where its value is proportional to the decay-
ing speed, combined with three configurations of trustmin. Their values are
respectively shown in Table 13, and Table 14). As an example, with the first triple
of k values in Table 13, the trust level decreases slower than with the second
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Table 13: Configurations of k parameter
Configuration Type and Value
k 1)
fast = 8× 10−3
average = 8× 10−4
slow = 5× 10−4
k 2)
fast = 1× 10−2
average = 1× 10−3
slow = 8× 10−4
Table 14: Configurations of trustmin parameter
Configuration Value Target
trustmina) 0.3 highly usable system
trustminb) 0.5 trade-off security/usability
trustminc) 0.7 highly secure system
triple.
We also want to compute the Probability of Time to Impostor Rejection (PTIR),
which is the probability that the TIR is lower than a Window of vulnerability (W).
5.3.3 Design of the Single Experiment
During the briefing, the observer welcomes the test participant and gives a brief
explanation of the purpose of the participation: testing a biometric continuous
authentication system. Participants are asked to complete a set of four extremely
simple tasks, designed to represent realistic tasks of an office worker.
For each participant, the entire session lasts from 1 to 2 hours, depending on the
participant’s speed to perform the required tasks. Figure 25 shows the work-flow
of the experiment.
After a brief introduction, the enrollment phase is performed: exploiting the
GUI of the BCAS, and with the help of the observer, the users register 10
facial images, their right thumb fingerprint and their keystrokes. This phase
lasts approximately 17 minutes. Acquiring the trait and training the related
algorithm requires approximately 1 minute for the face subsystem, and less
than 1 minute for the fingerprint subsystem. The keystroke acquisition phase
needs approximately 15 minutes of keyboard typing in order to acquire sufficient
statistical data about key pressure and release. We decided to have an enrollment
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Figure 25: Workflow of the Experiment
stage of this duration because, even if it may appear long and boring to the user,
having a long text to type usually increases the recognition accuracy [35].
Then, when the enrollment is completed, the observer starts the BCAS, which can
either be the real or the placebo version. As in [30], the users are not informed
of the presence of the placebo version of the BCAS, which does not perform any
authentication and, consequently, does not introduce a significant overhead, but
which has the same interface and appearance of the real BCAS.
The identified tasks represent some of the ordinary operations, as realistic as
possible, that users may perform in a working environment:
• Task Word: writing a given text document with Microsoft Word;
• Task Excel: producing a spreadsheet file with Microsoft Excel;
• Task PowerPoint: creating a presentation with Microsoft PowerPoint.
Tasks order is selected randomly before assignment. After the participants have
completed the third task, they are asked to leave the workstation for a short
break.
The participants who have been using the actual BCAS are asked to exit the
room without logging out from the BCAS. In that time interval, and with the
BCAS application running, the observer sits in front of the computer and is
able to verify if the BCAS rejects him as an impostor – as it is supposed to
do – and the Time to Impostor Rejection. The impostor looks at the screen and
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uses the mouse until being rejected by the BCAS. This attack scenario may look
artificial, because an impostor would probably avoid contact with the fingerprint
sensor if he/she needed to use the mouse. However, in our implementation – as
explained in Section 5.2.3– in terms of trust level and TIR, the consequence of no
fingerprint recognition is the same as presenting a non-legitimate fingerprint to
the sensor. The scenario also allowed to test if the face and fingerprint recognition
subsystems recognize the intrusion, or if and how many times they erroneously
accept the intruder. After having performed the attack and just before the end
of the short break, the observer switches the BCAS to the placebo version.
On the other hand, for the participants previously using the placebo version
of the BCAS are simply asked to exit the room for a short break. In that time
interval, the observer switches the placebo to the real BCAS. The attack scenario
is then executed exactly in the same way as for the other group, but at the end
of the whole experiment.
After the short break, all the participants are asked to complete a fourth task,
which is the replication of the first task, and it is supposed to take approximately
the same CT. We introduced changes to the documents in order to reduce the
learning effects [30]. The changes are on the format of the documents and on
their appearance, but not on their length.
5.3.4 Participants and Experiments Plan
Participants were students and researchers from the University of Campinas
(UNICAMP), in Brazil, and the tests took place at the Institute of Computing
of the same University. We spent some weeks looking for participants, sending
them an invitation through mailing lists and contacting them in laboratories
and classrooms. Among the 60 respondents, 65% were male (39) and 35% (21)
female. The mean age of the sample was 27.72, ranging from 19 to 41 years, with
a standard deviation of 4.54. Their educational level varied from undergraduate
to postdoc, and their field of study was mainly computer science or engineering.
Even if the participants are computer experts, the task completion did not
require any particular skill except from being capable of writing documents
using mouse and keyboard, and the basic knowledge of the Microsoft Office
suite.
In preparation of the experiment, we divided the 60 participants in 6 groups,
having 10 participants per group. Each group had assigned a combination of
trustmin and k parameters. The assignment of participants to groups followed
the order of appearance: for example, group I had participants number 1, 7, 13,
19,..., 55. Participants were not aware of the existence of the groups, neither of
the differences in parameters configuration.
We ordered the six groups (shown in Table 15) based on our expectations about
system security: group I conducted the test with the most usable parameter
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Table 15: Configurations of k and trustmin for each group of participants
XXXXXXXXXXXXTable 13
Table 14 trustmina) trustminb) trustminc)
0.3 0.5 0.7
k 1) group I group III group V
k 2) group II group IV group VI
configuration, and group VI with the most secure one. Each user had the
possibility to test both the real and the placebo version of the BCAS before
or after the break. In detail, 80% of the participants (48 users, 8 per group)
performed the three main tasks with the real application running, and the fourth
task with the placebo version. Instead, the other 20% (12 users, 2 per group),
had the placebo version running during the execution of the three tasks, and
the real BCAS for the fourth repeated task.
5.3.5 Data Collection Techniques
The Completion Time (CT) of the repeated task was logged by the observer,
using a chronometer. We used the BCAS application to track all the other data.
An extract from the log file is the following:
2017/05/02 12:24:33,1,1,0,0,nodecay,acq,acq,not,0.98 
Data contained in the log are, respectively:
• a timestamp of each continuous authentication iteration;
• four Boolean values representing respectively the result of face, fingerprint,
and keystroke recognition, and keyboard usage detection (1 for legitimate
user, 0 when the trait is not acquired or the user is not legitimate);
• the decaying speed of trust (fast, average, slow or nodecay);
• data about the biometric traits acquisition by the server – in other words,
if face, fingerprint and keystroke were acquired (acq) in that time window
or not,
• the trust level trust(ti).
As an example, a 40 minutes session corresponds approximately to a log file
with a length of 120 rows, where each row is generated by an iteration of BCAS:
this means about one identity verification each 20s, as expected for our setup.
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Table 16: Rejection and acceptance rates of the system
System System Face Fingerprint Keystroke Face Fingerprint Keystroke
FRR FAR FRR FRR FRR FRR FAR FAR
0.61% 3.33% 4.61% 25.20% 19.78% 3.43% 0.00% -
We decided not to involve any additional monitoring tool, except from the
BCAS itself, in order to avoid introducing any overhead that could affect the
Completion Time. However, the system overhead was computed separately
from the other tests using Windows Performance Analyzer (WPA), available by
default on Windows.
5.3.6 Analysis of the Collected Data and Discussion
BCAS Effectiveness
We are now able to discuss the effectiveness of BCAS in terms of error rates.
Analyzing the results of Table 16, we can see that during the tests the face
recognition subsystem had a FRR of 4,61%, the fingerprint a FRR of 25,20% and
the keystroke recognition subsystem showed a FRR of 19,78%. If considered
individually, the FRR of our three subsystems are slightly higher than the error
rates declared by other approaches in literature as [35, 36, 37]. In some of our
tests, a high FRR is found, probably because the users were busy completing the
tasks and did not focus on how well the biometric trait was presented; this may
have caused imperfect traits acquisition and consequent errors in the recognition
process.
Another important measurement taken for each test, in addition to logging
the three subsystems’ FRR, is system false rejection, which corresponds to any
unexpected session termination. In other words, we have a system false rejection
whenever the user trust level is below trustmin. As a consequence, the system
FRR is obtained dividing the number of false rejections by the total number of
identity verification attempts.
As shown in Table 16, the system FRR is 0,61%. This means that, despite the
high FRR of the individual subsystems, our algorithm for trust level calculation
properly integrates the three subsystems decisions in order to: i) reduce the
rejection errors; and ii) let the legitimate user remaining authenticated.
Furthermore, if we consider the users that performed three tasks with the real
BCAS (real system group) separately from the 12 users that completed only one
with it (placebo group), we obtain a FRR of 0,40% and 1,44% respectively. As
expected, for the placebo group the FRR is higher than for the real system group,
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because performing three tasks with the placebo version of the application
means that they used the real BCAS for a short period. However, the results are
good if compared with [30], in which FRR was 0,86% for the real system group
and 3,13% for the placebo group.
Performing the attacks, we are also able to measure the individual FAR of
face and fingerprint subsystems. It is the number of times that each of the traits,
belonging to the impostor sitting in front of the computer, was erroneously
recognized as legitimate. In order to recreate the same conditions of trust level
decreasing for all participants, the substitution of the legitimate user with the
attacker happens when trust(ti) is 0.98. This is realized asking the legitimate
user to look at the webcam and use the mouse right after the third task was
completed, and before leaving the workstation unattended for a short break.
As explained previously, during the attack scenario the impostor sits in front
of the workstation looking at the screen and using the mouse until session
expiration, and this has been rigorously repeated for all the 60 tests in order
not to alter conditions. As a consequence, we were not able to calculate the
keystroke FAR during the experiments. However, we know from [22] that with
the selected algorithm, the average number of keystrokes needed to lockout an
intruder varies between 79 and 348, that means about 30 words.
We considered a system false acceptance any iteration in which the user was
erroneously recognized by at least one of the subsystems, so when the trust
decaying was average or slow. Results regarding acceptance rates of the system
are shown in Table 16: the face subsystem has a FAR of 3,43%, and the fingerprint
subsystem has an interesting FAR of 0,00%. Therefore, the system FAR is the
ratio of the number of false acceptances divided by the number of identification
attempts; for the BCAS it is 3,33%. We cannot compare our result with [30]
because the authors did not report the FAR of their system.
BCAS Efficiency and Resources Utilization
Regarding efficiency, we first comment the results in Table 17. Analyzing the
log files of each experiment, we calculate the Time to Impostor Rejection (TIR)
as the time needed by the BCAS to determine the instant of session expiration
from the substitution of the legitimate user. In other words, it is a measure of
the time necessary to decrease the trust level under the trustmin threshold.
As expected, the MTIR is proportional to the threshold (see Table 17). For
instance, the group I of participants, which has the lowest threshold of 0.3
and the most usable k parameter configuration, shows a MTIR of 2 minutes.
Conversely, the MTIR of group VI is 1 minute and 18 seconds, because of
the most secure configuration of k parameter, and the highest trustmin of 0.7
designed for this group of users.
However, the MTIR proportionality, and more in general all the analysis,
applies as long as our system is not modified. With other implementation
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Table 17: System efficiency measures
Mean Time to Impostor Mean Authentication
Rejection (MTIR) (mm.ss) Time (MAT)
group I 02.00± 0.32 100.00%
group II 01.55± 0.25 99.36%
group III 01.48± 0.49 97.96%
group IV 01.47± 0.47 96.09%
group V 01.28± 0.28 99.85%
group VI 01.18± 0.37 98.09%
choices, as for instance a trust computation which distinguish between a missing
trait and a not legitimate one, we may have different results in terms of usability
and security measures.
Generally speaking, the TIR is influenced by the false acceptances of the
recognition subsystems: between the tests that did not show false acceptances,
the lowest TIR is 44s. This measure corresponds to the time needed by the BCAS
to close the session if the workstation was left unattended with the configuration
of group VI.
Regarding the number of unexpected session terminations, we have that
75% of the participants were able to complete the tasks without any session
termination, so the BCAS execution was actually transparent to them. We can
considered it satisfying, especially if compared with the result of [30], where
the percentage of completion without logout was 48%. It is also interesting to
observe that the most usable parameters configuration let 100% of group I users
to complete the tasks without interruptions.
We also report in Figure 26 the simulation of the lowest TIRs of the six groups,
in correspondence to different intervals [ti−1, ti]. In other words, this shows the
time needed to reject an impostor if we increase the frequency of continuous
authentication iterations. The intervals varies from about 20 s (as in the tests with
real users), to 3 s (referred as "3s Freq." in the Figure). Repeating the continuous
authentication (maintenance phase) every 3s, and having the parameters set as
in configuration of group VI, would make the impostor to be rejected in only 18
s.
In Figure 27 we show how many tests would have been completed without
session expiration with the corresponding trustmin value varying between 0.9
and 0.3.
The Authentication Time (AT) is calculated as a fraction of the total time that
the user remains authenticated [31]. For instance, suppose that the total time
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Figure 26: MTIR and expected TIR of the six groups
Figure 27: Expected number of tests without expirations
needed for a user to complete the tasks with the real BCAS running is T seconds
and, during this time, the system rejects the user once or more times, preventing
him/her accessing the protected resources a seconds. Thus, the AT is calculated
as (T-a)/T.
As shown in Table 17, the Mean Authentication Time (MAT) of group I was 100%
because they did not have any unexpected expiration. We are not able to formally
compare our results in term of MAT with [31], because of the differences in
terms of tasks, length of the experiment and number of participants. However,
our MAT seems to be very similar to the one obtained in [31].
In order to determine whether our system had any significant effect on
Completion Time (CT), we executed a paired t-test on the difference between
the tasks CT with the BCAS, versus the CT of the placebo version. It is generally
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Table 18: Paired t-test results for task completion time
Task N
Paired differences: BCAS- Placebo version
t df
Sig-2
Mean
Std.
Std.Err. 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
tailed
Time Dev Mean Lower Higher
Word 20 32.80 5.34 1.20 -7.40 73.00 1.7076 19 0.1040
P.Point 20 6.95 61.43 13.74 -60.42 74.32 0.2159 19 0.8314
Excel 20 42.75 -37.62 -8.41 -104.1 18.51 1.4605 19 0.1605
used to compare two population means to test the null hypothesis that the true
mean difference is zero.
The combined paired t-test results are in Table 18.
N is the number of tests executed with the BCAS and then repeated with the
placebo version, and it is 20 for each task.
The Mean Time is the mean difference between tests with BCAS and tests with
the placebo version, Std. Dev is the standard deviation of the differences, and
Std.Err.Mean is the standard error of the mean difference. Table 18 also shows
the 95% confidence interval of their difference.
Under the null hypothesis, the t-statistic follows a t-distribution with n-1=19
degrees of freedom (indicated with df in the table). Comparing the values
obtained for t with the t19 distribution, we obtain the p-value for the test. The
result is that at the p< .01 level:
• There was no significant difference between time taken to complete the
Word task with the BCAS and the placebo version (p = .1040)[t19 =
1.7076,p > .05]).
• There was no significant difference between time taken to complete the
PowerPoint task with the BCAS and the placebo version (p = .8314)[t19 =
.2159,p > .05]).
• There was no significant difference between time taken to complete the
Excel task with the BCAS and the placebo version (p = .1605)[t19 =
1.4605,p > .05]).
We can conclude that there is no significant difference in completion time for
all tasks. This gives evidence that there is not any significant impact on task
performance, which is the same result obtained by the authors of [30].
As explained previously, in order to avoid introducing any additional overhead
that could affect the Completion Time, the system overhead has been computed
as a separate test and without the involvement of participants. The observer
executed the PowerPoint task twice, with the real BCAS running and then
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Figure 28: Questionnaire results about acceptability
Figure 29: Questionnaire results about enrollment
repeating it with the placebo version, obtaining a comparative analysis of CPU
usage with Windows Performance Analyzer ®(WPA). The resulting overhead
for our machine, in terms of CPU usage, is 2,06%. This result is promising
if compared with [31] and [30], who declared an overhead of 25% and 42%
respectively, and is also an indication that nowadays, thanks to the technological
progress of the last decade, biometric continuous authentication be actually
integrated without slowing down the operating system.
User Satisfaction
Analyzing Figure 28, we can discuss to what extent the participants are willing
to provide each of the biometric traits in order to perform the enrollment. It
is interesting to compare our results with [10], in which the authors perceived
keystroke, fingerprint and face characteristics having respectively medium,
medium and high acceptability, and the same result has been reported in our
Table ??.
The result of the test is that we have the highest acceptability for the keystroke
trait; in fact 80% of users said that they did not felt uncomfortable in providing
it.
We find a high acceptability also for fingerprint (76,67%), and 70% of the
participants felt comfortable in providing their face.
We report in Fig. 29 the users’ opinion about the enrollment. Generally
speaking, 83,33% of them were satisfied with its easiness. Between the three
traits, as expected they felt more uneasy with the keystroke acquisition (11,67%),
probably because of the 15 minutes length of the process.
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Figure 30: Questionnaire results about usability of the system
The results about users’ satisfaction regarding system usability are shown
in Figure 30. A consistent amount of participants (28,33%) found the keyboard
unpleasant: the notebook used for the tests had a column of special keys on the
left that the users often pressed unintentionally. Also the mouse, with the optical
sensor for the right thumb fingerprint acquisition, was not pleasant to use for
20% of the users. These two elements probably influenced the perception on the
system’s usability; still it was comfortable for 78,34% of them. 13,33% of them
believed they could be more productive without this system, probably because
of the higher comfort and the familiarity they have with their own system, and
also because they were forced to change their usual interaction with mouse and
keyboard (10%).
Nevertheless, the participants found the system easy to use (88,33%) and were
satisfied with it (86,66%). They also said to be able to complete tasks effectively
(91,66%) and quickly (86,33%), and this was one of our main objectives thinking
about our system’s usability. A proper comparison with [30] is impossible,
because the authors did not report the complete results of their questionnaire
nor all the questions; we only know that their users were satisfied with system’s
responsiveness, with the overall system, and with the comfort they felt.
The Trade-off Between Security and Usability
In order to analyze the trade-off between usability and security, we follow the
approach of [31]. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, we call Probability of Time to Im-
postor Rejection (PTIR) the probability that the TIR is lower than a vulnerability
window (W). Vulnerability windows can be seen as the minimum time frames
needed by an impostor to damage the critical system. In the ideal situation, the
PTIR is 1, meaning that the impostor is certainly rejected.
In Figure 31 we report the PTIR of the six groups of users, for different values
of vulnerability window. The higher the PTIR, the higher is the security provided.
As we can see, configuration VI is the most secure for almost all the windows of
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Figure 31: Plot of PTIR versus W for the six groups of users
vulnerability, and this confirms our expectations. As discussed, we designed our
BCAS to execute authentication iterations every 20s (plus a delay of 2-3 seconds
basically for acquiring the fingerprint). For this reason, comparison with [31] is
not straightforward: their system acquires 10 frames per second and requires
less than 3s to reject an impostor. With our configuration, after 150s we can see
that for all the curves the reached PTIR is between 0.82 and 0.97.
However, as discussed before and shown with the simulation of Figure 26,
increasing the frequency of user verification can easily reduce the TIR. When
the interval [ti−1, ti] is set to 3s, the TIR decreases to 18s.
The resulting PTIR for configuration VI is shown in Fig. 31 (called "VI 3s" in
the legend). It is obtained synthetically and just for comparison, but clearly
demonstrates that with this configuration an impostor is rejected after 25s with
a probability of 76%, and the curve tends to 1 after about 30s.
Another interesting evaluation can be done analyzing the trade-off between
usability and security with the same approach of [31]. We can discuss the PTIR
and the MAT, being respectively a measure of system’s security and usability. A
PTIR of 1 is obtained when the impostor is always rejected, and this, for a low
vulnerability window, means a MAT close to 0%. If instead we have a high MAT,
it should be more unlikely to have the impostor rejected, especially with a low
W.
The results show that the decreasing of usability was always very low if
compared with [31]. In fact, the MAT of BCAS varies from 96% to 100%. However,
even if group I had the best results in terms of MAT, for the six configurations of
BCAS we tested, a higher security did not correspond linearly to lower usability.
This anomaly is probably due to the influence of FRR and FAR. As explained in
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Section 5.2.4, in our prototype the trust computation is only influenced by the
number of successful verifications. A different implementation choice, which
may distinguish between a missing trait and a not legitimate trait, would have
direct impact on TIR, AT and on the tradeoff between usability and security in
general. In fact, we can easily imagine that it would probably reduce the TIR.
On the other side, it would be interesting to study if and to which extent the
modification causes any side effect, for instance in terms of FRR, AT and user
satisfaction.

Part III
T O WA R D S C O N T I N U O U S N O N - R E P U D I AT I O N
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N O N - R E P U D I AT I O N O F R E M O T E S E RV I C E S
As we have introduced in Section 2.5, non-repudiation is an important security
service: it provides evidences of actions, protects against their denial, and helps
solving disputes between parties. In this Chapter, we first review biometrics-
based approaches for the point of view of the provision of non-repudiability
property (Section 6.1). Then, in Section 6.2, and Section 6.3 we propose two
solutions for non-repudiation of critical remote services based on multi-biometric
continuous authentication. Finally, in Section 6.4 we present an application
scenario that discusses how users and service providers are protected with such
solutions. We also discuss, in the same Section, the technological readiness of
biometrics for being employed in non-repudiation services.
6.1 non-repudiation through biometrics: related works
This Section presents an analysis of non-repudiation through biometrics, show-
ing that in the literature it is an open question. For biometric authentication, as
for all the other authentication mechanisms, non-repudiation depends on [89]:
• the ability of the selected traits to discriminate between individuals;
• the strength of binding between the trait and the individual in question;
• technical and procedural vulnerabilities that could undermine the intrinsic
strength of the binding.
The discrimination capabilities of biometrics depend on the technology used
and on other application-related factors, which are quantified in terms of error
rates (FAR and FRR). According to [6], unlike passwords and tokens, biometrics
– because of its strong binding to a specific person – is the only authentication
factor capable of guaranteeing that authentication cannot subsequently be denied
by a user. Despite biometric traits are sometimes presented in the computer
security literature as an authentication factor that may solve the repudiation
problem [6, 89], other works like [90, 91] draw a completely different conclusion:
according to their authors, biometrics is not a security mechanism able to provide
non-repudiation. Analyzing the state of the art, we can state that answers to this
research question are contradictory. However, the situation changes [92, 93, 94] if
biometric authentication is coupled with another security mechanism like digital
signature, which is commonly considered as the standard approach to achieve
non-repudiation [56]. In fact, public key infrastructure, or PKI, and biometrics
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can well complement each other in many security applications, giving birth to
biometric cryptosystems [91, 87], and to the so-called biometric signature [93, 94].
Biometric signature is defined as the process of deriving a private key from a
biometric trait and using the private key to sign an e-document. According to
[92], this eliminates the problem of vulnerability of private key storage, which
resolves the key management issue. The dynamically generated private key lets
the user to perform signatures without carrying a disk or smart card [92]. One
example is [94], in which the authors propose a fingerprint based signature
scheme that uses a biometric trait to generate a key string, and then exploits the
string to create a public key and the corresponding private key.
The analysis of the state of the art shows that no solutions capable of providing
multi-biometric continuous non-repudiation of remote services exist. To our
knowledge, this work is the first in this field. It is based on:
• Multi-biometrics, which as discussed in Section 2.4, solves the problem
of authentication factor loss or steal. It can also avoid authenticating an
impostor in case a single biometric trait is forged or compromised, and
yield a higher performance than using only one trait.
• Continuous authentication, to guarantee the actual presence of the user of the
system/device. Noteworthy, we exploit authentication as a requirement for
non-repudiation: our solution binds the generated evidence of an action to
the user identity only if identity verification is successful.
• Digital signature (for both the solutions we propose in this Chapter) and
biometric signature (for the BS-CNR), continuously applied for the entire
session duration in which a user remotely accesses an Internet service.
6.2 ds-cnr : digital signature for continuous non-repudiation
In order to continuously provide non-repudiation, our idea is to introduce digital
signature in the biometric continuous authentication system designed in [19].
We believe that biometrics and digital signature are two security mechanisms
that well complement each other. In fact, biometric continuous authentication
contributes to strengthen authentication. Vice versa, as discussed in the previous
Section, it is not so clear if, and to which extent, biometric authentication
provides non-repudiation if employed alone. As a remark, the qualitative risk
assessment of CASHMA system conducted in Section 5.1, highlighted that the
introduction of digital signature is an effective countermeasure to several threats
– as spoofing, forgery, or message corruption – not only for repudiation.
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Figure 32: Overall view of the DS-CNR architecture.
6.2.1 The Architecture
The overall system, shown in Figure 32, is obtained from CASHMA [19] adding
a Certification Authority (CA), as featured by many PKI schemes. The other
main entities that compose the system are: an Authentication Server, the clients
and the web services. All of them are connected through TLS1. The CA provides
digital certificates in order to certify the ownership of a public key by each client
and to guarantee that the client has sole control and access to the corresponding
private key. We denote the couple of cryptographic keys as K−c and K+c , being
the client’s private and public key respectively, certified by the CA. We also
assume that the Authentication Server has its own couple of keys: K−AS and K
+
AS.
As in [19], the Authentication Server is in charge of transmitting a certificate,
called DS-CNR certificate, to the client. As for the CASHMA certificate in [19],
the DS-CNR certificate is composed of:
Time stamp, sequence number, ID, Decision, expiration time.
The Decision, which represents the outcome of the verification procedure carried
out on the server side and the user is not considered legitimate if the trust level is
below the trustmin threshold. The higher is trustmin, the higher are the security
requirements of a specific application or web service. Note that, differently from
[19], trustmin varies during the same session depending on the criticality of the
operation that the client is asking to perform on a specific moment.
1 SSL is now deprecated, thus from here we refer to its successor: the Transport Layer Security
protocol
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Further, we introduce two databases of evidences: one is for the storage of
the messages received by the Authentication Server and the related signatures,
while the other contains the digital signatures of all the requests and DS-CNR
certificates received by the web service.
The other elements in Figure 32 are: high-performing computational servers
that perform comparisons of biometric data for verification of the enrolled users,
and databases of templates containing the biometric templates of the enrolled
users.
6.2.2 The Protocol
Figure 33: Initial Phase of DS-CNR protocol in case of successful identity verification.
During the enrollment, the client provides the selected biometric traits that are
stored by the Authentication Server. We propose a continuous non-repudiation
protocol (shown in Figure 33) integrating the digital signature in the existing
CASHMA protocol. In detail, two different signatures are used during Steps
1 and 3 (and during the maintenance phase on Steps 5 and 7). The following
description highlights the differences between the new version of the protocol
and the original one, discussed in Section 4.1.2.
Initial phase
This phase, shown in Figure 33, is now structured as follows:
First of all, exploiting the client’s private key K−c , the application on client
side performs the signature S1 of the message containing the biometric traits of
the user.
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Step 1 - Message M1, with the biometric traits, is sent at this step concatenated
with its signature S1. The resulting message is then sent after adding a further
encryption layer obtained using the Authentication Server public key K+AS.
Step 2 - The Authentication Server is the only entity able to decrypt the
message, using its private key K−AS. Then it analyzes the biometric traits received
and performs the authentication procedure as usual. As in [19], the user is not
considered legitimate if the trust level is below the trust threshold trustmin. In
the DS-CNR protocol, depending on the criticality of the action to be performed,
the trustmin threshold may vary during the same session, and the Decision
is directly influenced. If the user identity is successfully verified, the server
authenticates the user, computes an initial timeout of length T0 for the user
session, sets the expiration time at T0 + t0, creates the DS-CNR certificate and
sends it to the client. The Authentication Server also stores the received message
M1 and its signature S1 in its database of evidences: these data can be accessed
to solve possible disagreements between client and web service providers. In
this way, the Authentication Server can act as a Trusted Third Party.
At the end of Step 2, exploiting its own private key K−c , the client performs the
signature S2 of the message M2, containing request and the DS-CNR certificate.
Step 3 - The client forwards M2 to the web service concatenating it with its
signature S2, which constitutes the NRO token. In fact, the web service storesM2
and S2 (the NRO token) in its database of evidences. This solves disagreements;
in particular, it protects the web service providers against repudiation of origin.
Step 4 - As in [19], the web service reads the certificate and authorizes the
client to use the requested service until expiration time. The client stores the
message received on Step 4, which constitutes a NRD token and protects it from
disagreements with the web service.
Maintenance phase
A maintenance phase is then started. It is composed of four steps (Steps 5-8),
analogous to Steps 1-4 of Figure 33. This phase is repeated iteratively: the client
sends fresh biometric traits (Step 5), the server repeats the identity verification,
takes the related Decision, renews the certificate and saves the evidences (Step
6); the client sends the new request and certificate to the web service, in order
to have the timeout expiration postponed by the web service (Step 7); the web
service stores the NRO token and then sends back the "access granted until
timeout" confirmation, which is saved by the client and constitutes the NRD
evidence (Step 8).
6.2.3 Security Considerations
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, we assume that all data exchanged with this
protocol are transmitted using TLS, which has been designed to provide privacy
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and data integrity between communicating parties [86]. However, TLS cannot
protect against the insecurities introduced into the client system: if the user
leaves his/her computer logged in to a secure web service and someone gets
possession of the client computer without permission, the TLS protocol cannot
contrast the intrusion. For this reason, the continuous authentication protocol is
necessary to guarantee the authenticity of the user.
In addition, even if TLS – exploiting a MAC – can guarantee that a message
has not been changed during its transmission, it cannot provide non-repudiation.
In our protocol, this is obtained with the integration of digital signatures in the
communications where sensitive data is exposed.
In other words, the protocol is now able to continuously guarantee user au-
thenticity (thanks to multi-biometric authentication), privacy and data integrity
(thanks to the TLS-based communications) and non-repudiation (thanks to
digital signature) of the exchanged messages.
Non-repudiation is obtained digitally signing the messages from client to
Authentication Server (Steps 2 and 6), and the messages from client to web
service (Steps 3 and 7) and back (Steps 4 and 8). With this solution, if a client
tries to deny having accessed a web service, a judge can ask the web service
for the client’s message M2 – that contains request and certificate – and the
related signature S2; then retrieve the client public key K+c from the Certification
Authority and compare the signed message with the original one to verify if the
signature is valid or not. In other words, consulting the evidence (NRO token)
the judge establishes if the client is lying or not. Similarly, the NRD token and
the help of the Authentication Server (which has M1 and S1 stored) are the
evidences that can protect the client from possible disputes with the web server.
In general, in a direct digital signature scheme, which means without the
participation of a TTP, non-repudiation depends on the security of the sender’s
private key. If a sender wishes to deny the access, the sender can claim that the
private key was lost or stolen and that someone else forged his/her signature
[95]. The solution we proposed in this Section tackles this vulnerability but
still does not eliminate it completely. In fact, in DS-CNR the digital signature
only works as long as the private key K−c remains secret. However, if the key is
disclosed (or if the client discloses it), an attacker can produce the signature S1
only if it also possesses the biometric traits of the user. Similarly, the signature
S2 can be forged only if the attacker possesses a valid DS-CNR certificate, which
contains a new sequence number and in which the expiration time has not been
reached yet.
With the DS-CNR solution, the problem of usability of continuous non-
repudiation is solved. In fact, even if the client has its private key stored on an
external device, it does not need to provide a password or secret for each single
transaction. It is sufficient to insert the secret only at the first login, without
losing security: thanks to the multi-biometric identity verification, a secure au-
thentication is guaranteed for the whole session. If, instead, the private key is
101
stored on the client main computer/device, the multi-biometric continuous au-
thentication will guarantee protection against insiders. In fact, even if an attacker
succeeds in violating the client’s computer or device, it still has to continuously
send multiple biometric traits to the Authentication Server if desires to access
the web service and perform the operations that it offers.
In other words, without the multi-biometric authentication, the continuous
non-repudiation would not be possible at the same degrees of usability and
security.
6.3 bs-cnr : biometric signature for continuous non-repudiation
To address the problem of private key loss [95], we present an alternative solution
based on biometric signature.
In the literature largely investigated [91, 92, 87, 93, 94], biometric signature
is a process of deriving a private key from a biometric sample and using the
key to digitally sign a document or a message. We exploit biometric signature
to prevent client’s claim of having lost the private key or that the key has
been stolen. The idea is to generate a new, additional, private key, denoted as
BioK−c , during the first iteration (Initial Phase) of the protocol. Analogously, the
corresponding public key BioK+c should be generated concurrently.
The advantage of our solution is that the client does not store the private
key when the session terminates, because it is valid for only one session and,
assuming that the key is securely transmitted through TLS, the client cannot
claim that it has been lost or stolen. In addition, the <BioK+c , BioK−c > key pair is
generated only if the user identity is verified (the trust level trust(u, t) is above
the trustmin threshold).
6.3.1 The Architecture
The overall architecture of the BS-CNR system is shown in Figure 34. The main
difference with DS-CNR is that for BS-CNR the Authentication Server is also
responsible for the generation of a couple of biometric-derived keys <BioK+c ,
BioK−c > for each client during the initial phase of the protocol.
The remainder of the architecture does not change from what has been dis-
cussed in Section 6.2.1. As in DS-CNR, an external Certification Authority is
involved, which provides digital certificates in order to certify the ownership
of the couple of cryptographic keys K−c and K+c by the client. We also assume
that the Authentication Server has its own couple of keys K−AS and K
+
AS. The
other entities are: an Authentication Server, the clients and the web services.
All of them are connected through TLS. Again, the other elements in Figure 34
are a set of high-performing computational servers for the biometric traits com-
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Figure 34: Overall view of the BS-CNR architecture.
parison useful for verification of the enrolled users, and databases of templates
containing the biometric templates of the enrolled users.
As in the solution of Section 6.2.1, the BS-CNR certificate is composed of:
Time stamp, sequence number, ID, Decision, expiration time.
Finally, the considerations of Section 6.2.1 about the Decision are still valid
here: trustmin varies during the same session depending on the criticality of
the operation that the client is asking to perform on the web service at a specific
moment.
6.3.2 The Protocol
During the registration phase, the client provides the selected biometric traits
that are stored by the Authentication Server.
In this protocol, the Authentication Server exploits the biometric traits not only
for user identity verification, but also to generate a couple of cryptographic keys
<BioK+c , BioK−c >, following one of the existing approaches, e.g., from [92, 93].
Initial phase
This phase, shown in Figure 35, is now structured as follows:
First of all, exploiting the client’s private key K−c , the application at the client
side performs the signature S1 of the message containing the biometric traits of
the user.
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Figure 35: Initial Phase of BS-CNR protocol in case of successful identity verification.
Step 1 - Message M1, with the biometric traits, is sent at this step concatenated
with its signature S1. The resulting message is then sent after adding a further
encryption layer obtained using the Authentication Server public key K+AS.
Step 2 - The Authentication Server decrypts M1 with its private key K−AS.
Then, it analyzes the biometric traits received and performs the authentication
procedure as usual. As in DS-CNR, depending on the criticality of the action to
be performed, the security requirements can demand a trust threshold trustmin
set to significantly high values. So, during the same session, the threshold varies
based on the operation that the client is going to accomplish, and the Decision
is directly influenced by that.
If the criteria are not completely satisfied (the message in incomplete or the
trust is below the threshold), the user is forced to return to Step 1.
Instead, if the user identity is successfully verified, the server authenticates the
user, computes an initial timeout of length T0, sets the expiration time at T0 + t0,
and creates the BS-CNR certificate. Then, the Authentication Server derives the
<BioK+c , BioK−c > couple from the biometric traits. Together with M1 and S1, it
also stores the key pair in its database of evidences: these data can be accessed
to solve possible disagreements between clients and web service providers. In
this way, the Authentication Server can act as a Trusted Third Party.
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The Authentication Server sends to the client a message containing the BS-
CNR certificate, and also the couple of biometric keys <BioK+c , BioK−c > assigned
to the user for this session.
At the end of Step 2, the client, using its new private key BioK−c , computes
S2. It is the digital signature of message M2, which is composed of: the request,
the BS-CNR certificate, the public key BioK+c , and the biometric traits.
Step 3 - The client forwards M2 to the web service concatenating it with
the signature S2 which constitutes the NRO token. The web service reads
the BS-CNR certificate and verifies its validity: it also checks if the BioK+c
has been already used before the current session. The web service stores M2
and S2 (the NRO token) in its database of evidences. This may be used to
solve disagreements, in particular protects the web service providers against
repudiation of origin.
Step 4 - As in [19] and in DS-CNR, the web service reads the certificate and
authorizes the client to use the requested service until expiration time. On its
side, the client stores the message received on Step 4, which constitutes a NRD
token and protects it from disagreements with the web service.
As in DS-CNR, after the initial phase there is a Maintenance Phase composed
of four steps (Steps 5-8), analogous to Steps 1-4 of Figure 35. This phase is
repeated iteratively: the client sends fresh biometric traits (Step 5), the server
repeats the identity verification, takes the related Decision, renews the certificate
and stores the evidences (Step 6); the client sends the new request and certificate
to the web service, in order to have the timeout expiration postponed by the
web service (Step 7); the Web service stores the NRO token and then sends back
the "access granted until timeout" confirmation, which is saved by the client and
constitutes the NRD (Step 8).
Note that the <BioK+c , BioK−c > couple is generated (and stored) only during
Steps 1-2 of the Initial Phase: these operations are not repeated during the
Maintenance Phase.
6.3.3 Security Considerations
This solution addresses the problem of continuous non-repudiation trying to
reduce the weaknesses showed by the DS-CNR, including the potential claim of
private key loss by the client. This solution introduces a strong binding between
the private key and the client user: BioK−c is generated in case of successful
identity verification only through the biometric traits.
In addition, the biometric-based keys can be considered as one-time keys: they
remain valid only for one session. However, after the expiration of the <BioK+c ,
BioK−c > keys, the web service or a judge can still use the BioK+c to compare
the message M2 and its signature S2, thus guaranteeing non-repudiation of the
access. What cannot be done with these keys is using a private key for more
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than one session: in this way the client cannot repudiate having accessed the
web service. In fact, if a couple of keys <BioK+c , BioK−c > is used for more than
one session to send a request to the web service (Step 3), the web service would
receive a message M2 with a BioK+c key that is already stored, and would deny
the access.
Moreover, in this protocol we assume that the transmissions are protected by
TLS protocol, so that the privacy and the integrity of the information exchanged
are guaranteed. For this solution, privacy is even more important because the
message M2 contains also the biometric traits of the user. This choice has been
made to give even more strength to the NRO token stored by the web service.
However, to protect client’s biometrics, their templates are not sent to the web
service in raw format: they are transformed using client specific parameters [96].
Apart from security, we also consider that the computational and storage
resources needed are higher with respect to the previous solution: the Authenti-
cation Server generates a couple of biometric-based keys for each client, once
for each session. Further, it stores the <BioK+c , BioK−c > couple with the corre-
sponding certificates in case a TTP is requested to solve future disputes.
As in CASHMA, for the two versions of the protocol described here, and in the
solution in the following of this dissertation, the certificate is issued based on the
decision from multi-biometric recognition. Thus, our approach does not include
a certificate automatically generated as a result of the comparison, as in some
relatively recent schemes [155]. However, the benefits of biometric-generated
keys are actually included in the BS-CNR protocol, as well as in the solution of
next Chapter, and this happens in the same step of certificate generation. In other
words, we think that our solutions do take advantage of the so-called biometric
crypto-schemes, namely in the context of <BioK+c , BioK−c > generation, but it
has to be clarified that a significant further improvement may be generating also
the certificate with a similar approach, as a biometric key-binding scheme.
6.4 an online banking scenario and its security analysis
The two solutions presented in this Chapter are general enough to guarantee
a non-repudiation service for many scenarios in which users and remote In-
ternet services are involved in a continuous information flow. In the following,
we present a detailed description of how the BS-CNR is applied in a sample
application scenario (Section 6.4.1) in order to prevent repudiation from a cus-
tomer (Section 6.4.2) and from an online banking service operator (Section 6.4.2).
The same analysis, which we do not report here in order to avoid excessive
redundancy, can be easily performed also for DS-CNR.
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6.4.1 BS-CNR System Design and Assumptions
Let us consider an online banking service which distinguishes between Risky
Actions (RAn) and Basic Actions (BAn). An example of risky action is RA1:
transferring an amount of money that exceeds a specified value (e.g., five
thousand dollars) to an account of a different bank and/or belonging to a
different customer. An example of a basic action is BA1: consulting services.
The online banking service exploits BS-CNR to permit Risky Actions only to the
legitimate client which is highly trusted. That is, in order to get a valid BS-CNR
certificate, the trustmin threshold required by the Authentication Server is set
to a relatively high value. Instead, the trustmin threshold is set to a lower value
in order to get a BS-CNR certificate valid to perform Basic Actions.
We assume a customer intends to perform operations on his/her online
banking account. The customer has been previously enrolled to the BS-CNR
system. On the client side, the customer device is a desktop computer, which
integrates a webcam for the acquisition of face and iris traits, and a mouse with
an optical scanner for the acquisition of fingerprints [9].
We assume that on the Authentication Server the BS-CNR system depends on
Sys1, Sys2, and Sys3, being respectively three subsystems with the state-of-the-
art biometric verification algorithms:
• Sys1 with Google FaceNet [97], for face recognition, which showed at FAR
10−6 a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of 86.473 in Megaface challenge [98],
and the impressive accuracy result of 99.63%± 0.09 in LFW benchmark
[99];
• Sys2 with IRITECH algorithm for iris recognition, which showed at FAR
10−6 a FRR of 0.002 in the context of NIST Iris Exchange IREX I [100];
• Sys3 with Neurotechnology algorithm for fingerprint recognition, which
had at FAR %6 10−2 a FRR of 0.083 in the FVC-onGoing online evaluation
[101].
Thus the subsystems possess a relatively high subsystem trust level m(Sk, t0)
thanks to their low FARk.
If during an iteration of the protocol the client wants to perform a Risky
Action (RAn) but the Authentication Server does not provide the BS-CNR
certificate, the action would not be permitted. If it happens when the operation
is already ongoing, because during the previous iteration it has been permitted,
the operation will be aborted.
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6.4.2 Repudiation Attempts and Security Analysis
Before describing two repudiation attempts and performing the security analysis,
we summarize the assumptions under which the analysis is conducted. The
assumptions are:
1. all the communications between the entities are secure (e.g., under TLS);
2. the Authentication Server and the Certification Authority are both Trusted
Third Parties;
3. the subsystems Sys1, Sys2, and Sys3 adopt specific anti-spoofing and
liveness detection measures so that the biometric traits are not forgeable.
The following analysis considers only attacks in terms of fraudulent behav-
iors of the parties and describes how the BS-CNR solution neutralizes them
guaranteeing non-repudiation.
Fraudulent Customer
Consider the situation in which a customer sends money to a second account,
then denies the transaction and asks for a refund in order to deliberately fraud
the bank.
At time ti, Step 2 of the protocol has been just completed, the Authentication
Server has verified the identity of the user, produced a BS-CNR certificate
containing a timeout of Ti = 20 seconds, thus setting the expiration time at
ti+ Ti. The customer sends a RA1 action request, providing on Step 3 all the data
needed. The banking service checks the validity of the certificate, of the BioK+c
key, and grants the operation until ti+ Ti is reached. The customer spends more
than 20s to complete the RA1 operation, but the BS-CNR protocol continuously
verifies the user identity and checks if trust(u, t) is always above the trustmin
threshold requested by the web service to perform RA1 operations. Otherwise,
the operation is aborted. In this example, the expiration time is extended, and
the customer is able to complete the operation.
A short time later, the customer repudiates the transaction, claims having
been robbed and asks for the judge intervention in order to get a refund.
The online banking service is protected against this attempt of repudiation:
it can provide the NRO token received on Step 3 (and Step 7) of the protocol.
This protection also invalidates a possible claim of private key loss by the user:
the Authentication Server can provide the evidences stored at the end of Step 1,
showing that the private key BioK−c has been generated on that moment and
cannot be used during subsequent sessions. Moreover, even assuming the loss of
the private key, if all Sys1, Sys2, and Sys3 subsystems have successfully verified
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the user, the probability that the multi-biometric system has authenticated an
impostor is:
P(FAsystem) = P(FA1)∩ P(FA2)∩ P(FA3) = 10−14 ≈ 2−46. (6.1)
Its value is comparable with the probability of inverting 2048-bit RSA used
for digital signature, which is 6 2−60 [102]. Thus, we believe that biometrics
constitutes an important additional layer of security, and the P(FAsystem) value
is sufficiently low to cause the customer’s attempt of repudiation to be useless.
Besides, such a claim would be counter-productive if an investigation discovers
the fraud attempt.
Fraudulent Operator
Let us examine the opposite situation, with a dishonest operator of the online
banking service, who somehow obtains access to the money transferring system.
We assume the bank employee succeeds in sending 20 thousand Dollars to his
own account from the one of a customer. The customer who has been ripped off
asks for a refund and for the judge intervention. When questioned, the online
banking service is not able to produce a valid NRO token (S2 andM2 evidences),
related to a hypothetical RA1 operation executed by the customer on that time
interval. Thus the judge solves the dispute in favor of the innocent customer
and the bank is forced to refund.
7
C O N T I N U O U S A N D T R U S T L E S S N O N - R E P U D I AT I O N
In this Chapter, Section 7.1 introduces the basic technological aspects consti-
tuting the background required to fully understand if and how a blockchain
can contribute to improve our continuous non-repudiation mechanism. We
also present a requirements-driven methodology which helps in this process,
and guides the selection of the proper blockchain category. Then, in the same
Section, we describe the assessment conducted to highlight risk related to this
technology, especially focusing on threats and countermeasures related to the
non-repudiation use case. Section 7.2 proposes a blockchain-based continuous
non-repudiation mechanism, its architecture design, protocol definition, and
implementation. Finally, we discuss this solution and advantages offered in
terms of security and privacy.
7.1 introducing blockchain technology
While at the beginning it has been known primarily for being the underlying
technology of Bitcoin [117], and often associated with finance and cryptocurren-
cies, blockchain is rapidly becoming one of the most exciting areas of interest for
researchers, investors, and companies in many other domains: scientific, social,
humanitarian, political and more [118].
Recently, in 2018, Sierra Leone has been announced [119] as the first country
in the World to use blockchain in a national government election, and this will
be probably followed soon by West Virginia for U.S. federal elections [120].
Meanwhile, in 2017 the number of investments in blockchain startups increased
by 300% [121], as well as the list of big companies involved as large investors,
deployers of Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS), or patent owners: IBM, Microsoft,
Bank of America, and MasterCard can all be considered just the tip of an iceberg.
Moreover, it has been predicted that, by 2025, blockchain platforms will store
10% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [122].
With these news and numbers, we want to give an idea of the enthusiasm
surrounding blockchain, considered by many not only a disruptive technology,
but a real revolution for business, economies, and society [118, 123].
The reason of this huge excitement is explained by its properties of enabling
mistrusting entities, applications and systems to interact in a fully decentralized
fashion, without the need for any trusted third party. Blockchains are, indeed,
trustless and decentralized databases of records, distributed applications or
smart contracts that can be shared and executed among peers.
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Important properties are provided by such technology, including but not
limited to integrity, pseudo-anonymity, fault tolerance as a consequence of
redundancy, transparency and, especially, non-repudiability.
7.1.1 What is a Blockchain and how does it work?
Blockchain is a technology characterized by a shared database (or ledger) dis-
tributed across a peer-to-peer network. The term recalls its structure, a chained
sequence of blocks, where each block contains a set of transactions 1 and, except
for the first one called genesis block, it is linked to its predecessor by means
of a cryptographic hash. Blocks are linearly and chronologically added to the
chain and can be seen as links of a constantly growing chain, hence the name
blockchain.
Figure 36: Overall view of the steps executed when a transaction is requested in a
typical blockchain network.
Each node of the network possesses a local replica of the blockchain, which
is updated every time after appending a block to the chain. The process of
committing a block takes the name of mining, and the nodes which are taking
care of validating transactions, collecting them into blocks, and appending the
blocks on the ledger are called miners. Nodes are typically independent peers
1 Here, as in Section 2.5, the term transaction indicates a message exchange in general, which may
or may not include a cryptocurrency transfer.
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capable of reaching an agreement on the status of the blockchain, that is, the
latest block to be appended, without the involvement of any central authority.
This agreement is called consensus, and there are many different algorithms
designed for reaching it.
The first application of blockchain has been financial transactions of cryptocur-
rencies, known as blockchain 1.0 [118], and Bitcoin [117] is the most widespread
and famous implementation. More recent alternatives enable systems and appli-
cations to record other kind of information on the ledger.
One example are distributed applications or smart contracts, executed and
shared among participating entities, in which case the transaction includes the
result of a function call. The smart contracts can be self-executing and general
purpose, thanks to the Turing-completeness property provided in some cases,
as for Ethereum [127]. These fundamental extensions of capabilities gave rise to
the so-called second generation of blockchains, or blockchain 2.0.
Fundamental Properties
Hereafter, we describe the fundamental properties typically provided in dis-
tributed ledgers; however, their provision may be only partial for some categories
of blockchain.
• Immutability. Due to the presence of cryptographic hashes in the blocks,
transactions stored in the distributed ledger cannot be later tampered,
reversed, or deleted without altering the hash values, thus without being
detected.
• Integrity. Cryptography, together with algorithmic constraints, provide
integrity on messages from users or between nodes, and ensures that
operations are only performed by authorized entities. In fact, Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures provide accounts identification
and transactions authorization.
• Transparency. Each participating entity has access to the distributed ledger,
and can verify transactions without a central intermediary.
• Decentralization. There is no central authority deciding on the recording or
not of a particular data in the ledger. Also, decentralization avoids single
points of failure.
• Pseudo-anonymity. In general, each user can interact with the blockchain
with a generated address. The address is a pseudonym which does not
reveal the real identity of the user.
• Non-repudiability. We have already defined non-repudiability in the pre-
vious Chapters. In the blockchain context, its initiator digitally signs a
transaction; in this way, the origin of every transaction is traced so that
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Table 19: Blockchain Categories
Permissionless Permissioned
Public
Reading is open Reading is open
Writing is open Writing is restricted
Private/Consortium Not used in practice
Reading is restricted
Writing is restricted
there is no dispute about it neither on their sequence in a distributed
ledger.
Permissions and Blockchain Categories
Although the properties of decentralization, transparency and the absence of a
central authority are fundamental characteristics of blockchains, in some cases
the participants in the network may have different authorizations and play
different roles [124, 125, 126, 128]. Thus, the provision of these properties can be
only partial.
Let us consider the two main operations applicable to every database: reading
and writing. In a blockchain, we may call reading the operations of consulting
the current state of the ledger and creating transactions. Instead, writing means
validating transactions, aggregating transactions in blocks, appending blocks to
the chain, and participating in the consensus protocol.
A permissionless blockchain is a decentralized and open system in which every
node has reading and writing abilities. Examples of permissionless blockchains
include Bitcoin [117] and Ethereum [127].
Permissioned blockchains, on the other hand, have been proposed as an alter-
native in which only a set of known and identifiable participants, previously
enrolled and admitted to the blockchain, are allowed to read, write or perform
both operations. Some state-of-the-art permissioned blockchains available to-
day are Hyperledger Fabric [129], Ripple [134], Multichain [130], Kadena [133],
Tendermint [131], and Chain [132].
The distinction between these classes is often combined with the notion of
public and private blockchain, used to refer to reading permissions. The four
resulting categories of blockchain are shown in Table 19.
Between them, public permissionless blockchains are diffused in applications
involving the general population, as well as public permissioned ones but with
the attribution of writing only to some priviledged nodes. Private permissioned
blockchains are typically owned by one institution (or a combination of insti-
tutions, in which case they can be referred as consortium blockchain). Private
permissionless blockchain are not used in practice as they would restrict reading
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while permitting writing to any node; though, some applications may exist, e.g.,
a shared black box for air traffic, where writing is open to every aircraft and
reading is restricted to officers.
Choosing between permissionless and permissioned blockchains is not trivial,
as there are often trade-offs including scalability, interoperability, cost, per-
formance, availability, anonymity, privacy, confidentiality, transparency, and
censorship resistance.
Analyzing the characteristics and the properties of blockchains, it is evident
that a typical blockchain may be useful for designing a non-repudiation mecha-
nism. However, in order to decide if and how to integrate such technology in our
protocol, we perform a more detailed analysis, exploiting a requirements-driven
methodology that we have proposed in [161]. In the following, we introduce the
part of the methodology for the proper selection and configuration of blockchain
that is relevant for the Thesis, applying our requirements.
7.1.2 Do We Need a Blockchain?
We have to acknowledge that nowadays there is a tendency towards considering
blockchain a solution for many issues, mainly because of the wide range of
crucial properties it can provide, or just because of its popularity. It is one of the
emerging technologies at the peak of inflated expectations, as well as artificial
intelligence or augmented reality [135]. However, a system designer, having
in mind the system requirements, should consider whether this technology is
actually applicable to the specific problem and convenient for its solution. The
approach we propose in [161] to support the designer in this task is described
with the help of flow diagrams. In part it can be considered an extension of [126],
with the introduction of more criteria in the requirements analysis step and,
especially, because it addresses not only the general choice of the blockchain
category, but also its configuration. An overview of the whole methodology is
shown in Figure 37.
The flow begins at the Start block and goes through the following sub pro-
cesses:
1. Project Requirements Analysis, for the dichotomous choice between blockchain
recommended or not recommended.
2. Blockchain Choice, the step in which, based on blockchain-specific criteria,
the designer is guided on the choice of the most suitable blockchain
category.
3. Specific Configuration, which assists the designer throughout the decision-
making process for the configuration of the blockchain compliantly with
the chosen category and the given project requirements.
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Figure 37: Overview of the requirements-driven methodology for the proper selection
and configuration of blockchains
Project Requirements Analysis. Blockchain: Yes or No?
This Section describes the first step of the proposed methodology, which consists
in determining whether a blockchain is or is not an appropriate solution to
address a specific problem, given its requirements. In other words, it consists in
answering the question: "Blockchain: Yes or No?". It is called Project Requirements
Analysis, and the related flow diagram is shown in Figure 38.
It extends [126], introducing immutability, integrity and non-repudiability as
additional criteria. It should to be noticed that some of the criteria directly drive
to the result of recommending blockchain, or advising against its usage.
• Data or State Storage. The first criterion considered is the requirement for
designing a system capable of storing data or system state. If in the project
no information needs to be stored, no blockchain is needed at all, neither
any traditional database. Thus, if this is not a requirement, the diagram
brings to the answer "Blockchain NOT recommended".
• Immutability and Data Integrity. If immutability is a requirement, then we
can recommend using a blockchain, as this is probably the most distinctive
property of any blockchain. At the same decision block of the diagram
we also analyze Integrity, as these two requirements are closely related
to cryptography. If a project requires data protection from unauthorized
modifications, than this requirement can be met with a blockchain.
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Figure 38: Project Requirements Analysis: Blockchain YES or NO?
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• Non-repudiation. Non-repudiation is another fundamental service that can
be provided using blockchains; thus, if it is considered a requirement, the
diagram directly produces the output: "Blockchain RECOMMENDED".
• Multiple writers. This block of the diagram is related to the decision regard-
ing data or state storage, and in particular it considers the multiplicity of
entities in charge of writing. If only one entity is a writer, thus a common
database is probably most appropriate than a blockchain, in terms of
throughput and latency.
• Trusted Third Party always online. A Trusted Third Party (TTP) is an entity
that facilitates interactions between mutually mistrusting entities. If a TTP
is required in the system, and if it is planned to be always online, then
entities can delegate to TTP writing operations, such as transactions or
state changes. Therefore, a TTP plays the role of a trusted deliverer and
verifier. In this case, a blockchain, known to be a trustless technology,
becomes useless, and the methodology brings to the related output. It
may happen that the involvement of a TTP is planned, but not to be
always online. In this case, it could play the role of an authority giving
authorizations for permissioned blockchains. Alternatively, a TTP may not
exist at all. In both situations, we cannot exclude the recommendation
for using a blockchain, and the analysis of the following decision block
becomes necessary.
• Writers are known and trusted. If all entities interested in writing know
and mutually trust each other, a blockchain is superfluous and, therefore,
not recommended. Our advice, in this case, is to consider a traditional
database shared among the writers.
Regarding the continuous non-repudiation protocol, it is quite straightforward
to see that blockchain is recommended. In the following, we discuss all the
criteria in Figure 38 with regard to this use case.
• Storage of Evidences. The entities (client, web service, and potentially also
the authentication server) may need to store evidences of their interactions
in order to protect from a denial.
• Immutability and Integrity of Evidences. Immutability of the evidence is
mandatory, otherwise a malicious entity may alter it, after having commit-
ted a fraud or misbehaviour and, thus, removing traces of its involvement.
According to the methodology, this would be already enough to consider
a blockchain useful for our purposes.
• Non-repudiation. In the blockchain context, digital signature is performed
every time a transaction is proposed by its initiator, so that the origin
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of the transaction is traced and, therefore, there is no dispute about it.
For this reason, the methodology considers it as another determining
criterion to understand if blockchain is recommended. And, in our case,
non-repudiability (or non-repudiation service) is exactly what we are
trying to obtain.
• Multiple entities writing evidences. We do have multiple writers. In fact,
at least one client and one web service need to store evidences of their
interactions. But the authentication server may also be interested to it. And
several of these entities may potentially share a single blockchain.
• Removing the Certification Authority. A TTP is always online? The assump-
tion that, in order to provide continuous non-repudiation we need a TTP,
is actually an assumption that we may try to relax. In fact, the architec-
ture proposed in the previous Chapter, both for the DS-CNR and for the
BS-CNR mechanisms, involve a Certification Authority. Our idea is to
replace it for a blockchain. In a sense, we may consider the authentication
service as a trusted third party; however, it cannot provide evidences that
the client actually accessed the web service, but only that it requested a
certificate. Moreover, a blockchain may be useful even if the authentication
server is still present, and the flow in Figure 38 already confirms it with
the analysis of second and third criterion.
• Known writers, but trustless. In our case, the writers are known, but they
may not trust each-other (otherwise the problem of repudiation would not
be raised).
This analysis confirms that the blockchain technology may help in providing
continuous non-repudiation. In the following, we first present the subsequent
step and then, we apply it again to our use case.
Choosing the Blockchain Category
Supposing that the outcome of the Project Requirements Analysis is that adopt-
ing a distributed ledger is recommended, the subsequent step guides the de-
signer in the choice of the most suitable blockchain category between the possible
alternatives described in Table 19.
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Figure 39: Blokchain Category Choice
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The Blockchain Choice step first considers reading and writing operations as the
main criteria for the choice. As described in Section 7.1.1, these terms indicate
multiple operations. In the flow diagram of Figure 39, we split reading in two
criteria, separately considering:
• consulting the state of the ledger (referred to as reading in the diagram);
• creating transactions (referred to as creation).
The possible configurations are: open, restricted, and internal, meaning respec-
tively that the operation is permitted to any node, permitted to some privileged
nodes only, and permitted to some privileged nodes belonging to a unique
organization only.
We define as mining criterion a project requirement that establishes the
entities allowed to perform writing operations as referred to in Section 7.1.1; the
possibilities we consider, as shown in the diagram, are: open mining, meaning
that every peer node can be a miner; consortium mining, where only some nodes
are allowed to write, but they can be entities belonging to different organizations,
or internal mining, where the miners are just a subset of the nodes of the same
organization. However, it may happen that, for a given project, the mining
criterion is not known a priori; thus, in order to conclude the choice step, we
have to consider more criteria. When this is the case, the flow brings to a sub-
diagram, indicated by State 1; the same situation occurs if reading or creation
criteria are missing.
The next states of this step, as well as the final step of the methodology, are not
discussed here because they are slightly out of the scope of this Thesis; however,
more details can be found in [161].
Applying the methodology to the continuous non-repudiation use case, we
have as an outcome a Consortium Blockchain. In fact, our requirement is that
reading, and especially writing2 transactions are operations that have to be
possible only for known entities. Another compatible outcome would be "Private
Permissioned Blockchain": however, in our case the entities are not part of a
single organization (as in private permissioned blockchains), but have to be
considered as a group of different entities.
To resume, after having applied the requirements-driven methodology, we are
now able to claim that our continuous non-repudiation mechanism may benefit
from the adoption of a consortium blockchain.
However, before designing the blockchain-based continuous non-repudiation
mechanism, we want to be fully aware of the possible known risks related to the
adoption of this technology, and the necessary mitigations in our use case.
2 to be intended as publishing evidences on the ledger and mining blocks
120
7.1.3 Risk Assessment of Blockchain Technology
In this Section, we identify the main threats to blockchain technology, and assess
the related impacts. Then, applying a NIST-compliant approach3, we perform
a qualitative risk assessment. We review the possible countermeasures, where
existing, for each threat analyzed. Finally, we discuss the consequences of their
occurrence in the context of continuous non-repudiation.
Goals of The Assessment
• Giving a broad view to users and designers on possible risks in adopting
this technology;
• Understanding strengths and weaknesses of a typical blockchain and how
the latter may be exploited by attackers;
• Exploring solutions and countermeasures to make the blockchain more
secure and resilient.
Assessment Methodology
Our analysis [162] surveys the most relevant threats, trying not to focus on a
specific platform, assesses the risk related to each of the threats, and describes
the respective countermeasures available so far, or desirable in the future.
Threat Sources. During the assessment, as for the assessment in Section 5.1, we
choose to address adversarial threat sources only, as opposed to non-adversarial
like human errors, structural failures, or natural disasters.
Threat Agents. The characteristics of the identified attackers are summarized
in Table 20, and this characterization is based on the Threat Agent Library (TAL)
in [146].
• Criminal Organization (CO) represents an external attacker, with govern-
ment level resources (e.g., a corporation, a terrorist organization, or an
adverse nation-state entity), and having good technological skills. This
attacker maps agents 6, 7, 10, 15, and 18 in [146].
• Hacker (Hk) represents an external individual having high technological
skills, and moderate/low resources. This attacker maps agents 5, 8, 14, 16,
and 21 in [146].
In each assessment, we specify the threat agent that we consider most likely
capable of conducting the attack. As an example, some threats involve the
control of multiple nodes by the same entity, and we think it would be easier
for a corporation, such as a CO, having at its disposal more resources. On the
3 as in Section 5.1 for CASHMA continuous authentication protocol.
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Table 20: Attackers and their characteristics
Criminal Org. (CO) Hacker (Hk)
Resources Government Moderate
Capabilities Operational Adept
other hand, other threat events require fewer resources but more capabilities,
and those are the attacks for which we indicate Hk as a threat agent.
In this Thesis, we only present the risk assessment for the threats that are
relevant for the continuous non-repudiation protocol. However, the complete
assessment and the full description of all the threats we analyzed can be found
in [162] and in [164].
The approach we followed to determine the likelihood of occurrence, as in
Section 5.1, is based on our experience and confirmed by the CVSS framework
[84]. Again, as proposed by NIST, the overall likelihood is expressed in a qual-
itative scale: from Very Low (VL), to Very High (VH). Similarly, the impacts
determination and assessment, as well as the risk derivation, follow the strategy
of NIST SP 800-30 [55].
Network Threats Analysis
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS).
This threat is characterized by an explicit attempt to prevent the legitimate use
of a service. A DDoS deploys multiple attacking entities – constituting a botnet –
to attain the goal, and is typically targeted to a single point of failure. This type
of attack is highly more complex to be conducted against a blockchain, thanks to
the decentralized nature of this technology; in fact, by eliminating a middle man
between the nodes of the network, the single point of failure disappears. More-
over, according to many sources (including for example [147, 148]), a blockchain
itself can be considered as a mitigation for DDoS, or even capable of making
this attack obsolete.
However, examples of successful DDoS already exist. Some are initiated by
miners and targeted against adversary mining pools to eliminate their chances
of winning the next competition. In [136], the authors empirically analyzed
DDoS attacks, and documented 142 unique events against 40 Bitcoin services;
they also found that 7% of all known operators were attacked.
Also, blockchains 2.0, as Ethereum, suffered from DDoS attacks. One example
is a computational DDoS [140]: an attacker took advantage of a combination of
underpriced operations and not efficient client (known as geth) implementation
to create "bad transactions". The effects were a reduction in the rate of block
creation, leading to a slowdown in the network, and an increase of I/O on the
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clients, some of which were unable to synchronize with the blockchain. It has
been fixed with a hard fork and changes in the protocol and gas costs, making
the transaction spamming more expensive and ineffective [141].
All considered, the assessment is the following:
Attacker: Criminal Organization.
Targets: Adversary Mining Pool, Users.
Likelihood: High.
Impact: Moderate.
Risk: Moderate.
Countermeasures: Proof-of-Activity (PoA) protocol, fast verification, and signa-
ture based authentication [143].
In the context of continuous non-repudiation, if the blockchain is temporary
unavailable, the entity is not able to store the evidences of interactions. However,
timeliness is not a fundamental requirement for non-repudiation; it is sufficient
to collect the evidences and have them stored on the ledger, when this is
accessible. It is fundamental that the evidence is provided in case of a dispute.
If one entity is isolated and cannot deposit the evidences on the ledger, it is
necessary to provide a solution in case this happens (e.g., temporarily storing
evidences on the device itself).
Other network threats, similar to DDoS, are: Partitioning Attack and Delay Attack
(or Tampering).
Partitioning Attack (as known as BGP hijacking [145]).
It consists in deviating and cutting all the connections between a set of nodes
and the rest of the network, in order to disconnect and isolate them. In [139], the
authors describe how an attacker can verifiably isolate a selected set of nodes in
the Bitcoin network. The impact of a partitioning attack depends on the number
of isolated nodes and on their mining power. Isolating a few nodes essentially
constitutes a DoS attack. Disconnecting a considerable amount of mining power
can lead to two different versions of the blockchain, with consequences as: block
discarded, transactions reversed, as well as loss for the miners, risk of double
spend and selfish mining attacks [139]. In the last case, the Impact is High.
Likelihood is High as well, and its feasibility has been demonstrated in [139].
Attacker: Criminal Organization.
Target: Users, Miners and Network.
Likelihood: High.
Impact: High.
Risk: High.
Countermeasures: BGP security extensions, monitoring systems [145].
For the continuous non-repudiation use case, isolating an entity consists in
another example of DoS, and can be addressed as we explained for DDoS. The
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possibility that a huge amount of nodes is disconnected may indeed lead to a
creation of a different versions of the ledger, with serious consequences such
as altering the contents of an evidence, or completely deleting it. However,
thanks to the consortium nature of the blockchain we are going to introduce in
the architecture, and considering that only authorized entities are allowed to
read/write and mine the blockchain, the risk is significantly reduced.
Delay Attack or Tampering.
A typical blockchain network assumes that information about mined blocks
is broadcast to the other nodes and quickly reaches them. The goal of a delay
attack is to slow down this propagation. Studies that demonstrate the feasibility
of this attack already exist. In [138], the authors proved that the adversary can
reach the goal by either introducing congestion in the network, or making a
victim node busy by sending requests to all its ports [143]. Similarly, in [139]
the authors describe an attack procedure against Bitcoin in which the delivery
of blocks is delayed by up to 20 minutes. This is obtained modifying some key
messages while making sure that the connections are not disrupted. This attack,
also known as tampering [143], can prepare for other subsequent threats, as
double spending or DoS.
Attacker: Criminal Org.
Target: Users, network.
Likelihood: High.
Impact: Moderate.
Risk: Moderate.
Countermeasures: possible mitigations are, e.g., monitoring round-trip time
(RTT), or using UDP heartbeats [139].
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Table 21: Risk Assessment For Network Threats in Blockchains
Threat Short Description
Threat
Targets
Assessment
Countermeasures
Relevance for
Agent Likelihood Impact Risk non-repudiation
DDoS
Exhaust network resources
CO
Mining pools
H M M
Proof-of-Activity (PoA) protocol, fast
Timeliness not necessary:sending large and verification, and signature
number of requests users -based authentication [143]
Partitioning
Disconnect and isolate
CO
Mining pools
H M/H M/H
Monitoring systems,
evidences will be included innodes from the network. Forks, users, BGP security
prepare for other attacks miners, network extensions [145]
Delay/Tampering
Slow down propagation
CO
Blockchain
H M M
Monitoring
blocks when possible.of info about mined blocks, network round-trip time (RTT),
prepare for DoS use UDP heartbeats [139]
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Private Key/Wallet Threats Analysis
The private key of a blockchain user is critically important, as it constitutes the
authentication factor. Since there is no TTP, if a user loses the key, irreversibly
loses the crypto-coins – or any asset and confidential information – linked to the
key. Moreover, if the key is stolen, it may also cause identity theft and account
tampering. In fact, once a criminal steals the account, it becomes very difficult
to track their behavior and recover the modified blockchain information.
Wallet Theft.
Many users maintain their cryptographic keys associated with the account with
the help of wallets. Most of them are online, or hosted software wallets, while
others are different kinds of implementation, such as hardware, paper and brain
wallets [143]. Their thefts can occur because of system hacking, bugs in the
software, malwares, or incorrect usage. Even if recent studies are proposing
more secure alternatives to software wallets, the usage of the latter ones is still
high. Therefore, in general, the likelihood of a wallet theft is High, while the
impact is Moderate, considering that typically one theft affects only one user.
The resulting risk is thus Moderate.
Attacker: Hacker.
Target: User.
Likelihood: High.
Impact: Moderate.
Risk: Moderate. Countermeasures: Possible solutions, apart from hardware
wallets, are Password-Protected Secret Sharing (PPSS), and threshold signature
based two-factor security [143].
Man-in-the-middle (Address Attack).
In some cases, the attacker does not target private keys directly. Instead, it acts as
a "man in the middle", altering the recipient address of a transaction before it is
signed. The malware replaces it with the thief’s address. In our opinion, the man
in the middle attack for the purpose of address altering, has High likelihood, as
it can be conducted in many ways, some of which have been already detected
[150]. Again, the impact is Moderate because limited to a single victim. The risk
is thus Moderate.
Attacker: Hacker.
Target: User.
Likelihood: High.
Impact: Moderate.
Risk: Moderate.
Countermeasures: Prevention strategies for man-in-the-middle, e.g., IDS (Intru-
sion Detection Systems).
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Vulnerabilities in the Cryptography.
To authorize transactions, many blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) use
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). As well as SHA-256,
ECDSA is currently also considered very strong, but this does not guarantee
that it might not be broken in the far future. Moreover, mathematical complexity
does not necessarily guarantee the security of a cryptographic algorithm when
it is implemented in a real-world situation. Implementation can dramatically
lower the security level [142], and this may have a dramatic impact in private key
security. In [142], the authors discovered a vulnerability in the ECDSA scheme,
through which an attacker can recover the user’s private key because it does not
generate enough randomness during the signature process.
Thus, the likelihood of breaking the cryptography is, in our opinion, Very Low,
at least for the computational power available, even for a CO. However, for
this assessment we consider the likelihood of exploiting a vulnerability in the
implementation of a cryptographic algorithm as slightly higher: Low. The impact,
instead, is High because the vulnerability can cause the loss of private keys for
every user of a blockchain with that particular implementation.
Attacker: Criminal Organization.
Target: User.
Likelihood: Low.
Impact: High.
Risk: Low. Countermeasures: they are specific for addressing implementation
related vulnerabilities. Some examples are in [142].
Considering the continuous non-repudiation use case, every entity interested in
storing an evidence on the blockchain has its own private key. In this context,
the loss or theft of the private key is a risk that has to be eliminated; otherwise,
repudiation would be possible, undermining all the efforts.
Therefore, we assume that the entities involved in our scenario are not using
online wallets, and that the countermeasures presented in this Section (e.g.,
prevention strategies for man-in-the middle, and IDS), necessary to face the
problems of private key loss and theft, are integrated in the continuous non-
repudiation mechanism.
Moreover, as already addressed in Section 6.3, the same solution is viable also
here: usage of biometric signature to be included in the evidence. As discussed
for the BS-CNR, this measure significantly reduces the effectiveness of a private
key loss claim.
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Table 22: Risk Assessment For Private Key/Wallet Threats in Blockchains
Threat Short Description
Threat
Targets
Assessment
Countermeasures
Relevance for
Agent Likelihood Impact Risk non-repudiation
Wallet Tampering the sw that
Hk User H M M
Password-Protected Secret Sharing, Include a Biometric Signature
Theft manages user keys and threshold signature based in the evidence
associated with the account two-factor security [143] stored on the chain
Man-in- Altering the address
CO
Mining pools
H M M
Typical prevention strategies Assuming that
the-middle of a transaction users, for m-i-t-m, typical prevention measures
before it is signed miners, network as IDS [145] are taken.
Breaking Slow down propagation
CO
Blockchain
L H L
Specific for implementation Assuming that known
the of info about mined blocks, network related vulnerabilities. vulnerabilities
Cryptography prepare for DoS Examples are in [142] are removed from implementation
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7.2 block-cnr : a blockchain-based approach for continuous non-
repudiation
In order to continuously provide non-repudiation, our idea is to introduce
blockchain technology in the architecture designed for previous versions of
the CNR protocols, as described in in the previous Chapter. This solution, in
particular, builds on the BS-CNR solution presented in Section 6.3, with the aim
of maintaining all its strengths, while avoiding the involvement of an additional
Certification Authority.
Moreover, we believe that the usage of a blockchain, thanks to its intrinsic prop-
erties (especially immutability and integrity), enhances the storage of evidences
with regard to a traditional database. As previously explained, evidences are
the key elements for the provision of a non-repudiation service.
After having considered the usefulness and main risks regarding the adoption
of this technology for continuous non-repudiation, we present in this Section
the approach that we called Block-CNR.
7.2.1 Design of the Architecture
The overall system, shown in Figure 40, is obtained from BS-CNR, after re-
moving the Certification Authority (CA), and substituting it with a consortium
blockchain. As in the previous versions, the other main entities that compose
the system are: an Authentication Server, the clients and the web services.
Again, we assume that all the connections are under TLS, and this is mandatory
in order to reduce the risks highlighted during the assessments (e.g., man-in-
the-middle). The couple of cryptographic keys, denoted here as K−c and K+c , are
the client’s private and public key, respectively: in this case they indicate the
keys necessary also for interacting with the blockchain network.
As in the BS-CNR, we assume that the Authentication Server has its own couple
of keys: K−AS and K
+
AS. As in [19], the Authentication Server is in charge of
transmitting a certificate to the client. The certificate is composed of:
Time stamp, sequence number, ID, Decision, expiration time.
It should be noted that, in Figure 40, the two databases of evidences, present
in the DS-CNR and BS-CNR architectures, have been removed here. The other
elements, instead, are not changed.
As a pre-requirement, we assume that the entities allowed to perform read
and write operations to the blockchain, as well as mining the blocks, have
been previously enrolled and are considered part of a consortium. In general,
each entity that interacts through Block-CNR possesses the cryptographic keys
necessary to participate in the consortium blockchain. This means that the Web
Service is also equipped with its own keys.
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Figure 40: Overall view of the Block-CNR Architecture
7.2.2 The Protocol
As in the BS-CNR, in this protocol the AS exploits the biometric traits obtained
from the client during the enrollment, not only for user identity verification, but
also to generate the <BioK+c , BioK−c > keys. This is necessary to face the problem
of private key loss, which has already been raised during the risk assessment of
the blockchain technology. The biometric key pairs may be generated following
one of the existing approaches e.g., from [92, 93].
Initial phase
This phase, shown in Figure 41, is now structured as follows:
Step 0 - The client performs an Access request to the Web Service, in order to obtain
access to the critical functions. The Web Service replies with a Certificate
Request, asking for its provision; otherwise, the access is not granted.
Exploiting the client’s private key K−c , the application on the client side
performs the signature S1 of the message containing the biometric traits of
the user.
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Figure 41: Initial Phase of the Block-CNR Protocol
Step 1 - Message M1, with the biometric traits, is sent at this step concatenated
with its signature S1. The resulting message is then sent after adding a
further encryption layer obtained using the AS public key K+AS.
Step 2 - The Authentication Server decrypts M1 with its private key K−AS. Then,
it analyzes the biometric traits received and performs the authentication
procedure as usual. As in the BS-CNR, depending on the criticality of
the action to be performed, the security requirements may demand a
trust threshold trustmin significantly high. So, during the same session,
the threshold varies based on the operation that the client is going to
accomplish, and the Decision is directly influenced by that.
If the criteria are not completely satisfied (the message in incomplete or
the trust is below the threshold), the user is forced to return to Step 1.
Instead, if the user identity is successfully verified, the server authenticates
the user, computes an initial timeout of length T0, sets the expiration
time to T0 + t0, and creates the certificate. Then, the Authentication Server
derives the <BioK+c , BioK−c > couple from the biometric traits.
One of the main differences here, with regard to BS-CNR, is that the
storage of messages M1 and S1 in a database of evidences is not necessary.
In fact, thanks to the involvement of a blockchain, AS is not asked to play
the role of a TTP and solve possible disagreements between clients and
web service providers.
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AS, instead, is now only responsible for sending to the client a message con-
taining the certificate, and the couple of biometric keys <BioK+c , BioK−c >
assigned to the user for this session.
At the end of Step 2, the client, using its new private key BioK−c , computes
S2. It is the digital signature of the message M2, which is composed of the
request, the certificate, the public key BioK+c , and the biometric traits4.
Step 3 - The client forwards M2 to WS, concatenating it with the signature S2 that
constitutes part of the NRO token. The web service analyzes the certificate
and verifies its validity; it also checks if the BioK+c has been already used
before the current session.
Step 4 - As in [19], and in the previous versions of the CNR protocol, the web
service reads the certificate and authorizes the client to use the requested
service until expiration time.
Step 5 - This step is introduced in this version of the protocol, and constitutes the
main innovation with regard to the previous versions. Both the client and
the Web Service propose a transaction to be included on the next block of
the ledger. These are the evidences useful in case of a repudiation attempt
operated by the counterpart, and constitute the core of non-repudiation
service.
NRD, is a transaction proposed by WS that contains message M2 and its
signature S2. This is to protect the WS against C’s false denial of having
originated the message on Step 3, that is, denying the (request of) access
to the web service and to the critical functions offered by it.
NRO, is a transaction proposed by the client that contains "access granted
until timeout" message. This is to protect C against WS’s false denial of
having originated the message on Step 4, that is, having provided the
access to the client.
Note that this is in agreement with the definitions of NRO and NRD in
[56], as described in Section 2.5.1.
The structure and detailed content of NRO and NRD transactions are
discussed in Section 7.2.3.
As in BS-CNR, after the initial phase there is a Maintenance Phase composed of
five steps (Steps 6-9), analogous to Steps 1-5 of Figure 41. This phase is repeated
iteratively: the client sends fresh biometric traits (Step 6), the server repeats the
identity verification, takes the related Decision, and renews the certificate (Step
7); the client sends the new request and certificate to the web service, in order to
4 this information, indicated as biometric traits in Figure 41, is not intended as raw biometrics, but
as a transformation of their templates, e.g., performed following one of the template protection
approaches indicated in [88]
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have the timeout expiration postponed by the web service (Step 8); finally, new
NRO and NRD transactions are proposed for inclusion on the ledger (Step 9).
Note that, as happened for BS-CNR, the <BioK+c , BioK−c > couple is generated
only during Steps 1-2 of the Initial Phase; these operations are not repeated
during the Maintenance Phase.
7.2.3 Implementation
In order to test if the adoption of a blockchain is actually a viable alternative for
the provision of continuous non-repudiation, we created our own consortium
blockchain. However, we think that the approach presented in the previous
Sections of this Chapter is general enough to be adapted to different platforms
and implementations.
Our implementation is based on Multichain [130, 151]. This is an open platform
for building and deploying blockchain applications, already discussed in Section
7.1.1 as one of the alternative permissioned blockchains. One of the reasons
for choosing Multichain is the possibility to set many fine-grained permissions.
However, the objective of this implementation is only to show that it is easy to
create a blockchain and set it up to effectively store the evidences necessary in
our continuous non-repudiation protocol.
The architecture is composed of two nodes: C and WS, representing Client and
Web Service, respectively.
Creating a Blockchain
After having downloaded and installed Multichain on both our servers, the first
step is the creation of the chain, whose name in our case is chain1.
On WS, we run the command
multichain-util create chain1 
and the output contains the message
[...]
Blockchain parameter set was successfully generated.
[...] 
WS here plays the role of the seed node, being the node that created the chain.
However, the parameters can be later set in order to give exactly the same
permissions to nodes that are part of the consortium. In this way, we will not
have differences between nodes, and our blockchain could be actually considered
peer to peer.
Initialization
Then, we initialize the blockchain with the command:
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multichaind chain1 -daemon 
This step, which also includes the mining of the genesis block, produces the
output:
MultiChain 1.0.2 Daemon (latest protocol 10009)
MultiChain server starting
Looking for genesis block...
Genesis block found
Other nodes can connect to this node using:
multichaind chain1@11.11.11.39:9731
Node started 
Connecting and Permissions
By default, the blockchain we have created so far is a private one. This means
that it has been sucessfully initialized, but any other node needs permissions in
order to connect to the chain.
In fact, this is what happens if, on the C server, we control the existence of
chain1 chain without having the permission.
Executed command:
multichaind chain1@11.11.11.39:9731 
Output:
MultiChain 1.0.2 Daemon (latest protocol 10009)
Retrieving blockchain parameters from the seed node 11.11.11.39:9731 ...
Blockchain successfully initialized.
Please ask blockchain admin or user having activate permission to let you
connect and/or transact:
multichain-cli chain1 grant 1CW42yEtA4bLQ8saCAtmdxG8oradVPB7PQKwny connect 
The meaning of the message is that, checking on WS (the seed node), the
blockchain chain1 that C is looking for, actually exists and has been initialized.
The Multichain output also suggests the command to be executed in order to
give permissions is grant; it has to be noticed that
1CW42yEtA4bLQ8saCAtmdxG8oradVPB7PQKwny
is the address (public key) of C server, and the permission we have to provide is
connect.
Thus, what we do is running the command
multichain-cli chain1 grant 1CW42yEtA4bLQ8saCAtmdxG8oradVPB7PQKwny connect 
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Table 23: Permissions in Our Consortium Blockchain
Node Role Permissions
Web Service Seed Node mine, admin, activate, connect, send, receive, issue, and create
Client - mine, admin, activate, connect, send, receive, issue, and create
Any other node - none
obtaining:
{"method":"grant","params":["1CW42yEtA4bLQ8saCAtmdxG8oradVPB7PQKwny","
connect"],"id":1,"chain_name":"chain1"}
5c95375b6d862e61f658eb3f7555d35e4548359feec7d12cee83beb50cbcfeac 
The connection from C side can be easily completed with
multichaind chain1 -daemon 
and the output is:
MultiChain 1.0.2 Daemon (latest protocol 10009)
MultiChain server starting
Retrieving blockchain parameters from the seed node 11.11.11.39:9731 ...
Other nodes can connect to this node using:
multichaind chain1@11.11.11.11:9731
Node started 
As can be seen in this output, a third node (e.g., another Client, or another WS),
which is part of the consortium and has already obtained the permissions, can
easily connect to the same chain specifying the chain name, followed by either
the IP of the seed node, or the IP of another node already connected to it.
The permissions, as set in our implementation, are summarized in Table 23
Where to Store Evidences
The next step is to investigate if and how we can store and retrieve evidences on
the chain.
There is an item called stream, which can be created in a Multichain blockchain
in multiple instances. Each stream acts as an independent append-only collection
of items, and possesses the following features:
• publishers - One or more publishers who have digitally signed that item.
• key - An optional key (between 0 and 256 bytes in length) for convenient
later retrieval.
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• data - Some data, which can range from a small piece of text to many
megabytes of raw binary. It must be an hexadecimal string.
• timestamp - A timestamp, which is taken from the header of the block in
which the item is confirmed.
Also for streams, there are permissions that can be set in order to control
entities that are allowed to publish data on a stream and manage it.
We execute the following command, where evidences is the name of the
stream, and false is the setting for "open" parameter of this stream, based on
which publishers must be explicitly granted per-stream write permissions.
create stream evidences false 
Publishing NRO and NRD Evidences
The last step is to understand which will be the format of evidences to be
published on the stream. As discussed in Section 7.2.2, the core of the evidences
will be:
• NRD, on WS side, containing message M2 and its signature S2.
• NRO, on client side, containing "access granted until timeout" message.
An exemplary log for the NRD is
{
"client_id": "1CW42yEtA4bLQ8saCAtmdxG8oradVPB7PQKwny",
"ws_id": "1CKN5knCoPniPnsGKrFBHyAu2e4BxPFATJPBcM",
"m_2": {
request:{
function_1(parameters_list)
...
function_n(parameters_list)
}
certificate: Timestamp, seq_num, ID, Decision, exp_time
biok+: public_biometric_key
biometric_traits:{
transformed_template_1
...
transformed_template_n
}
"s_2": signature_of_m2
} 
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where the client_id and ws_id correspond to the respective blockchain
address (or any other identifier). Therefore, this evidence can be published
on a stream called evidences, with the key value expressed in the form of
client_id_NRD_ws_id, followed by the content of the NRD itself, after the appli-
cation of a hash function5.
The command to be executed is the following:
publish evidences client_id_NRD_ws_id d94553547c00025df6036278249cc19baf39e
910781543759450696c59019bda 
With an analogous approach, we also publish the NRO evidence.
In case of a dispute, a stream can be queried in many different ways, e.g.,
indicating the stream name, or specifying also the key value. An exemplary
output is the following:
[
{
"publishers" : [
"1CKN5knCoPniPnsGKrFBHyAu2e4BxPFATJPBcM"
],
"key" : client_id_NRD_ws_id,
"data" : "d94553547c00025df6036278249cc19baf39e910781543759450696c
59019bda",
"confirmations" : "86",
"blocktime" : "1515755332",
"txid" : "23bc4302ddf8a8d8ced5663b6cf954fccedb75dd051343b299b
8304578120912"
}
] 
The output shows that, together with some metadata (as number of confir-
mations obtained, timestamp, and transaction id), we obtained the id of the
publisher entity, the key, and data, as needed.
7.2.4 Security Considerations and Discussion
In this Section, we analyze advantages and disadvantages obtained with this
new version of the continuous non-repudation mechanism, with regard to the
CNR solutions described in the previous Chapter.
This solution addresses the problem of continuous non-repudiation with the
aim of taking advantage of the characteristics and intrinsic properties provided
by blockchain technology.
5 In this example we applied the SHA256 hash function the the content of NRD
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Trustless Scheme
First, the involvement of a Certification Authority is avoided. Typically, its role
is to provide trusted digital certificates to certify the ownership of a public
key by an entity. In our scheme, the legitimacy of the entities is granted by the
consortium blockchain: the cryptographic keys, necessary for the encryptions
and signatures of the protocol - <K−c , K+c >, <K
−
AS, K
+
AS> and <K
−
WS, K
+
WS> -
are not managed by an external authority. Instead, the key pairs are generated
when an entity connects to the consortium blockchain for the first time. And
this is provided only to known nodes. Moreover, in the case of the client, the
assurance that the owner of <K−c , K+c > is the legitimate user, is corroborated by
multi-biometric verification.
Thus, the only third party that client and web service have to trust now is the
Authentication Server, in charge of performing the multi-biometric continuous
authentication of client users.
Biometric Signature
Then, the Block-CNR mechanism also includes the advantages of biometric
signature, introduced with BS-CNR; in fact, the couple of biometric-derived
keys <BioK+c , BioK−c > is generated also during the Initial Phase of the Block-
CNR protocol. This is because there may be a claim from a client to have the
private key lost, or even stolen. Moreover, having the CA removed, a client may
repudiate his/her K−c , and there is no trusted entity which may intervene to
disprove it. However, when K−c is used at Step 1 for the signature of M1, that
message contains multiple traits of the user; and, if they are verified by the
AS and considered authentic, the repudiation of K−c has to be followed by a
repudiation of biometric traits in M1. Thus, if we assume the global accuracy of
the multi-biometric authentication to be as described in 6.4.2, in our opinion the
probability that the system has authenticated an impostor is sufficiently low to
guarantee non-repudiability (see equation 6.1).
Availability, Decentralization and Fault Tolerance
Evidences of non-repudiation, in this mechanism, are included in blocks of
the consortium blockchain. This removes the need of storing them in specific
databases which is a single point of failure. Instead, in Block-CNR, thanks to
decentralization, every node participating in the consortium blockchain possesses
a copy of the evidences stored on the chain. This redundancy also provides fault
tolerance. Now, in case of a dispute, a judge may always obtain evidences even
if one or more copies of the evidences are not accessible for some reason (e.g.,
natural disasters) or temporarily unavailable.
The risk assessment performed in [162] and discussed in Section 7.1.3 with
regard to the non-repudiation use case, highlighted a non-negligible risk of
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network threats, e.g., DDoS or other threats that can be considered a different
version of DoS. In our system, we assume that known countermeasures (e.g.,
monitoring systems) are present. However, in the protocol, even if the blockchain
is under attack and temporary unavailable, or if one node is disconnected and
isolated from the network, there is no need to complete step 5 right at the
moment in which the entity attempts to publish the evidences of interactions. In
fact, it is enough to publish the NRO and NRD transactions when possible, and
to have them available in case of repudiation attempt. The timeout information,
and timestamp present in the certificate, respectively included in messages M3
and M2, will constitute a demonstration of the moment in which the access to
critical functions has been granted, or has happened.
Integrity
Key properties of blockchain technology, as immutability and integrity, are very
useful here: blocks containing evidences are cryptographically hashed, and evi-
dences cannot be altered or deleted without being detected. Instead, integrity in
previous versions of CNR solutions is provided thanks to TLS communications
only.
As highlighted by our risk assessment [162] and discussed in Section 7.1.3, the
risk of breaking the cryptography is currently negligible. However, it has to be
taken into account in the future. For the moment, we assume that known vul-
nerabilities are removed from the implementations of cryptographic algorithms.
Confidentiality and Privacy
Regarding privacy, the presence of biometric traits of the user in message
M2, is treated as in BS-CNR: templates are not sent to the WS in raw format,
but transformed using non-invertible functions (e.g., based on client specific
parameters, or following one of the approaches in [88]). Thus, even if M2 is
included in the NRD and stored on the chain, there is no risk that raw biometrics
of the user are stolen from the chain.
Size and Scalability
When addressing blockchains, one of the main issues which slows down its
adoption is size. In fact, when a blockchain grows in size, needs more space for
storage. This may be a problem, especially in case new nodes connect to the
ledger for the first time and need to copy the entire chain, or nodes that come
back online and have not been updated for a long period of time.
In our scenario, however, we are considering consortium blockchains, which size
is considerably lower than for other categories, e.g., public permissionless ones.
Moreover, the dimension of NRO data is negligible; the size of NRD token may
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vary depending on the transformation applied to the biometric traits it contains,
but is still limited to few bits.
Another typical issue to be taken into account is scalability. Generally, blockchains
do not scale well when the volume of transactions to process grows (e.g., more
than 15 per second). However, as already explained before, in our scenario time-
liness is not a fundamental requirement: it is sufficient to have NRD and NRO
tokens on the ledger when a dispute arises. Thus, in case the writing time grows
because of a network traffic congestion, or temporal unavailability, a node may
maintain its evidences in a buffer and postpone the publication on the stream.
Then, with the help of metadata, a judge may query the ledger and trace back the
exact position of the evidence. To conclude, we think that the expected workload
on the blockchain is sustainable considering the requirements of Block-CNR
mechanism, and the design and implementation choices made.

8
C O N C L U S I O N S
Nowadays, ICT plays an important role in our society, and security services are
getting increasingly fundamental to protect users and entities involved.
In many critical systems and applications, it is mandatory that only authorized
users are allowed to have services and functionalities at their disposal. In some
working environments, in fact, users are in charge of analyzing potentially
sensitive data, taking decisions for which they are directly responsible, and
which may have serious implications on company’s assets or even on citizen’s
safety. Their workstations should be properly protected in order to prevent
undesired consequences.
Some existing solutions based on multi-biometrics addressed the problem.
However, their evaluation is often conducted as a simulation, rarely with human
involvement, and almost never through a proper usability assessment
In this Thesis, we presented our design, implementation and experimental
evaluation of a multi-modal biometric continuous authentication system con-
ducted taking into account user needs and behaviors, and having end users in
mind in all phases of the work. Towards this end, we designed a solution which
integrates face, fingerprint and keystroke recognitions and removes the necessity
of explicit interactions to prove the user identity.
We defined a protocol that improves security based on the trust in the user, which
is continuously computed by an authentication server. The security provided
by the proposed solution can be managed through a wide set of configuration
parameters.
A significant number of experiments with human participants has been per-
formed to assess usability and security of our approach. The tests clearly stated
that our system is usable and incurs in little system overhead.
Evaluations also showed that the system is satisfyingly effective and efficient.
The number of users who completed the test without unexpected expirations
(75%) is very high if compared with the previous studies. However, it could
be further improved, e.g., replacing the three biometric subsystems and their
recognition algorithms with high accurate ones.
Participants declared to be satisfied with the solution, and 91,66% of them said
to be able to complete tasks effectively. As expected, with the change in the
parameters, we were able to obtain a highly usable configuration, or a more
secure one, without markedly decreasing usability.
As a further contribution, we publish a repository of the log files recorded by
the system during experiments, which, as far as we know, is the first public
dataset on logs of a continuous authentication service available to researchers.
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The supplementary data consists also in detailed questionnaire results regarding
user satisfaction.
We also observe that this solution has been integrated in the prototype of the
Secure! crisis management system [156], in which users have to command
intervention teams during emergencies.
Non-repudiation is another essential security service: it provides evidences
of actions, protects against denial of involvement, and helps solving disputes
between parties. Traditional non-repudiation mechanisms, as digital signature,
are widely applied to prevent denial of past behaviors such as having sent or
received messages. However, if the information flow is continuous, evidences
should be produced for the entirety of the flow and not only at specific points.
Further, non-repudiation should be guaranteed by mechanisms that do not
reduce the usability of the system or application.
To meet these challenges, in the last part of the Thesis we proposed three
solutions for continuous non-repudiation of remote services based on multi-
biometric verification of user identities. Each of them introduces a fundamental
improvement to the previous solution: they are respectively coupled with digital
signature, biometric signature, and blockchain technology. As for the continuous
authentication mechanism, we choose the CASHMA approach [19] as a starting
point. In this Thesis, it has been evaluated from a qualitative perspective by mean
of a risk assessment. The study identified the main threats for the transmission
and the biometric system levels. Most of the selected countermeasures, capable
of reducing the risk for the detected threats, have been integrated in the CNR
solutions.
The DS-CNR and BS-CNR approaches are a demonstration that, under specific
assumptions, continuous authentication mechanisms can actually be comple-
mented with non-repudiation. The proposed approaches are able to provide
continuous non-repudiation for the entire information flow between a client
and a remote Internet service. The NRO and NRD evidences generated, and the
Authentication Server involvement guarantee protection for both parties.
We also showed that some biometric algorithms found in the literature al-
ready have high verification accuracy. In our opinion, if those algorithms (or
different ones equally accurate) are properly integrated in a multi-biometric
system, with high quality sensors and anti-spoofing measures, biometric-based
continuous non-repudiation is possible. The probability of authenticating an
impostor is relatively low and constitutes a first evidence of user involvement.
This is particularly valid for traits which inherently possess high distinctiveness.
Then, coupling biometrics with other security mechanisms makes continuous
non-repudiation very effective.
In the last Chapter we investigated if and how a blockchain can contribute
to improve our continuous non-repudiation mechanism. We also presented
a requirements-driven methodology which helps in this process, and guides
the selection of the proper blockchain category. We described the assessment
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conducted to highlight risk related to this technology, especially focusing on
threats and countermeasures relevant for the non-repudiation use case. The
result of this activity is Block-CNR, a consortium blockchain-based continuous
non-repudiation mechanism. We designed the architecture and defined a proto-
col that leverages distributed ledger technology and its properties. We provide
an implementation to show that creating a blockchain and configuring it for the
storage of non-repudiation evidences is feasible and constitutes an interesting
alternative. Finally, we discuss this solution and its advantages, especially in
terms of security and dependability attributes, taking also into account the
issues that it may raise.
A concrete further development, is to apply a biometric key-binding scheme
to the certificate generation step of the CNR protocols: this would constitute a
significant improvement. Besides that, our future research direction is aimed
at further assessing the CNR approaches, possibly through quantitative model-
based evaluation and with a usability testing campaign, as happened for the
continuous authentication mechanism proposed in this Thesis.
For the future of ICT, we envision an increased involvement of biometrics
and blockchain technology in the seamless and trustless provision of security
services, including but not limited to the ones addressed in this work.
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